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This thesis will explore how British political parties over the period 2010-2017 have 
developed their mobilisation and contacting methods. Looking at social media, 
demographics, and other salient issues, I will construct a coherent and clear 
narrative of how British political parties have reacted to new technology, and what 
the advantages and disadvantages of doing so are. I shall be looking in particular at 
youth political mobilisation and contact, as this demographic has a poor election 
turnout record, so I shall explain why this is and how British political parties are 
attempting to contact and mobilise them (and how they have done so successfully). 
Looking at the 2010, 2015, and 2017 General Elections as well as the 2014 EU and 
2016 referendums, this will enable me to take a look at Britain in different political 
times and differing levels of technology, from the first TV debates in 2010 to the first 
social media election in 2017. Examining how voter contacting has changed and how 
political parties attempt to use voter contacting to drive up turnout will be key to the 
thesis, and will illuminate how the evolution in British political parties over time has 
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Introduction: Aims, objectives and results 
 
This thesis aims to establish over the 2010-2017 British electoral period how political 
parties mobilised and contacted voters to support them and increase turnout. Thus, I 
will look at turnout and mobilisation theory and their application to Britain. I will look 
at the 2010 General Election, which featured the first British TV debates; the 2014 
Scottish Independence Referendum, which indicated how significant and divisive 
referendums could be; and the 2015 General Election, which featured the first 
successful national social media campaign by a major British political party and also 
a completely unexpected result, so how the various political parties mobilised and 
engaged voters is crucial. I will then study the 2016 European Union (EU) 
Referendum to see why Remain lost, and how Leave utilised online campaigns and 
emotive issues to mobilise victory, and finally the 2017 General Election, where I will 
analyse the social media success of Corbyn’s Labour while also examining how the 
Conservatives lost their majority. I will also examine the social media campaign of 
the Conservatives and Labour to see why the Conservative campaign suffered in this 
regard, especially in comparison to Labour. I will also discuss political leadership and 
how it affects turnout. 
I will discuss how in these elections, different mobilisation methods of supporters and 
voters were used, permitting me to depict how contacting and mobilising methods 
evolved. I hypothesise that over time, political parties utilised new developments 
(such as television debates and social media) to re-engage voters and increase 
turnout. Therefore, I will focus on youth voters, who vote least, as demonstrated 
later, and I will also analyse social media’s effect on elections, both by voters and by 




mobilised and contacted supporters from 2010-2017, and allowing further analysis 
as more literature and studies are released in future years.  
I have two hypotheses: 
H1: Young voters have increased turnout since 2010.  
H2: British political parties have become more adept at using the 
Internet and social media to influence election results and voter turnout. 
These hypotheses are reasonable, and  will be reviewed at the end. With my 
selected case studies and theories, I will fulfil my research objectives. 
Methodology 
 
Quantitative data will be employed, with datasets such as the British Election Study 
(BES) and the Scottish Referendum Study (SRS). I will analyse demographics as 
well as contacting/mobilisation methods. Furthermore, I shall also be drawing upon a 
wide range of literature, from academic journals, newspapers, party political receipts 
and more, which I will detail in the literature review. During the thesis, I drew upon 
many databases and journal catalogues such as Web of Science, Google Scholar, 
JSTOR, the British Library, the Guardian archives, the University of Exeter library 
catalogue and journal database, the EPOP Journals, Rallings and Thrasher’s local 
election series, and more.   
 To clarify, the BES is a long-running survey that has been measuring every British 
election, including referendums, since 1964, and measures demographics such as 
age, turnout, social media usage, and other elements, making it invaluable for the 
thesis. It collected data on the EU Referendum as well as the 2010, 2015, and 2017 




required simple, thus being useful for studying the effect of political mobilisation by 
British political parties during 2010-2017. 
This thesis employs secondary research; I have not carried out my own data 
collection nor have I interviewed political figures. The BES data is reliable as the 
BES has been running for many decades, the data has been used previously by 
many academics and projects, and the data has been cleared ethically, ensuring its 
acceptability.  More advanced quantitative analysis could hypothetically have been 
used, and if this thesis examined more about the relationship between money spent 
versus level of turnout, for example, or other detailed methods such as a mixed 
multi-level regression analysis, I would be doing that. However, analysing voter 
turnout and party mobilisation over 2010-7 in this case can be done with relatively 
basic quantitative analysis, ensuring that the thesis is accessible as well as being 
sophisticated enough for academic readers.  
Another benefit of using secondary-data such as the BES is its online accessibility 
making use of the data easier than otherwise would be. The scope of the data is 
large, allowing me to customise and analyse as appropriate. One disadvantage of 
using the BES however is the relative lack of information on such issues as social 
media and the level of demobilisation. Thus, I have researched other works on these 
issues, marrying them with the BES data analysis. This made the analysis more 
effective, as many different sources were utilised. 
Johnston recognised secondary data analysis as ‘flexible…utilized in several ways… 
a viable method to utilise in the process of enquiry’.1  Using secondary data will save 
                                                           
1 Johnston, Melissa (2014) Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time Has Come 
Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries (QQML) 3: pp.619-626. [Online] Located at: 
www.qqml.net/papers/September_2014_issue/336QQML_Journal_2014_Johnston_Sept_619-626.pdf 




time, as Ghauri discussed2. Using the BES also allows me to analyse over 2010-7 
the elements of party mobilisation and efforts to increase turnout with trustworthy 
data. I have also used The Nuffield Election study (The British General Election) 
series, having run since the 1945 general election. In particular, I used Cowley and 
Kavanagh’s 20103, 20154, and 20175 General Election works. The series covers 
British elections in detail, including campaigns, leaders, manifestos, party 
mobilisation strategies, new technologies, and post-election. Thus, the Nuffield 
Election series is an excellent resource, and although extra research must be carried 
out to flesh out under-developed issues in the series (for example, detail concerning 
the TV debates in the 2010 election was low in the 2010 study, neither was the use 
of social media in 2015 and 2017, and Labour’s 2017 development and usage of 
apps) they make an excellent research base, even if more works are necessary for 
the thesis. I would also like to highlight the Britain Votes series, in particular the 
20156 and 20177 editions. These are collections of articles concerning the various 
elections, examining each party’s campaign while also looking at issues such as the 
election itself, the salient issues, and post-election. They are useful, especially 
considering the large spread of issues that the books cover, and thus are good 
works for the thesis and background knowledge. 
                                                           
2 Ghauri, P. N (2005) Research methods in Business Studies: A Practical Guide. Pearson Education, 
London. 
3 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2010) The British General Election of 2010. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London 
4 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2015) The British General Election of 2015. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
5 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2018) The British General Election of 2017. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
6 Geddes, Andrew and Tonge, Jonathan (eds) (2015) Britain Votes 2015. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
7 Tonge, Jonathan, Leston-Bandeira, Cristina, and Wilks-Heeg, Stuart (2018) Britain Votes 2017. 




I have used BES data (as well as the 2014 SRS) as my main quantitative source, 
excluding data derived from various journals and the like I have used. I did not use 
other resources such as The British Household Survey8 and The Next Steps dataset9 
as the BES has all the necessary thesis information, including turnout variables, data 
on different methods of voter contact by political parties, data on age and media 
usage, and other useful information. I could have used the other resources as stated 
above, but that would have added another layer of unnecessary complexity to the 
thesis. 
Initially, the thesis ran from 2010 to 2015, before it expanded to include the 2016 EU 
Referendum and the 2017 General Election due to their unexpected resolutions. I 
chose the 2010-7 period because the crossover from New Labour to the coalition, 
the Conservative majority and the post-referendum period is fascinating. The growth 
of the Internet, of contested electoral decisions and of sharply-delineated parties 
created natural research questions regarding how political parties mobilised and 
contacted supporters over this period. I chose not to carry out qualitative surveys for 
this thesis, I do not think a small qualitative research dataset would have assisted 
me in informing how political parties mobilised their supporters over a large period of 
time, but if I focussed on one particular constituency or similar analysis, I would have 
proceeded along that route. However, arguably, a personally-designed survey would 
have enabled more personal control over the thesis results, but again this would 
have changed the design of the thesis. Despite this, I have used articles which utilise 
                                                           
8 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2018) British Household Panel 
Survey: Waves 1-18, 1991-2009. [Data Collection] 8th Edition. UK Data Service. SN:5151. [Online] 
Located at: http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN5151-2 and accessed 2nd May 2019. 
9 University College London, UCL, Institute of Education, Centre for Longitudinal Studies (2018) Next 
Steps: Sweeps 1-8, 2004- 2016. [Data Collection] 14th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 5545. [Online] 




qualitative data, as their findings are invaluable. I shall consider qualitative analysis 
for future work, but relying on secondary quantitative, literature and qualitative 
analysis will suffice for this thesis. 
Contribution Made 
 
With the thesis not being a PhD, an original contribution is not the aim. However, it 
will contribute a solid review of how British politics has evolved in the advent of social 
media, and how political parties have responded. Whether the youth are more 
engaged in the era of Corbyn and the Internet will also be resolved to a degree, and 
will present a future academic source. The thesis will be sufficiently large to carry out 
a perspective of party mobilisation, yet narrow enough to see how social media and 
the young can be effectively utilised by political parties for support. 
Literature Review 
 
As stated, I am drawing upon a wide range of literature. I will consult data and 
sources relating to academic theory concerning social media, turnout, party 
mobilisation and contacting as well as case studies. I will not provide an exhaustive 
list of all the literature concerning the thesis, but I will provide a solid review of some 
of the literature. I will separate it into different parts, looking at turnout literature and 
literature concerned with electoral mobilisation and electoral psychology, both of 
which will be important. I will also look at voter-contact literature, as party contacting 
is one of the main elements of the thesis, and a critical literature analysis as well. 
Furthermore, I will also look at social media literature and how social media has 
affected British politics and parties, because exploring how political parties have 




Finally, I will also look at the 2010, 2015, and 2017 General Election literature, with 
caveats for some of the literature as simply not that much time has passed since the 
2015 and 2017 elections. In addition, I will look at the 2014 and 2016 referendum 
literature, as analysing these referendums will enable me to see how referendum 
campaigns mobilised and contacted various supporters. This in turn will enable a 
stronger image of how mobilisation and contacting works in the UK in the advent of 
social media campaigns and issue salience increasing turnout.  
(Youth) Turnout literature 
 
I have identified key literature which discuss turnout theory such as Bowler and 
Donovan’s Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about Citizen Influence on 
Government10, which discusses how democratic participation can be altered and 
political motivation can be lessened by political events. It dates 2002 and is United 
States-focussed, but its relevancy in discussing direct democracy’s impact on turnout 
is undeniable, essential when considering the European Union (EU) and Scottish 
referendums. Building upon this knowledge will be crucial for the thesis, so although 
I may not draw upon it directly, it will be essential in building up background 
knowledge. 
Rosenqvist’s Rising to the Occasion? Youth Political Knowledge and the voting age11 
discusses the wisdom of lowering the voting age below 18. I will discuss 16 year-olds 
voting in the Scottish referendum chapter as it was permitted during the referendum. 
Although Rosenqvist is discussing Sweden and how 16 year-olds’ lack of political 
                                                           
10 Bowler, Shaun and Donovan (Todd (2002) Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about Citizen 
Influence on Government. British Journal of Political Science, Vol 32, No.2 (Apr 2002). Pp.371-390. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
11 Rosenqvist, Olof (2017) Rising to the Occasion? Youth Political Knowledge and the voting age. 




knowledge suggests granting votes to under 18s would be negative, the application 
of this to British politics is valid. Additionally, Henn and Foard’s Young people, 
political participation and trust in Britain12 discusses how British young voters in are 
demobilised and sceptical of formal politics. Although the research stems from 2002, 
it is useful as it informs how youth political disengagement has evolved, and a critical 
view of political mobilisation in the post-2010 era amongst the youth will occur 
throughout the thesis. Thus, Ladner and Milner’s 1999 Swiss election analysis13 and 
its demonstration of higher turnout in proportional systems, is essential for studying 
how turnout differs across nationalities and systems, although Freitag’s 1994 
argument that majoritarian systems may have higher turnout must be acknowledged 
as well14. Indeed, Blais and Carty counter this by arguing that PR systems have a 
higher historical turnout than majoritarian ones15. However, Saunders believes that 
boosting low turnout is anti-democratic16. Additionally, Sloam and Henn’s youth 
turnout work, Youthquake 201717, explores youth turnout and mobilisation pre and 
during the 2017 General Election, is good for general analysis and overview of the 
literature, although further sources were also used.  
                                                           
12 Henn, Matt and Foard, Nick (2011) Young People, political participation and trust in Britain [Online] 
Located at: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/research/microsites/epop and accessed 
6th August 2018. 
13 Ladner, Andreas and Milner, Henry (1999) Do voters turn out more under proportional than 
majoritarian systems? The evidence from Swiss communal elections. Electoral Studies 18, p.235. 
[Online] Located at: 
http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/aufsaetze/Electoral_Studies_1999_al_hm.pdf and accessed 
13th July 2017. 
14 Freitag, M (1994) Wahlbeteiligung in Westlichen Demokratien. Eine Studie zur Erkla rung non 
Nivenaaunterschieden. Magisterarbeit an der Ruprecht-Karls-Universtat Heidelberg. P.27 
15 Blais, Andre and Carty, RK (1990) Does Proportional representation foster voter turnout? European 
Journal of Political Research 18: P.167 .Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands. 
16 Saunders, Ben (2012) The Democratic Turnout ‘Problem’. Political Studies Volume 60, Number 2, 
June 2012 pp. 306-321 
17 Sloam, James and Henn, Matt (2019) Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in 




There are many different interpretations of turnout theory and how the youth turnout, 
and I will explore them to construct a foundation for discussing turnout, voter contact 
and mobilisation. Although many works analysed here are from prior to the period 
studied or concerning another country, the concepts introduced and the analysis 
they will inspire justify their inclusion. 
Social Media, contacting and mobilisation  
 
Hansen et al’s 2011 article Good Friends, Bad News – Affect and Virality in Twitter18 
discusses viral Twitter subjects, with ‘bad’ public news retweeted most, as well as 
friendly chatter between accounts. Thus, ensuring a positive outlook yet sharing 
negative news about opponents is the most effective Twitter strategy. Care must be 
taken as the article is dated a year after the 2010 case study and before the other 
case studies, but how the article discusses Twitter and the spread of content over it 
is invaluable, and will be employed during the thesis. Furthermore, Berger and 
Milkman’s 2010 Social Transmission, Emotion and the Virality of Online Content19 
argues positive and anger-inducing content goes viral more than sad news, which 
fits in analysis of social media mobilisation for elections and referendums . 
Furthermore, Dommett and Temple’s Digital Campaigning: The rise of Facebook and 
Satellite Campaigns from 201820 identifies the rise of social media campaigns 
                                                           
18 Hansen, Lars Kai, Arivdsson, Adam, Nielsen, Finn Arup, Colleoni, Elanor and Etter, Michael (2011) 
Good Friends, Bad News Affect and Virality in Twitter. January 4, Technical University of Denmark 
[Online] Located at: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1101.05.10v1.pdf and accessed 1st June 2018. 
19 Berger, Jonah and Milkman, Katherine (2010) Social Transmission, Emotion and the Virality of 
Online Content. [Online] Located at: http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~kmilkman/Virality.pdf and 
accessed 6th June 2018. 
20 Dommett, Katherine and Temple, Luke (2018) Digital Campaigning: The Rise of Facebook and 
Satellite Campaigns Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 March 2018, Pp.189-202. [Online] 
Located at: https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx056 and accessed 3rd May 2018. Also located in: Dommett, 
Katharine and Temple, Luke (2018) Digital Campaigning: The Rise of Facebook and Satellite 
Campaigns. Britain Votes 2017.pp.189-202 (eds) Jonathan Tonge, Cristina Leston-Bandeira and 




through British politics and how satellite campaigns were used in 2017 by Labour to 
contact and mobilise voters. This work shall assist in filling the literature gap of how 
political parties manipulated social media and the Internet over time. Furthermore, 
Aldrich et al’s work on how digital tools change the nature, extent and impact of 
electoral party contacting21 is vital, as it discusses how younger citizens are 
contacted and mobilised through online political contact, and although the paper was 
written in 2015 before the EU Referendum and 2017 election, it is crucial in 
analysing youth political mobilisation. I will also discuss works such as Whiteley and 
Seyd’s22 1994 work. It is still worth studying to see how British political mobilisation 
occurred in the 1990s, providing a good foundation to study mobilisation 
developments. Linking it up with the current day is Sloam’s23work on EU referendum 
youth mobilisation, which discusses how social media was used to mobilise the 
young for the Referendum. Additionally, works such as Political Communication in 
Britain: Campaigning, Media and Polling in the 2017 General Election, a collection 
edited by Wring, Mortimore and Atkinson24, is vital for the 2017 election analysis, as 
well as its general overview of British political communication. 
One concern is that in analysing social media is not to portray it as the ultimate 
panacea for political mobilisation and engagement. Avoiding ‘technological 
determinism’ or assuming that technology drives forward and motivates the 
                                                           
21 Alrich, John J, Gibson, R, Bison, K, Cantijosh, Marta and Konitzer, Toibas (2016) Getting out the 
vote in the social media era: Are Digital tools changing the extent, nature and impact of party 
contacting in elections? Party Politics 2016, Vol.22 (2), p.174. 
22 Whitley, and Seyd (1994) Local Party Campaigning and Electoral Mobilisation in Britain. The 
Journal of Politics. Vol. 56, No.1 (Feb, 1994) pp.242-252. [Online] Located at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2132356 and accessed 2nd March 2018. 
23 Sloam, James (2018) #Votebecause: Youth Mobilisation for the referendum on British membership 
of the European Union New Media and Society 1- 18. [Online] Located at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/146444818766701 and accessed 1st July 2018. 
24 Wring, Dominic, Mortimore, Roger, and Atkinson, Simon (2019) Political Communication in Britain: 




development of society is important, as although social media has undoubtedly 
affected British politics, it has not totally driven all avenues of political life and 
society. Thus, discussing Lawrence’s Electing our Masters25 will be important for 
this. Although it was written in 2009 and thus ends before the case studies, the 
findings it has regarding public gatherings and public engagement in British politics 
are relevant, especially relating it to social media and TV debates. Indeed, Lawrence 
discusses how political interaction evolved over the 20th century26: ‘Whereas… once 
politicians… helped sustain a public culture of face-to-face political interaction, it is 
now principally broadcasters who fulfil that role.’ Thus, the TV debates further 
demonstrated this public culture, and the introduction of them was beneficial to voter 
mobilisation. Furthermore, developments in technology like social media and the 
Internet echoed the development of the radio and TV being used for political means, 
with Lawrence again stating this, although making warnings that sound similar to 
current warnings about political social media and the Internet27: 
‘Many of the technological developments of the post-war period had 
the potential to enhance rather than diminish demagogic politics… this 
is not to deny that the new mass media were beginning to transform 
the way that ordinary people interacted with politics and politicians…’  
 
Although the transformative element of TV, the radio, and then the Internet was 
there, the extent to which social media and technology can effectively mobilise and 
engage all citizens must be questioned. Although it is certainly useful, not all efforts 
must be placed in social media, because as Keating and Melis claimed in 2017, 
social media is not the ultimate solution28:  
                                                           
25 Lawrence, Jon (2009) Electing our Masters: The Hustings in British Politics from Hogarth to Blair. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
26 Ibid, p.13. 
27 Ibid, p.97 
28 Keating, Avril and Melis, Gabriella (2017) Social Media and Youth Political Engagement: Preaching 
to the Converted or providing a new voice for youth? The British Journal of Politics and International 





The principal driver of online political engagement of young Britons… is 
political interest (even after controlling for socio-demographic 
characteristics)…we conclude that social media may be providing a 
new outlet for some young adults: it is not re-engaging the young 
adults who have already lost interest in politics.  
 
Thus, although social media is useful, it cannot mobilise all, instead just mobilising 
and engaging those already political, leaving the unengaged as they were. As such, 
placing such faith in social media must not occur, with instead other avenues of 
mobilisation and political engagement taking place. It is beyond the skills of one 
political party in one election to do this, and remobilising and engaging the apathetic 
30% of voters will have to occur over a longer period of time. However, this source 
will be reviewed at the end, especially in the contest of the rest of the thesis, and 
Lawrence will also be revisited throughout the thesis, especially in regards to how 
technology has evolved throughout campaigns, and in particular referendums. 
Scottish and EU Referendum literature 
 
Why did Scotland stay, and why did Britain vote leave? Antonuzzi et al’s work on 
who voted for Brexit29 is vital, as it discusses the demographics and motivation 
behind the Leave vote, which becomes important when analysing voter contacting 
and mobilisation during the referendum. This  is useful as a foundation before going 
into further analysis with other works. This ties into the issues concerning the 
Referendum: the young, who vote less than older voters30, voted in far bigger 
                                                           
29 Antonucci, Lorenza, Horvath, Laszlo and Krouwel, Andre (2017) Brexit was not the voice of the 
working class nor of the uneducated – it was of the squeezed middle. LSE Politics and Policy. 
October 2017. [Online] Located at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-and-the-squeezed-
middle and accessed 2nd February 2018. 
30 2015 British Election Study Internet Panel Waves 8 and 9, found in Curtice, John (2017) Why 
Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum. The JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2016. 
Volume 55, Issue S1, September 2017. Pp19-37. [Online] Located at: 




numbers to Remain. The EU campaign was dominated by the issues of the NHS, the 
economy and immigration, with Curtice31 identifying why Leave won along these 
lines. Sources such as these will be crucial in exploring mobilisation. Regarding the 
Scottish Referendum, I will also discuss the SRS as well as the BES. Unfortunately 
the SRS is not yet publicly available, but research has taken place regarding it which 
is publicly accessible such as Henderson and Mitchell’s work32. This discusses why 
the Better Together campaign succeeded, which will assist in exploring voter contact 
and mobilisation. I will also utilise the BES, in particular Waves 733, 834 and 935 of the 
BES Internet Panel, as these took place before, during and after the EU referendum, 
allowing valuable insight into the referendum and precisely how voters were 
mobilised and contacted.  Furthermore, I will analyse Waves 236 and 337 as these 
contain the pre and during Scottish referendum data, which I shall use in the 
absence of the SRS data..  
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Seminar Series, 27 March 2015. [Online] Located at: 
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33 Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk, J. Mellon and C. Prosser (2015) 
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March 2018. 
37 Fieldhouse, E., J. Green., G. Evans., H. Schmitt, C. van der Eijk and J. Mellon (2014) British 





Going into further analysis, Fieldhouse and Prosser’s 201638 work on how the 
Scottish independence referendum negatively impacted Labour demonstrates how 
the realignment of attitudes post-referendum almost annihilated Scottish Labour. 
This shows how voters’ priorities can radically change, making mobilisation and voter 
contacting by political parties difficult. As such, I will also study works such as 
Goodwin and Pickup’s 2018 study of campaign effects on public attitudes towards 
the EU39 and how this affected voters.  
2010, 2015 and 2017 General Election literature  
 
The main debates concerning these elections are: what was the impact of the TV 
debates, how did the Conservatives win a majority, and how did Corbyn and Labour 
almost defeat the Conservatives? Answering them, I shall look at the 201040, 201541 
and 201742 BES data, as this will enable quantitative analysis of them, and to see 
how the campaigning strategies used contributed to the results. Furthermore, I will 
also identify key parts of the literature. For example, Blumler’s TV debates work work 
will be analysed: Blumler has been writing on election debates for fifty years, so he 
will be very useful43. For the 2015 Conservative success, one source I will examine 
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is Foos’ research on candidate contact and party support44, which details how the 
Conservatives and other parties contacted and mobilised voters.  As stated, the 
material available on 2017 is more limited than others simply due to the short 
amount of time since the election. However, I have read widely, and have found 
excellent pieces of scholarship. For example, Curtice and Simpson45 used statistical 
and demographic data to work out why turnout increased in 2017, and why this did 
not help Labour electorally:  although more of the already-voting youth voted Labour, 
there was no ‘youthquake’.The BES analysis of the ‘youthquake’46, a phrase used to 
describe a supposedly large turnout increase amongst previously disengaged youth, 
details how this did not occur, which will assist the 2017 chapter. As stated, I will also 
be looking at the Nuffield Election Study series of British Elections, studying 201047 
201548, and 2017. These works are well-written, have a wealth of evidence and 
cover a wide range of topics, making them ideal for analysis. Furthermore, I will 
analyse the Hansard Audits of Political Engagement49, which feature statistics, 
demographics, election news and other essential information that will assist in the 
thesis and how political parties mobilised and contacted their supporters. There are 
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45 Curtice, John and Simpson, Ian (2018) Why Turnout Increased in the 2017 General Election and 
the Increase Did Not Help Labour NatCen March 2018. [Online] Located at: 
http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39222/why-turnout-increased-in-the-2017-general-election.pdf 
and accessed 3rd March 2018. 
46 BES Team (2018) The myth of the 2017 ‘youthquake’ BBC 29 January. [Online] Located at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-42747342 and accessed 5th August 2018. 
47 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2010) The British General Election of 2010. Palgrave 
MacMillan, London. 
48 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2015) The British General Election of 2015. Palgrave 
MacMillan, London. 







other works concerning the elections, but these will become apparent throughout the 
thesis. 
Therefore, I have collected a wide-ranging portfolio of literature, and will create a 
strong thesis that seeks to explore how British political parties mobilise and contact 
voters to increase turnout. I shall begin by analysing turnout and turnout theory. 





Chapter I: A study of turnout in British Politics: Theory, practice, and thoughts 
 
In legitimate elections, political parties and candidates try to win support and votes 
through promoting policies and candidates, while highlighting the supposed 
hypocrisies of the opposing parties. Thus, one crucial aspect is increasing voter 
turnout. Voter turnout is self-evidently defined as voters literally turning out to vote. 
Thus, political parties have an interest to increase voter turnout to increase election 
legitimacy. This could be seen as simplifying turnout and how to measure it 50: 
Did one take the ratio of the number of voters to the entire population, 
to the population of voting age, to the eligible population or to the 
number of  [registered voters]? 
 
Therefore, looking at exactly how turnout is measured is vital. Also, exactly how 
elections vary is important, and the variables that affect election conduct and turnout. 
This chapter shall be primarily concerned with discussing turnout, and how it varies 
across different British elections with discussion of voter mobilisation in later 
chapters.  
Exploring turnout variation across first and second order elections51 will now occur. 
By studying this and turnout variation, a clear exploration of voter mobilisation in 
different elections and variation of political engagement will be evident. Studying the 
British electoral registration system and its effect on youth registration and turnout 
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will also occur. Defining first and second-order elections is essential, as this informs 
how people are motivated in different types of elections. Using all of the case studies 
and analysing all the information, the foundations for analysing voter mobilisation  
and youth turnout during different elections will be laid. How political leadership and 
personalisation of voters shapes voter turnout will also be discussed, with the case 
studies of Nick Clegg in the 2010 election and Theresa May’s refusal to debate in the 
2017 election debates (and her general campaigning style) as compared to Corbyn’s 
positive perception will be studied. However, I will not focus on it too much 
throughout the thesis, as otherwise it will become too expansive.  
What are primary and secondary order elections? 
 
It is commonly agreed, not least by Reiff and Schmitt, that all British elections bar 
Parliamentary elections are second-order52: 
The “first-order” elections in parliamentary systems are the 
national parliamentary elections.... In addition to these, however, 
there …are… “second-order” elections: by-elections, municipal 
elections,…regional elections, those to a “second-chamber” and 
the like… many voters cast their votes in these elections not only 
as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the 
second-order arena, but also on the basis of factors in the 
…national political arena.... 
 
Most British elections bar General elections are second-order, possibly excluding the 
devolved assembly elections. It could be assumed that referendums are second-
order mostly, but whether the 2016 EU Referendum can be defined as first-order is 
interesting, as it was a national referendum of national import, and as Denver’s 
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definition of a first-order election shows53, it fulfils the criteria. This thesis shall treat 
the 2016 referendum as first-order, as its impact was similar to a General Election. I 
will not discuss referendums like the AV or Northwest Assembly referendums.  
First-order elections are simple to differentiate from second-order, with Denver 
stating:  
In first-order elections, there is saturation media coverage, the 
parties mount intense national and local campaigns, and the 
electorate usually think it’s important who wins… electors are 
keener… to vote in them.54 
 
First-order elections have higher turnout, and they differ in voter mobilisation and 
supporter strategy. General elections have the highest turnout, with the 2017 
election at 69%55, while UK European election turnout has never exceeded 38%56. 
By-election turnout since 1997 rarely breaches 50%5758; turnout for London 
Mayoral/Assembly elections has not gone above 45%59; the Scottish Parliament 
election turnout average is 53.06%60 61; the average Welsh Assembly turnout is 
                                                           
53 Denver, David (2007) Elections and Voters in Britain. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke. P. 26 
54 Ibid. 
55 UK Political Info (nd) Turnout from 1945 to 2017 [Online] Located at: 
http://www.ukpolitical.info/Turnout45.htm and accessed 6th August 2018. 
56 European Parliament (2014) Results of the 2014 European Elections: United Kingdom. Nd. [Online] 
Located at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-uk-2014.html and 
accessed 9th April 2016. 
57 UK Political Info (nd) By-election turnout since 1997 nd. [Online] Located at: 
http://www.ukpolitical.info/by-election-turnout.htm and accessed 10th April 2016. 
58 House of Commons Library (2012) UK Election Statistics 1918-2012. Research Paper 12/42. 7 
August. 
59 Rogers, Simon and Burn-Murdoch, John (2012) The Guardian UK Election historic turnouts since 
1918. 16 November. [Online] Located at: http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/nov/16/uk-
election-turnouts-historic and accessed 8th April 2016. 
60 Scottish Parliament (2011) Turnout by Region Scottish Parliamentary Elections 1999-2011 n.d. 
[Online] Located online at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Electionresults/2011%20election/5_Turnout_Region.pdf and 
accessed 8th April 2016. 
61 Aiton, Andrew, Burnside, Ross, Campbell, Allan, Edwards, Tom, Liddell, Gregg, McIver, Iain, and 
McQuillenn, Alanis (2016) SPICe Briefing Election 2016. 11 May. [Online] Located online at: 
http://www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-34_Election_2016.pdf and 
accessed 28th March 2017. 




42%62; and Northern Ireland assembly turnout since 1998 averages 61.75%63 64. 
Thus, British first-order elections have higher turnouts. It must be determined why 
they have higher turnout than second-order elections and whether the voting system 
affects turnout.  
First-Order Election Turnout and electoral formulas 
 
As Denver discussed, first-order elections are seen as more important due to 
increased media coverage and thus higher turnout. British first-order elections and 
local elections use the first-past-the-post system (FPTP)65, which states that all a 
candidate must do to win is get more votes, with no vote-redistribution, unlike the AV 
or the Single Transferable Vote (STV) systems. This contrasts to many British 
second-order elections, which use different voting systems, such as STV being used 
in the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Additional Member System (AMS) being 
used for the Scottish Parliament and others. The Closed Party List is also used for 
EU Parliamentary elections, which proportionally distributes seats according to vote. 
Turnout for the 2017 general election was 69%, and second-order elections rarely 
breach 55%. Thus, analysing the literature on the political science of voting systems, 
proportionality et al would benefit in seeing how voting systems affect turnout. 
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Initially, turnout is expected to be higher in PR systems than majoritarian; Ladner 
and Milner address this in their examination of the proportional Swiss system, stating 
that proportional representation results in higher turnout66, and that majoritarian 
systems result in a large disproportion between votes cast and seats won, resulting 
in disengaged voters67, especially those from smaller parties, and therefore as 
Jackman argues, lower turnout68. However, proportional systems having higher 
turnout is not gospel; for example, Switzerland’s 1995 general election turnout was 
42.2%69, far less than the UK General Election 1997 70%70 turnout. However, Swiss 
PR system regions have higher turnout than majoritarian regions, and smaller areas 
tend to be majoritarian rather than PR71. Reviewing the argument that majoritarian 
systems result in higher turnout and are preferred by voters, it is worth reviewing 
Ladner and Milner, who comment on Freitag’s arguments on why majoritarian 
systems can have higher turnout why voters may prefer majoritarian systems72: 
…majority voting [mechanisms] are [simpler] and…stimulate 
participation; and second, [majoritarian elections] may… matter 
more to citizens as they can be expected to lead to clear majorities 
in government rather than to an unpredictable process of coalition 
formation within a highly fragmented party system. 
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As majoritarian systems are simpler, more people vote, and people prefer a decisive 
majoritarian government to coalitions. However, Lijphart stated that the boost to 
turnout in proportional systems compared to majoritarian systems is 9-12%73, so 
arguably proportional turnout will be higher than majoritarian systems. 
Proportional systems tend to have higher turnout than majoritarian systems such as 
FPTP and AV; according to Blais and Carty, PR systems have higher turnout 
globally74. Although the study dates from 1990, the average PR turnout from 1847 
until 1990 was 82.1%, while majoritarian systems over this period had a 73.6% 
turnout75, demonstrating higher PR turnout. This is evident in Britain’s first-order 
election turnouts being lower than other nations’ turnouts since 1997. Also, nations 
with compulsory voting have higher turnouts than those which without, with average 
turnout increasing by 11.8% in compulsory turnout nations compared to those 
without76, corresponding with Lijphart earlier, and with the UK lacking compulsory 
turnout, lower UK turnout is explanatory. Brockington argues compulsory voting is 
one of the strongest indicators of increased turnout77. Blais and Carty also argue that 
proportional representation boosts turnout78: 
 …Within PR systems, disproportionality did not seem to 
matter. This suggests that it is the ‘symbolic effects’ of electoral 
systems rather than either their consequences for seat-vote 
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relationships or the number of parties, that matter to potential 
voters. PR does foster higher turnout. 
The symbolic effect of PR systems results in higher turnout, as voters feel that they 
will not have ‘wasted votes’, as seen with Jackman’s analysis earlier. However, in 
cases such as New Zealand, which changed to MMP from SMDP in 199679 turnout 
actually fell in subsequent elections, as Vowles found80. However, that seems to be 
down to specific circumstances such as boundary changes and voter unfamiliarity, 
so conclusions must not be jumped to.  Assumedly, UK elections that used 
proportional electoral systems would have higher turnout, which will be explored 
further. 
Why is turnout lower in British second-order elections? 
 
Denver earlier stated elections which are deemed as more ‘important’ have higher 
turnout and political interest, explaining why turnout is higher in British first-order 
elections than secondary. If a voter feels consequential, they will vote and politically 
engage. Returning to the previous Switzerland case, Swiss local elections turnout is 
lower than similar elections elsewhere as Swiss local elections are viewed more as 
second-order elections81. Interestingly, Ladner and Milner suggest local elections 
elsewhere do not have significantly lower turnout for local elections/second-order 
elections than general elections, which is not necessarily true in the UK case. 
Indeed, British local election and second-order turnouts are often lower than first-
order elections, with only concurrent elections increasing local election turnout. As 
Larcinese suggested, knowledge of political affairs has a sizeable positive influence 
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on voting probability with mass media playing an important role in influencing political 
participation82. Furthermore, voters are more likely to vote if they know they are 
registered83, and that someone with maximum political knowledge is almost one third 
more likely to vote than someone with minimum political knowledge, controlling for 
other variables84. Previous voters are 17% more likely to vote,85 showing that 
previous political knowledge and voting history increases turnout and voting 
likelihood .  
Combined with low local election turnout, this explains why low participation in 
second-order elections will remain relatively constant, as voters who have not voted 
in them before will be less likely to vote. However, Denny and Doyle argue ‘the 
[British[ relationship between education and…turnout… is weak. While education 
plays a small role in determining turnout… cognitive ability and personality play a far 
greater role.’86 Thus, in Britain, political knowledge plays a smaller role in turnout, 
with cognitive ability and personality being more influential. This explains high 
turnout in British first-order elections: people are often politically aware in these, 
boosted by the SMDP system in first-order elections, supported by Denver’s 
statement earlier that first-order elections are typified by media saturation, intense 
political national campaigns a greater sense of importance. According to Karp et al, 
overall party contact levels are greater in candidate-based systems than in 
proportional systems, so political information levels are naturally higher in first-order 
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elections87, and as second-order elections are naturally less intensive, this explains 
partly their lower turnout.  
To discuss further first-order elections higher turnout, Stewart and Clarke discuss 
party leader images and how they influence party choice88, and thus when party 
leader visibility is naturally higher in first-order elections, turnout increases due to 
people disliking or liking various party leaders. Combined with Karp et al’s89 theory 
earlier that party-contact is greater in candidate-based systems, this dovetails with 
an increased party-leader perception and an increased first-order turnout. 
Consider English local election turnout since 199790:
 
Figure 1: Turnout in Local Elections in England from 1997-2016. Data located in 
various Local Elections Handbooks and Electoral Commission data. 
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 Turnout for these is significantly lower than first-order turnout, although turnout 
increases whenever they are concurrent with first-order elections, and lower than 
many other British second-order elections. Thus, if voters are already voting, they 
will also vote in the local election, as obstacles are almost non-existent. Filer and 
Kenny support this as well as Carter, who argue that the cost of visiting a voting 
location is fixed, and unrelated to the number of elections that is voted on there9192. 
The voting cost of same-day elections is ‘spread’, reducing cost and theoretically 
increasing turnout,93 explaining  concurrent local election turnout is higher. The data 
shows English local election turnout averages 31%, only increasing in general 
elections. Therefore, it will be worth analysing how voters perceive local government 
and why local election turnout is lower.  
 Trust in local government is low as only 43% trusted councillors and local 
government in 200894, improving to 48% by 201695 according to the European 
Commission, so therefore people are less motivated to vote. Furthermore, candidate 
recognition is lower due to the more local campaign nature, further reducing voter 
motivation. Kelley and Mirer indicate that past votes affect voter decisions:96 
The voter canvasses his likes and dislikes of the leading 
candidates and major parties… Weighing each like and dislike 
equally, he votes for the candidate toward whom he had the 
greatest …favourable attitudes.... If no candidate has such an 
advantage, the voter votes consistently with his party affiliation, if 
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he has one. If his attitudes do not incline him towards one 
candidate… and if he does not identify with one of the major 
parties, the voter reaches a null decision.  
 
This can be directly linked to lower second-order turnout, as local elections have 
lower elections, and political knowledge is less for local election candidates and 
parties, decreasing turnout. This is clear with the Police Crime and Commissioners’ 
elections, with a low 15% turnout in 201297, increasing to 27% in 2016, clearly 
indicating how British voters were not engaged by the PCC elections, as Kirkland 
explores98. Moving on to the London mayoral and Assembly elections, although 
turnout increased for the 2008 mayoral election to 45.3%99, turnout has not gone 
above this, with previous elections hovering around 35% 100, with 2016 just pushing 
45.6%101. Voters are not turning out for the devolved London government. As 
London mayorals are conducted via Supplementary Vote, and Assembly elections 
are conducted under AMS, the suggestion all British non-FPTP elections will have 
higher turnout is incorrect. This touches upon Downs’ rationality theory which stated 
that it would be ‘rational’ to abstain from voting in larger turnout elections, as a single 
abstention will most likely not affect the result102. Riker and Ordeshook also 
comment on rational voters, arguing that as an election becomes closer and a vote 
becomes more decisive, the perceived benefit of voting becomes greater. Therefore, 
a voter is more likely to vote in a close election rather than in an election with a clear 
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favourite103. With these different interpretations of rational voter theory, the disparity 
in different election turnouts under different electoral systems can be demonstrated. 
The link between rational voter hypothesis and non-FPTP systems resulting in higher 
turnout in British elections may not be immediately evident, but as these elections 
are conducted under alternative systems or are not seen as relevant (or both), 
arguably voters as rational actors either think that due to the proportional system, 
their vote is unnecessary as the system is seen as ‘fairer’, or that the election doesn’t 
matter, so they abstain. This matter of consequential elections is supported when 
analysing the two most recent UK referendums in 2014 and 2016. These had a 
turnout of 84%104 and 72%105 respectively, beating turnout for all elections since 
1997 and also demonstrates turnout rising in elections perceived as consequential. 
Blais and Achen develop this further106, arguing that citizens vote out of duty or 
strong electoral preferences, and abstaining when these are both absent. This is 
corroborated by Goldstein and Ridout’s work on United States presidential 
elections107, which is relevant as the US has a similar FPTP system. They state that 
the more competitive an election, the higher the turnout, and the more likely political 
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parties will attempt voter mobilisation108. However, scholarship is not settled with 
this, with Matsuska arguing109:  
‘…not a systematic relationship between closeness and 
turnout…voters are not sensitive to the probability their votes are 
decisive, and…other parties which found higher turnout for close 
elections probably detected an increased mobilisation of party elites...’ 
This study both dates from the early 90s and only considers Californian referendum 
turnout, but it argues that perceived closeness of votes does not affect turnout, and 
when it does, it is due to the influence and mobilisation of party elites, and the 
electoral system. This can be extrapolated over to the UK referendums; party elites 
dominated both the EU and Scottish independence referendums, with both sides 
employing anti-elitism rhetoric and appealing to those ‘left behind’ (i.e. socially and 
economically disadvantaged). This was pursued particularly by the Leave campaign 
in the EU referendum, which resulted in those explicitly feeling ’left behind’ more 
likely to vote Leave, as BES data shows110.  
 The Scottish independence r and the EU referendums were highly salient, highly 
increasing turnout. They were not elections, so the extent voters felt the referendums 
mattered and were mobilised were significant. This gives credence to previously 
stating that the referendums should be treated as first-order elections. To conclude, 
British voter turnout is highest in General Elections and referendums that dominate 
the discourse, and also how expectations that proportional voting systems would 
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increase turnout has not come to pass from examining other UK elections. Across 
the board, the youth are the least likely to vote. The next section shall explore youth 
turnout in the  2015 General Election . 
Youth turnout in 2015  
 
This is a prelude to the upcoming 2015 chapter. It can be expected that youth 
turnout, along with other demographics, in any general election will be higher than 
second-order elections. This is true for 2015; although turnout was low with a 44% 
18-24 year-olds turnout111, average turnout in the 2014 European Election was 44%, 
showing the low average of turnout. However, paraphrasing Phelps, electoral 
competition does not explain why there are abstention increases at second-order 
elections where outcomes are less certain112. Therefore, low engagement and 
turnout for second-order elections are universal issues compared to first-order 
elections, arguably explained by only 57% of voters having full confidence in election 
results113, which may be worse for second-order elections. Phelps114 argues that 
young voters abstain in greater numbers despite the level of competition or the 
perceived closeness of the result. Therefore, low youth turnout motivation must be 
explored. 
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Abramson et al115 conclude FPTP turnout is affected by voters’ perception of election 
closeness  and that turnout and closeness of previous elections is relevant. With 
youth turnout being low since 1992116, the question is how to reengage them. The 
ease of voting and motivating people to vote is key; according to a University of 
Warwick youth turnout study, the young are discouraged to vote as registration, 
choosing how to vote and voting all take time117. According to a Parliamentary 
Committee voter-engagement report, only 44% of 18-24s voted in 2010, while over 
75% of 55 year-olds+ did118. Furthermore, as The Electoral Commission stated in 
2011, a far smaller proportion of the young were registered to vote compared to the 
elderly119: 
The lowest percentage of completeness is recorded by the 17-18 and 
19-24 age groups (55% and 56% complete respectively). In contrast, 
94% of the 65+ age group were registered.  
The elderly are both far more likely to be registered and vote. Furthermore, young 
voters may be politically disengaged due to their that politics is not aimed at them; 
with low youth turnout, parties are less inclined to provide beneficial policies for 
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them, like pensioners’ free heating120121. If elderly beneficial policies are contrasted 
with various youth-orientated policies, such as tuition-fee rises and  youth housing 
benefit cuts122123, and that  UK youth under-employment is 11%, one of the highest 
in the EU, including Greece and Spain,124 then youth apathy becomes 
understandable. To quote the  former head of the National Union of Students125: 
…There is a combination of reasons [why many young people 
don't vote]…disillusionment, the idea that voting does not make 
any difference to them or the political system does not make any 
difference to them. 
 
This supports the previous evidence that the youth are not catered for. As such, 
motivating the youth vote is crucial in increasing youth political engagement, as then 
parties will provide attractive youth policies. Discussion of youth engagement and 
turnout must mention the ease of voting and voter registration, with concurrent 
elections improving voter turnout. However, it would be beneficial to discuss the role 
that political leadership plays in shaping voter turnout. 
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Political Leadership and voter turnout 
 
I will discuss the role and theories of political leadership. I will not discuss it to the 
fullest extent due to the fact that it is a large area of study which would take up the 
thesis. I will focus on political leadership in the 2010 and 2017 general elections, 
particularly looking at the rise of Clegg in 2010, May’s underperformance and 
Corbyn’s perceived excellent performance in 2017. I will use these as the main case 
studies with some reference to the other campaigns in the thesis as they are the best 
cases of political leadership in shaping voter turnout. I will also discuss some of the 
main theories as they apply to the case studies. 
 
Although Clegg during 2010 (as well as discussion of his Coalition-era unpopularity) 
will be discussed in detail later, a brief discussion will occur now. Thus, political 
leadership theory and their mobilisation of voters should be examined. Clarke et al 
argued that ‘leader images serve as cost-effective heuristic devices…that enable 
voters to judge the…capabilities of rival political parties.126’ This is arguably one 
reason why the Liberal Democrats performed well just after the first debate, and why 
they fell back as the campaign continued. Interestingly, Milazzo and Hammond found 
leader popularity has a stronger effect in marginal seats127, which possibly was why 
Corbyn over-performed in 2017 and why May underperformed. Indeed, Stevens et al 
found that there was a strong relationship between leader performance and electoral 
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choice128, which perhaps explains the 2017 result and the Liberal Democrats’ 
increased 2010 vote-share, even if this did not translate into more seats. However, 
leaders who present well and seem charismatic are at a greater advantage than 
those not, because as Lenz and Lawson identify, individuals less interested in 
politics are inclined to use appearance when determining vote-choice129. Thus, 
mobilising the unengaged is easier with a positively presented leader, and Clegg’s 
emergence from being an ‘outsider’ at the start130 to becoming the most popular 
British politician since Churchill and a 50% increase in the Liberal Democrat polling 
share just after the first debate 131 was significant, even as stated, this did not result 
in more seats. Thus, political leadership can influence voting decisions and 
mobilisation, but it has to be married with popular policies, salient elections and a 
consistent engagement drive by parties to result in increased turnout. Indeed, the 
Liberal Democrat failure to break through was due to the lack of credibility and belief 
held by voters in the party, with Labour and the Conservatives also bringing their full 
firepower against the party, ensuring that the party would falter, as explained by 
Cutts et al132.  
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Political leadership being important but not overly so is clear from Clegg being 
viewed far more positively than any other party leader133 during and before the 
election, but on election day, only 12% selected the Liberal Democrats as the party 
best on the most important issue134, showing again how policies and party 
perception influence voter choice and turnout. However, Clegg’s campaign impact 
was undeniable, and was as a result of his leadership and his TV debates role: the 
party took the opportunity, and although beaten down during the election, there was 
indeed a Liberal Democrat boost135. However, Clegg and the campaign shall be 
analysed in more detail later. It would be now relevant to discuss how Corbyn won 
the leadership. 
 
Labour for the 2015 leadership election had a ‘one member one vote’ policy due to 
Miliband reforms, which perceived to be more favourable to Labour’s right wing. 
Corbyn was seen as being a leader with integrity and ‘not a normal politician’, with 
even rightwing commentators saying: 
By…avoiding…spin and speaking in proper sentences, he may well 
create a public demand for other, more successful politicians to do the 
same.136  
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Heffer’s acknowledgement of Corbyn’s speaking style taps into why Corbyn was 
popular. Golin, a PR firm, researched political language in 2015, and reported how 
voters found typical ‘politician-speak’ repellant: 
…a third of the British electorate trust candidates less when they lapse 
into buzzwords and "politician-speak”. [They] also believe politicians 
care less about the issue they are discussing if they resort to prepared 
speeches… 
More than 60%...believe "a lot of politicians seem to talk without 
actually saying anything meaningful", while 45% said candidates 
should speak "plain English".137 
 
Corbyn campaigned with the slogan ‘Straight talking, honest politics. 138’ Blais and 
Achen’s maxim about turnout being reduced by lack of civic duty and a lack of 
election preference comes into play139: if voters like Corbyn due to his ‘normal’ 
nature, then turnout and political interest should increase. As Lawrence said: ‘The 
public had been relegated to ‘passive receivers’ of a pre-packaged media politics, 
that was honed…to woo the key target groups identified by scientific polling.140‘ This 
was done somewhat in the television-dominated era, but was a critique that was 
posed at politics and still is to a degree. Corbyn’s sheer Labour popularity was clear, 
as he was elected with 59.5% of the vote overall, 59% of full Labour members, 58% 
of Labour affiliates and 84% of associate Labour members141. 
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Looking at London YouGov figures from the leadership election, the youth’s belief in 
Corbyn is evident. Corbyn was the choice of 53% of London’s youth, with other 
leadership contenders lagging behind142. Corbyn also had the support of 46% of the 
population143. Thus, Corbyn’s support amongst the young and population in general 
was high, across all ages (and most other demographics, apart from Conservative 
voters) Corbyn was seen as the best possible Labour leader with UKIP voters putting 
him at an astonishing 62%144, higher than Labour voters! Significantly, Corbyn’s 
leadership contest support was lowest amongst Labour members pre-2010, and 
highest amongst those who had joined after post-2015 election, with those in 
between ranking in the middle145. Furthermore, Corbyn’s youth support was even 
higher than YouGov, with 64% youth support146. Interestingly, only 5% of Corbyn’s 
supporters stated him as most likely to unite the party and the same again for 
winning in 2020, with 70% stating that his policies were best for Britain and 65% 
stating that they represented a clean break from New Labour147, departing from the 
status quo. Indeed, Corbyn’s refusal to back the caretaker leadership of Harman’s 
support of Conservative welfare cuts, ensured his polling shot up148. Thus, although 
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Corbyn was unpopular with the rest of the party149, Labour’s activists were more 
radical and elected him, demonstrating how the ‘law of curvilinear disparity’, which 
discusses how political parties memberships tend to be more radical than the MPs, 
was evident for Corbyn’s victory150 after having been absent from British politics 
somewhat151. There was scepticism about Labour’s young voters and if they 
represented something new for Labour and Britain in general152, which will be 
discussed later. 
By paying £3 and signing up online, anyone could sign up as a registered Labour 
supporter and have the right to vote in the leadership contest, which as Chadwick 
and Stromer-Galley point out, is European-derived153: 
We are now in…“multi-speed” party membership along the lines 
predicted by Margetts’s “cyber party” model (Margetts 2006)154…. 
Many European parties have introduced mechanisms that blur the 
boundaries between formal dues paying and looser modes of 
affiliation. These include primaries; one-off donations rather than 
regular subscriptions; online consultations, online voting; online 
petitioning; and simply encouraging individuals to become the 
party’s “news audience” for online newsletters and social media 
feeds. 
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 Social media could potentially mobilise and incentivise supporters; dipping in and 
out and using online methods could increase engagement and participation. Thus, 
Labour’s membership reached over 600,000155, although Labour’s new members are 
mostly wealthy city dwellers, who are already politically involved and engaged156. As 
such, Gibson also discussed “the emergence of online “citizen-initiated campaigning” 
based on “community building, getting out the vote, generating resources and 
message production”157. Labour’s attempts at doing this with satellite campaigns 
shall be discussed later, but Labour’s efforts with doing this with the associate 
memberships are significant. Before that, I will summarise the Corbyn section. 
A Corbyn ally summed up his Corbyn thoughts:  
Jeremy is Jeremy. He isn’t a rock star politician…he doesn’t wear 
slick clothes, but in a way he is an anti-hero. He’s …authentic and 
he just seems to have resonated with people. 158  
Corbyn’s ‘normalness’ struck a chord with many, as he engaged rather than being 
‘an average politician’, as Crines argued159. Many people, even in other parties, 
thought he was the best possible Labour leader, and he won overwhelmingly. As 
Olson argues, the Internet can reduce collective action cost160, so the £3 associated 
membership as well as Corbyn’s focus on online mobilisation and the ‘Corbynmania’ 
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phenomena161 demonstrated Labour’s utilisation of the Internet. Although Corbyn’s 
supporters were unconcerned with his electability162, they felt the party had drifted 
too far from its roots, and they felt they could trust in him163 rather than someone 
conventionally electable. To an extent, the activists were already there, as is argued 
by Vaccari and Valeriani164:  
…The Corbyn campaign was based on a hybrid mix of traditional 
volunteering, where trade unions and a constellation of social 
movements seemingly played a substantial role, and digitally enabled 
strategies to recruit registered supporters and distribute the campaign 
message on social media…the findings shown here suggest that 
already in 2014, there was a reservoir of citizen campaigners who were 
not party members but were ready to participate in party-related 
activities, which the Corbyn campaign tapped into.  
 
Corbyn gained a large majority of post-2015 election members, and almost 90% of 
the associated membership, on a total turnout of 76%165. To tackle mobilisation and 
political engagement, Momentum, a digital campaign group which emerged out of 
Corbyn’s leadership campaign, undertook online activism to support Corbyn’s 
leadership and Labour. Momentum explicitly discusses the need to be ‘participatory, 
[to have] interactive development of leaders and organisers within communities: and 
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people coming up with their own viable alternatives.’166 Thus, the campaign involved 
digital interaction and discussion on a level beyond what had previously occurred in 
a leadership contest, which created friction within Labour167. However, political 
mobilisation and turnout-increasing lessons are clear. Corbyn was seen as new, 
grabbing general interest, and Labour’s £3 associate membership and Momentum 
demonstrated how to engage and mobilise people online politically, which is 
paramount for voter mobilisation, as well as comparing them and other political 
mobilisation methods to other case studies. Thus, how Corbyn engaged and 
mobilised supporters is significant for how leadership can engage voters. This would 
come to the fore again in the 2017 election, when May and Corbyn’s leadership 
affected the election vastly. 
 
May, although popular pre-election168, ended it much diminished, and Corbyn, 
perceived as someone who would lead Labour to certain defeat, ended up boosting 
Labour’s vote by percentages not seen since 1945169. May was seen as aloof and 
cold, while Corbyn was not. As voters prefer a  genuine leader with good policies 
rather than an impersonal leader with bad policies, it was clear how the leadership of 
the parties during the election affected the result, and their effect on mobilisation and 
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turnout. As competence and reliable boosts turnout, according to Miller et a170 and 
Lewis-Beck and Nadeau171, this benefitted May, who was seen throughout the 
campaign as being more competent and reliable than Corbyn, although this drifted 
down throughout the campaign172. However, voters perceived May more negatively 
throughout the campaign and Corbyn more positively, especially rating Corbyn highly 
on honesty and likeability173. Indeed, when May’s fortune’s started to drop as a result 
of her lack of campaigning finesse, Corbyn’s poll-ratings began to increase 
compared to May’s, and was seen as a potential Prime Minister. Bittner identified 
that empathy and integrity of party leaders affected vote-choice strongest174, with 
positive evaluations of party leaders increasing the likelihood of voting for a particular 
party, and vice versa for negative175. However, as Bittner176, Holmberg and 
Oscarsson177 argue, presidential systems have a stronger leader effect than 
parliamentary ones, although parliamentary majoritarian systems have a stronger 
electoral effect regarding leaders178, making the study of this regarding Westminster 
2010/7 elections valid.  
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Although May started off the campaign strongly with a 36% lead as best Prime 
Minister over Corbyn179, her campaigning became ineffective. As Prosser 
explains180:  
 
The Conservatives began [by[ emphasising May’s leadership… 
May promised ‘strong and stable’ leadership compared to 
Corbyn’s ‘coalition of chaos’. As the campaign unfolded, 
[emphasising] May proved to be a mistake. She was not a natural 
campaigner. Her interactions with voters were awkward and the 
‘strong and stable’ mantra wore thin with voters and the press 
alike. The Conservative campaign also featured…missteps such 
as the announcement of -and rapid backtracking on- changes to 
social care payments (the…dementia tax). Similarly, proposals to 
end the pension triple-lock and introduce means testing for winter 
fuel payments [were met with hostility]… 
 
Thus, this demonstrates May’s poor performance, and how leadership perception 
can have an effect, along with poor policy and campaigns. In contrast, Labour and 
Corbyn were more effective campaigners181: 
Labour soon gained momentum… concentrating…opposition to 
austerity and promises to increase funding for public services. 
Many Labour policies – from renationalising the railways to 
abolishing tuition fees – proved popular…especially among 
younger voters. In stark contrast to May, Corbyn was in his 
element on the campaign trail and his popularity soared as May’s 
declined.  
As the campaign went on, it was clear that a combination of good policies and 
leadership impacted Labour and Conservative fortunes: with Corbyn campaigning 
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well and May not, along with well-received policies by Labour and negative 
Conservative ones, the polling and leadership deficit was considerably narrowed. 
Significantly, as Cowley and Kavanagh find, Labour won more than half of those who 
changed their minds during the election, with 19% doing this in total182.  The TV 
debates were important for this. May never went head-to-head versus Corbyn and 
the other party leaders. Prosser explains183: 
The first national debate consisted of the leaders of the Liberal 
Democrats, SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Greens, and UKIP, with no 
representative from the Conservatives or Labour…Corbyn, 
invigorated by a successful campaign, decided to take part [in the 
second debate], challenging May to face him. She did not, 
sending…Amber Rudd instead. Rudd performed well but May’s 
absence was striking and went down poorly with the media and 
voters alike.  
Therefore, along with Labour’s campaign judged to be more honest, positive, clear 
and relevant to the important issues184, leadership and policies impacted Labour’s 
chances. Corbyn narrowed the gap on the question of best Prime Minister to 11 
points by the end of the campaign185, demonstrating the importance of leadership. 
With Corbyn’s effective handling of the terror attacks in Manchester and London, 
which weakened May due to her ministerial history186, Corbyn came out stronger. 
Therefore, Stewart and Clarke’s maxim that leader images had strong effects on 
party choice187 was accurate, because as Corbyn’s ratings rose, so did Labour’s. 
                                                           
182 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2018) The British General Election of 2017. Palgrave 
Macmillan: London. 
183 Prosser, Christopher (2018) p.1230 
184 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2018) p.412 
185 Ibid, p.413. 
186 Prosser, Christopher (2018) p.1230 
187 Stewart, Marianne, and Clarke, Harold (1992) The (un)importance of Party Leaders: Leader 
Images and Party Choice in the 1987 British Election. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 54, No.2, May 
1992.  




Also, Labour and Corbyn were more popular on social media, but this shall be 
examined later. 
Party leaders act as a mobilising agent and have substantial impact on the likelihood 
of turning out to vote in Parliamentary elections, as Da Silva identified188. Notably, he 
also identified how this effect was especially strong in dealligned voters189, which 
explains why Labour gained so many. Thus, leadership theories and their relevance 
to the case studies is clear. There is more scope to discuss the effect of media 
representation of leaders and their construction, but that will take place in other 
works, and Aaldering et al’s work on mediated leader effects would be a good 
foundation190. 
Thus, the significance of leadership as well as a good manifesto and how that 
manifesto is communicated is clear. The thesis is not overly concerned with how 
Corbyn and May’s leadership has evolved, as this is again a task for another thesis, 
but the impact that leadership had in the case studies selected is relevant for 
mobilisation and engagement analysis. The UK adopted a new voter registration 
system in 2014, and discussing how voter registration changes can hold down 
turnout will now occur. 
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New Voter Registration System and turnout 
 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone stated ‘the requirement [to register] makes voting a more 
difficult act than it otherwise would be.’191 Therefore, Geys argued registration 
requirements drive down turnout: 
Automatic registration, Election Day registration, and the absence 
of literacy tests and poll taxes all lead to significant turnout 
increases…Empirical work… strongly supports the depressing 
effect on turnout of tighter registration procedures.192 
 
Thus, when considering these when discussing the voter registration system 
introduced in 2014, the effect it had on voter turnout can be discussed further. 
Arguably, the new system assisted Cameron in winning the 2015 General Election, 
with an estimated one million voters being left off the register by January 2015, 
primarily made up of students, other young people, private renters and the mobile193. 
Considering the turnout and Labour vote for the 18-24 demographic was 43% in 
2015 as compared to 27% for the Conservatives194, it is evident how the new system 
benefitted the Conservatives. Previously, voter registration was conducted via a 
‘household’ system that had one person in the household registering everyone at the 
address, which was seen as open to fraud. However, it was simple to get registered: 
for example, universities could register students living in university accommodation 
instead of students individually registering, increasing student registration. However, 
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in September 2014, the new system of ‘individual voter registration’ was introduced. 
As stated, implementation was poor, and had an adverse effect on political 
representation. 
 The new electoral registers will form the boundaries for the planned reduction of 
parliamentary seats, thus resulting in a reduction of representation for young people, 
urban inhabitants, mobile voters (as they will need to reregister every time they move 
house) and students, resulting in reduced political engagement. Therefore, referring 
back to Geys, voter registration is evidently more difficult. Therefore, turnout may 
decrease and decrease political efficacy. The Electoral Commission warned in the 
2014 trial for Individual Voter Registration about the risks195 : 
…areas with a high concentration of certain demographics – 
students, private renters and especially young adults – are very 
likely to return a lower match rate. These demographics are also 
strongly associated with under- registration. These variables are 
all also associated with population mobility.  
With Jackman stating that disproportionality in the translation of votes into legislative 
seats results in the disincentivisation of voting and lower turnout196, it is clear that 
these demographics will be disengaged and unrepresented. Advertising and sending 
out mobilisation messages are useful for engagement; as Nickerson found in 2008, if 
a household received a mobilisation message, voting probability rose by around 10% 
for the message recipients, and voting probability for others in the household 
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increased around 6%,197 demonstrating a network of increased probability and voter 
communication. Therefore, mobilisation and awareness messages are crucial for 
increasing turnout. The British government did this in March 2016 by nationally 
dispatching  information packs on why Britain should stay in the EU, and what was at 
stake, while also including the referendum date and how to register to vote198. 
Vonnahme’s 2012 research demonstrates that shorter voter deadlines increases 
turnout, as registration costs are reduced199: 
While the results indicate that deadlines are related to both rates 
of registration and turnout, the effect on turnout is greater. This 
suggests that shorter deadlines not only affect non-registered 
voters, but also previously registered voters…200 
 
Both newly registered voters and pre-registered voters increase turnout with shorter 
deadlines. The deadline for the referendum was 7th June 2016, two weeks pre-
referendum, which should have increased turnout accordingly. Returning to the 
packs, they were criticised by Leavers, as they were sent at a £9 million cost and 
were viewed as one-sided201. This perhaps demonstrates that low turnout and youth 
disengagement were key to Leave’s victory, as they were not interested in increasing 
voter knowledge.  When the government announced that the registration deadline 
would have a 48 hour extension202, this arguably increased turnout and voter 
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engagement due to the close deadline. As Nickerson suggests, turnout increases 
further with previously registered voters through social contagion, making voter 
reminders and shorter registration periods essential to increasing turnout and 
political engagement.  
Turnout can be restrained in other ways, such as inaccessible polling stations for 
disabled voters, as Schur et al discuss203, which can be described as an individual 
barrier that complicates turnout.  
Conclusion 
 
First and second-order elections and their difference  has been examined 
underpinned by theory. Case studies of different British elections, ranging from local 
elections, devolved elections and General elections occurred in order to lay 
foundations for later chapters. Levels of turnout over different types of elections, the 
new registration system and a brief analysis of youth turnout have been analysed 
and given a theoretical background. The purpose of this is to lay the groundwork for 
the chapters on youth engagement and party mobilisation in various elections, as 
knowing the general direction of turnout and how it differs in different elections will be 
key for the understanding of how political parties mobilise and engage voters. 
Leadership has also been discussed and the role political leadership can play in 
mobilising and engaging voters. One key analysis will be seeing how voter 
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engagement and low voter turnout is tackled by political parties. As such, the 2010 
case study will be an excellent beginning.





Chapter II: An analysis of the 2010 Election. 
 
In the last chapter, turnout, mobilisation and engagement theory were explored, with 
electoral systems, election salience, political mobilisation via leadership and more 
were discussed. This chapter will analyse the 2010 election, using theory discussed 
in the last chapter and analysing how political parties mobilised and engaged voters, 
utilising the Internet, the new TV debates, and other methods. Thus, building upon 
the theory introduced last chapter and using 2010 as a case study, a picture will be 
built of how political parties mobilised their supporters at this period in time. 
British political parties’ ability to motivate their supporters have rapidly evolved with 
the Internet. Parties and political figures must venture beyond canvassing, hustings, 
leaflet campaigns, TV and radio advertising and other methods of political 
mobilisation. According to the Office of National Statistics, over 90% of 16-24 year 
olds used-social media in 2013204, so mastering this politically is key. However, 
appealing to the youth is difficult, as seen previously205. Youth political 
disengagement is compounded further after examining turnout. In the 1997 General 
Election, youth turnout was 68%206. The 2001 election had 39%207, 37% in 2005208, 
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and 44% in 2010. In 2015, it dropped to 43%209, remaining the same for 2017210, 
illustrating the decrease since 1997. Therefore,  youth turnout fell by 1% from 2010 
to 2017, which could be explained by the changes in the electoral registration 
system. In later chapters, the other referendums and elections shall be discussed. I 
will be discussing the 2010 General Election during this chapter, before moving onto 
later elections in later chapters. A breakdown of the necessary terms will need to 
take place to provide context. 
What is voter mobilisation, and why is it important? 
 
Norris defines voter mobilisation as increasing voter participation and attention to the 
political campaign,211 so the more voters are mobilised by political parties and by 
political figures, the more they participate and engage. Saunders dissents to this, 
arguing that low turnout is not an issue, as forcing those who do not want to vote is 
anti-democratic212. However, this seems to be isolated, as Nyhuis et al for example 
discuss encouraging voters with specific voter mobilisation methods213. Traditionally, 
mobilisation studies focus on how voters are contacted by parties via canvassing, 
postal leaflets, telephone contacting, and other such tools214. Other studies have 
focused on how television advertising and newspapers have affected political 
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support and voting likelihood215: if your party wins, your trust and belief in the efficacy 
in the political system increases, as Clark and Acock demonstrated216. Therefore, 
effective mobilisation is essential. 
Karp and Banducci’s 2007 work217 discusses political mobilisation and participation 
in the Eastern Bloc democracies and how the older democracies of France, Britain 
and the United States differ in this approach. They argue that when parties contact 
citizens, they are more likely to vote and be politically engaged, so it is in their 
interest to effectively mobilise supporters. This benefits the political system, as when 
citizens participate, they are more likely to be satisfied with it and political 
institutions218. Returning to the above however, FPTP systems have lower turnout 
and political participation because in them, parties have less incentive to mobilise 
everywhere, and thus voters are less incentivised to vote if not contacted or 
mobilised219. Therefore, in Britain, low youth turnout is compounded by FPTP 
resulting in low youth political participation and engagement. How British parties 
have countered this is key, and thus I will analyse the 2010 election. 
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The 2010 General Election and youth mobilisation 
 
The 2010 election marked New Labour’s end. In the election runup, it seemed as if 
the Conservatives would win outright, defeating Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
This did not happen. Thus, by examining the context of the 2010 election, it will be 
possible to divine how voters were mobilised and engaged by manifestos and party 
campaigns. 
The election took place against after 13 years of Labour. After two Labour Prime 
Ministers and a financial crash, the election ended up being hung, with a 65.1% 
turnout, 307 seats and 36.1% for the Conservatives, 29% and 258 seats for Labour, 
23% and 57 seats for the Liberal Democrats (a 1% increase in vote-share but a 5 
seat drop since 2005)220. The Greens won their first seat, and there was also a 
concerted effort from UKIP and the BNP. Labour could have assembled a rainbow 
coalition of the other parties, as Quinn et a discuss221, or conversely, a Conservative-
led government was possible. Thus, the Conservatives went into coalition with the 
Liberal Democrats, resulting in the first Liberal-influenced government since the 
Second World War. Therefore, an analysis of the various election media issues, 
particularly the mass media’s promotion of ‘Cleggmania’, when Clegg and the Liberal 
Democrats were extremely popular, will occur.  
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 Over 75% of Britain was online. This was promoted by various bloggers222 and 
journalists223 who proclaimed that with the online and social media activity, 2010 
could be considered the first Internet or social media election. However, others were 
sceptical, with Dale rejecting this notion, focusing on Twitter224 : 
…Twitter, as a campaigning tool, is useless. Most have so few 
"followers" that their tweets are irrelevant unless they say something a 
journalist can make a story out of – and of those followers… only a 
small minority will be resident in their constituency. 
 
Opinion was divided. However, there were other reasons for 2010’s 
significance. As well as the first coalition in decades as well as the first part-
Liberal Democrat government, it also heralded the first television debates in 
Britain, consisting of three debates between Brown, Cameron and Clegg, 
which impacted the election and incited ‘Cleggmania’, which was perceived 
to boost the Liberal Democrats, with some predicting over 100 seats225. 
Thus, the TV debates were seen as significant226: 
…63% of voters used television to get information about the 
campaign, compared to 47% who read the newspapers, 27% who 
listened to the radio, and 9% who visited political websites.  
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 Therefore,  using the Internet for political purposes was not a priority for most. 
Although parties made tentative steps towards adopting an online presence, as 
Lilleker and Jackson state, focusing particularly on forums and voter interaction for 
electoral success and mobilisation227, the television debates were the most exciting 
new election development. However, various political parties utilised the Internet. 
Quoting Cowley and Kavanagh again, 2010 heralded the combination of old and new 
media228: 
…The general election could hardly be called an internet 
one…Britain still lagged behind the United States [in this 
regard]...Large numbers ‘meshed’, watching television while 
online, and there were many online reactions to the debates and 
election broadcasts. Most candidates now have a web presence. 
The rise of blogging, social networks, tweets… have made it 
difficult for parties and the traditional print media to exercise… 
control over political messages…and are sure to become more 
important... By contrast, press advertising was markedly reduced 
and party election broadcasts continued to decline…  
 
Therefore, political parties, inspired by the United States, were beginning to realise 
the Internet’s importance. Manifestos were posted online, satirical videos were made 
by the Liberal Democrats, videos accompanied the Labour and Conservative 
manifestos, tweets and blogs were utilised by political figures, and party election 
broadcasts were released online to mention some steps taken.  Labour sold only 
9,000 copies of their manifesto in 2005, while in 2010 Labour’s online manifesto 
cartoon achieved over 100,000 views, the same amount of the manifesto proper was 
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downloaded229. Although there was some superficial online engagement with voters 
and mobilisation of party members, political parties did not truly engage dialogically 
with voters and party members, instead relying on a top-down approach, not utilising 
the Internet’s potential. 
Data Analysis of the 2010 Election 
Political parties during the election were not adept at contacting voters over social 
media, according to the 2010 BES pre-post election panel. A large Internet panel of 
voters was interviewed three times: once pre-election in April 2010, once during in 
May 2010, and once post-election in June 2010 on a large multitude of issues, 
including contact rates. Although questions exist about the reliability of internet 
panels as compared to personal or telephone interviews, as Szolnoki and Hoffman 
state, who argued online panels had issues concerning representativeness230. 
Hoogendorn and Daalmans went further, stating online panels tend to favour highly-
educated rich people231. Couper also identifies various demographical issues with 
online panels232, and Chang and Krosnick are sceptical about using Internet-based 
data for a representative national sample233. However, by taking care, online data 
collection is valid, as identified by Lindhjem and Navrud234, and by Sanders et al, 
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who analysed the 2005 BES and determined if data is properly weighted, Internet 
survey data is as reliable as face-to-face235.  
Looking at the pre-campaign data, the contact rate of political parties to voters was 
low. However, it is still relevant by providing context on how political parties 
contacted potential voters pre-election: 
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Table I: Pre-Campaign contact % rates for various parties in the 2010 
Election. 
British Election Study, 2010 Pre/Post Election Panel 
Party  Contact Rate 
Conservative 25% 
Labour 20% 
Liberal Democrat 19% 
Conservative and Labour 13% 
Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat 
12% 
Labour and Liberal 
Democrat 
10% 
All three 8% 
N: 12296  





The Conservatives contacted more voters pre-election than other parties. 
Only 10% of voters were contacted by all three. The high Conservative 
contact rate demonstrates the party’s aims;  it was confident of victory due 
to consistent poll leads236, so thus was active in voter contacting. It will be 
useful to briefly examine the money spent by the three parties during the 
election, as this will shed light for contact rates analysis237: 
 
Figure 2 The amounts spent by the three main parties on their long and short 
campaigns (the allowed maximum percentage  is in parentheses) 
 The Conservatives spent the most overall through both campaigns, 
although significantly, the Liberal Democrats had seemingly spent more 
than Labour. The weathlier parties have been able to contact more voters, 
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as they were more able to subsidise volunteers, employ media adverts, 
utilise the Internet effectively,  and so on. 
During elections, contact rates increase, and this increased when the panel 
was asked both during and post-election if they had been contacted: 





The Conservatives again beat the others, with 34% voter contact during the election 
and 43% post-election. Compared to Labour’s 31% and 40% and the Liberal 
Table II: Party contact rates during and post-election 




Conservative 34% 43% 















All three 16% 26% 
Number: 12296   




Democrats’ 27% and 38%, the Conservatives contacted more voters over all times 
than the other parties, and  it was again rare that all three parties contacted voters 
during the campaign. Furthermore, there was the same chance of being contacted 
by both Conservatives and Labour post-campaign as being contacted by the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Less than 50% of all voters were contacted 
by the main political parties before, during and post-election. Therefore, how parties 
contacted voters and mobilised them will remain important, as different contacting 
and mobilisation methods will reveal what drove voter engagement and mobilisation. 
Contact type remains significant: face-to-face campaigning and contact by parties 
are still significant, as if someone was contacted by a particular party, their voting 
likelihood is likely to increase, as Johnston et al demonstrate238.  
Using 2010 BES data, the more money spent on elections and the more contacts 
made by political parties during both campaign periods, the higher the turnout and 
the lower the voter abstention 239. Thus, party voter-contact must be analysed. 
Looking again at the 2010 BES pre-post analysis of from Johnston et al, the Internet 
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Table III: Types of contact reported by respondents to the BES 
Contact Wave 
Campaign Post-campaign 
C L LD C L LD 
Telephone 1 2 1 3 4 2 
Leaflet 32 29 26 42 37 37 
At home 6 4 3 9 7 5 
On street 2 1 1 3 2 2 
E-Mail 5 2 2 6 3 3 
Twitter 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Text a 0 a 1 1 s 
Other a a a a a a 
% of respondents contacted by number of types of contact 
None 65 68 72 56 60 61 
1 25 25 23 30 30 31 
2 8 5 4 10 8 6 
3 2 1 1 3 2 2 
4 + 1 2 1 1 1 1 




a= less than 0.5%. C= Conservative, L= Labour, LD= Liberal Democrat 
  
Leafleting was most common, with post-election reporting 42% of Conservative 
contact was via leaflets, versus 37% for Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Telephone contact was low, with no party reaching above 5% during the campaign 
or post-campaign, with Labour inching ahead on 2% during the campaign and 4% 
post-campaign. Home visits were slightly better, with the Conservatives reaching 6% 
during the campaign and 9% post-campaign, with the other parties just behind. On 
street contact, the Conservatives reached 2% during the campaign and 3% post-
campaign, while Labour and Liberal Democrats are at 1% during and 2% afterwards, 
demonstrating street contact was not seriously pursued. 
 Bearing this in mind, online activism could be perceived as the future, but the social 
media campaigns were rudimentary. Gibson and Ward in 1998 noticed that the 
Internet, although slowly adopted, would increasingly dominate British political 
discussion and mobilisation: “it is not unreasonable to assume that over the next 
decade party communication and campaigning on the Internet will have 
moved…toward the mainstream.241” This can be seen in 2010 somewhat, although 
as seen later, the 2015 election was really the first General Election with effective 
Internet utilisation. The Internet is seen sceptically sometimes however, as Dalton 
and Wattenberg state242: 
…Party members who formerly attended a few meetings might 
take advantage of the [Internet’s] communication possibilities… 
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but virtual party membership lacks the educational and social 
capital… that come with in-person participation… only a small 
portion of campaign information is likely to come from internet 
sources; the mass media and other traditional communication 
forms will continue to dominate electoral politics. 
 
This was written before the advent of social media, and thus the Internet’s 
capabilities was not fully apparent. However, Dalton and Wattenberg recognition that 
disparate party members may be able to participate online but is no substitute for 
active social participation is significant, as well as their argument of mass media and 
traditional communication dominating electoral politics. Some concessions are made 
:243‘new social movements will face fewer organisational start-up costs in an age 
when people can be quickly brought together through e-mail lists and a website.’ 
With this in mind, an analysis of Twitter will occur. 
Twitter utilisation was is in its infancy, as seen from the extremely low Labour Twitter 










Valid no Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube 
1201 34.2 99.9 99.9 
Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube 
1 .0 .1 100.0 
Total 1202 34.2 100.0  
Missing System 2310 65.8   
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Total 3512 100.0   
 
With caveats for responses and numbers, 99.9% of respondents were not contacted 
by Labour over social media! Those who use social media in Britain tend to be 
younger, as stated previously, and Twitter’s viability in campaigning was questioned. 
To return to Table III, Twitter contact rates were very low, being 1% throughout for all 
parties, demonstrating that parties either did not see or understand Twitter’s 
opportunity for campaigning. Regardless, the Twitter contact rates were higher 
texting and ‘Other’ s, illustrating these methods as irrelevant to the main parties. 
Furthermore, , large percentages of voters simply were not contacted during the 
election or post-election, with 65%, 68% and 72% having not been contacted during 
the election by the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats respectively, with 
similar figures post-election. All this suggests contacting all voters was  not a priority. 
This may be due to Britain’s electoral system which directs political attention away 
from safe seats, as studied. Overall, examining Johnston et al again, as they 
demonstrate the relationship between party spending and number of contacts during 
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Table V: The percentage of voters contacted by each party during the short 
campaign, according to the amount spent in the respondent’s constituencies 
Amount 
spent % 
Number of contacts by party 
 Conservative Labour Liberal Democrat 
 0 1 2+ 0 1 2+ 0 1 2+ 
1-25 77 18 5 74 23 3 72 25 3 
26-50 70 23 7 64 29 7 63 30 7 
51-75 60 29 11 54 33 13 56 34 10 
76-100 46 35 19 45 37 18 36 42 22 
N= 6403 3461 1670 6781 3490 1205 6888 3554 1041 
 
As spending increased, so did contact. If 1-25% of the maximum constituency spend 
was spent, the Conservatives contacted 18% of voters once, with the other parties 
contacting more. This suggests that Labour and the Liberal Democrats were more 
able or willing to contact voters at least once during this time. However, if the 
contacts examined is raised to 2+, the Conservatives (apart from in areas with 76-
100% spending) contacted the most voters. Clearly, the main parties did not see 
contacting voters in low-spend constituencies as a priority, with barely 3.6% of all 
voters across all parties having being contacted 2+ times in these constituencies. 




Therefore, in areas less important to the main parties, less money and time was 
spent by the parties on voter mobilisation and turnout efforts.  
Clearly, leaflets remained the primary voter contact: as an Ipsos Mori poll during the 
election stated, out of all voters contacted, 93% had received leaflets, 21% were by a 
party representative, and 5% had been telephoned246. Although the figures are 
different to the BES data up above, it is still relevant, as the BES data was 
conducted and collected via Internet panels, while the Ipsos Mori poll was by 
telephone. However, I have not mentioned the TV debates and their impact on 
mobilisation and voter engagement yet. The TV debates were the first ones in 
general election history, and thus their impact on the 2010 election have to be 
studied.  
Impact of the 2010 TV Debates 
 
I shall not be discussing in detail the history of political televised debates. I will not 
also be discussing in great detail party political broadcasts as these are not relevant. 
Instead, the impact the 2010 television debates had on electoral participation, 
interest, and youth engagement will be analysed, with initial thoughts being  that the 
TV debates resulted in an energised electorate. 
In 2010, it was agreed that there would be three General Election debates on three 
different channels.  Although there were concerns that the UK parliamentary system 
was unsuitable for the personal and promotional nature of televised debates, these 
were brushed aside, and fafter Blumler and McQuail in 1968 had proposed the 
introduction of British television debates :‘many voters would flock to them…they 
                                                           
246 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2010) The British General Election of 2010. Pp. 241. 
Palgrave Macmillan, London. 




would help to inform large numbers of viewers, including less politically minded 
ones…and they would counter tendencies towards the routinisation of campaign 
communication…’247 they were introduced. 
 60% of the first of five research surveys conducted by the Universities of Leeds, 
Oxford and Wolverhampton pre-debate stating that they would ‘definitely or probably’ 
watch the first debate, with the actual figure being 62% of the survey group being 
exposed to the debate in some way248. The debates were perceived positively; 50% 
of the viewers of each of the debates watched all three, while a significant 
percentage of the rest had at least watched an hour249. Thus, excitement was 
evident, even if figures dropped slightly for the middle debate250.  Election debates 
were being discussed as ‘being the spine of the campaign… and will totally change 
the rhythm.’251 This was clear from the normally campaign-vital national press 
conference, being dropped almost completely252. This echoed Lawrence’s assertion 
that the 253‘television age would…coincide with [and arguably cause] the near total-
eclipse of local party campaigning.’, although on a different scale, as other TV 
election events suffered, with party election broadcasts being  shorter, fewer, and 
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scattered over the schedules254, leaving the TV debates as the most significant 
media event.  
55% of 18-24s stated that from seeing the first debate, they were more interested in 
the campaign, and 74% of 18-24s said they had learned something about the 
various parties’ policies due to them, as compared to 63% of 55+s255. This may have 
affected turnout, because 2010 youth turnout was 44% as compared to 37% in 2005. 
The perceived electoral closeness may affected youth turnout, although as seen 
previously, the scholarship is unsettled, with Matsuska stating that close elections do 
not necessarily result in higher turnout256, and Goldstein and Ridout stating they do 
as well as increasing mobilisation and political engagement257. Arguably, the debates 
resulted in higher mobilisation and youth engagement. They were key to attracting 
voters less electorally-engaged, because as Pfau stated, debates are the only 
televised political event that attracts those ‘marginally attentive’258. As younger voters 
vote and participate less, television debates were instrumental in engaging the youth 
voters. To illustrate this further, Table 3.4 from Blumler’s work shows the extent to 
which people who were politically disengaged were engaged by the debates259: 
 
 
                                                           
254 Cowley and Kavanagh (2010) 
255 Coleman, Stephen (2011) p.4 
256 Matsuska, John G (1993) Election closeness and voter turnout: Evidence from California ballot 
propositions Public Choice 76. P313 [Online] Located at: http://www-
bcf.usc.edu/~matsusak/Papers/Matsusaka_PC_1993.pdf and accessed 9th March 2018.  
257 Goldstein, Kenneth and Ridout, Travis (2002) The Politics of Participation: Mobilisation and 
Turnout over Time Political Behaviour, Vol. 24, No.1 March 2002, pp.3-29 [Online] Located at: 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=082d7517-3e0a-44e9-8277-
383c64f1ecb8%40sessionmgr101 and accessed 31st May 2017. 
258 Pfau, M (2003) The Changing Nature of Presidential Debate Influence in the New Age of Mass 
Media Communication 9th Annual Conference on Presidential Rhetoric, Texas A&M University. 
259 Coleman (2011) p.42 




Table VI: Interest in politics (per survey wave, %) 








in politics at all 
1st Debate 
Survey 
84 69 56 29 
2nd Debate 
Survey 
71 57 39 15 
3rd Debate 
Survey 
76 62 41 20 
 
Those already interested in politics watched the debate in large numbers, with this 
number decreasing the more apathetic the viewer. However, apathetic viewers 
watched the debates at a 29-15% rate. Thus, electoral debates’ potential to mobilise 
turnout is evident. There is a small significant positive impact by watching the 
debates (especially the first one) on voting260, demonstrating their positive effect in 
regards to mobilisation and engagement. As there was an 8% youth turnout increase 
from 2005 to 2010, the election debates arguably played a key role in this. The  
debates’ effect on youth mobilisation and election interest is clear, although their 
effect could be coincidental. Indeed, pre- campaign, only 68% 18-24s definitely or 
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probably intended to vote, while 55+s were 85%, demonstrating youth disinterest in 
formal politics261.  
The post-election survey revealed that 18-24 year-olds overwhelmingly voted for the 
Liberal Democrats, with 41% of 18-24s voting for them compared to 26% 
Conservatives and 27% Labour. This is reflected in the final debates evaluation 
amongst viewers, who responded very positively to questions about the Liberal 
Democrats, stating in greater numbers than the Conservatives and Labour that they 
knew more about the Liberal Democrat party leader, they knew more about Liberal 
Democrat policies, they helped the viewer to understand national problems, and the 
Liberal Democrats helped make up minds on how to vote262. Thus, the party that had 
the most youth support and votes was received most positively in the TV debates, 
showing how the debates boosted youth support nationally, with 49% of 18-24s 
viewing them positively263. How this was mobilised by the Liberal Democrat 
manifesto, especially the tuition fees pledge, shall be examined later, as well as the 
media’s promoting ‘Cleggmania.’   
The TV debates arguably contributed election excitement, which instead of being 
dominated by ‘immobilising discourses’, as Wahl-Jorgensen argued, resulting in 
disgust or political disengagement 264, also noted by Blumler and Coleman265, the 
election was tinged with excitement, with many voters expressing political interest in 
politics and election interest due to the debates266. However, this may not mean a 
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longterm shift in political perceptions and attitudes; it enlivened the election 
campaign, but a longterm political attitudinal shift was  unforthcoming267. However, 
Dutton and Shipley stated268: 
…while intention to vote is a complex phenomenon that cannot be 
fully predicted... having watched the first debate in particular had a 
modest but statistically significant impact on…intention to vote. 
 
Arguably, the debates (particularly the first one) positively impacted voting, which 
when combined with excitement, demonstrated election debates had a small yet 
positive youth turnout impact. The debates also had another impact on interest and 
campaign discussion, as debate viewers  were more likely to be electorally engaged, 
in addition to being more willing to politically use other media and discussion269. 
However, it is worth analysing polling over the election to see the impact. 
After the first debate, Clegg and the Liberal Demorats’ popularity rose , with the party 
polling 21% pre-debate, before rocketing to 32% afterwards, equalling the 
Conservatives and 4% ahead of Labour270. Clegg’s approval went from 45% to 68% 
post first debate. However, although this was seen as an unexpected rivalry to the 
two main parties, there was form, as the Liberals previously had improved their 
electoral position due to political television, as Blumler and McQuail note271.Russell 
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and Fieldhouse272 and Pattie and Johnston273 also recognise the Liberal Democrat 
tendency to perform better at elections due to increased visibility, although previous 
media visibility during elections was not similar to the TV debates.  
The Liberal Democrats actually lost seats, going down to 58 seats from 65, with t 
vote-share going up from 2005’s 22% to 23%274. Clegg did not ensure greater 
electoral support (although the Liberal Democrat vote is arguably distorted by 
Britain’s SMDP system), even if support declined around the third debate275. 
However, Clegg was perceived as the debate victor, with 35% on the BES Internet 
Panel stating he gave the best performance over the debates276. Again, there was no 
Liberal Democrat surge; Pickup et al concluded the election was dominated by 
Liberal Democrat polling bias277, notably.  
The election pledge of eliminating tuition fees boosted the Liberal Democrat student 
vote-share to 45% as compared to 24% for Labour and 21% for the Conservatives, 
as Anstead notes278. After the coalition formation  and the Liberal Democrats were 
perceived to have broken the trust of the electorate, the Liberal Democrats’ student 
support fell to 15%279. How popular the Liberal Democrat manifesto and party 
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actually were during the election must be examined further. This was assisted by 
Cleggmania dominating the media, with Cowley and Kavanagh commenting that 
‘Clegg was nearly as popular as Churchill on an 72% approval…over 100,000 
Facebook users – more than the… entire membership – had joined a group 
dedicated to supporting a Liberal Democrat victory.280’ Thus, support was clear, 
which was in opposition to the negative reaction Clegg and the Liberal Democrats 
received from the press, with questions of how British Clegg really was281 and the 
Sun asking readers to not trust the party282.  Backlash against these attacks were 
prevalent on Twitter, with one particular pro-Liberal Democrat and Clegg hashtag 
becoming the UK’s top hashtag283. Karp and Stevens are brought to mind here, with 
their statement of:284 ‘…both the amount and the tone of newspaper coverage can 
affect leadership evaluations which could result in a gain or loss in party support…’ 
demonstrating that with the older voters who actually turnout voting mostly against 
the Liberal Democrats reading newspapers and the youth mostly not, it does seem 
that the newspaper evaluations of Clegg had an effect on party support, with the 
attacks against Clegg and the other elements eventually forcing the party down from 
the first debate heights. 
Whiteley comments on how professional politicians are seen to ‘under-perform’285, 
and combined with a more informed and critical citizenry286, especially regarding the 
debates, may have assisted Clegg’s positive perception. Cleggmania was ‘…a 
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product of the TV coverage revealing to thousands…for the first time an engaging 
and intelligent person in post.’287, which dovetails with an informed and critical 
citizenry’s positive reaction to Clegg. Furthermore, Carvalho and Winters discuss 
how debate viewers responded positively to Clegg’s performance288, by appearing 
trustworthy and striking a positive chord with his criticisms of the two main parties289. 
However, Clegg’s performance in the later debates was perceived poorly290, putting 
him and the party in a negative light. Additionally, Labour won back most voters 
tempted towards the Liberal Democrats due to a heavy targeting campaign291, with 
Johnston and Pattie arguing that ‘policies and leaders mattered… and as opinions 
changed about both so respondents changed their voting intentions.292So although 
the Liberal Democrats improved their vote-share, they performed less well in target-
seats and especially in student-heavy seats, converse to expectations. 
Students and young people vote less than older populations, and thus in one of the 
most student-heavy seats, Oxford West and Abingdon, the Liberal Democrats 
actually lost a seat to the Conservatives293. This was reflected in less-than-expected 
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gains (with indeed some net losses) of highly student areas294, demonstrating that 
although students especially and young people were attracted to the Liberal 
Democrats on 30% (with 18-24s being the same and 25-34s voting 29%, with 30% 
for Labour and 35% for the Conservatives, with 65s and over voting 44% 
Conservative, 31% for Labour, and 16% Liberal Democrat, and the middle-aged (35-
55) voting 25% for the Liberal Democrats, 29% for Labour, and 35% for the 
Conservatives295), the party did not capitalise. The 2005 Election was actually better 
for Liberal Democrat student votes, demonstrating that Labour’s introduction of 
tuition fees since entering government in 1997 had impacted 2005 more than 2010, 
with even some victories in 2001 being thanks to student anger at the fee-supporting 
parties of Labour and the Conservatives as Fisher and Hillman demonstrate296. 
Thus, tuition fees and cutting them is not as important as perceived. 
 Although some policies were as popular along with Clegg, the party could not break 
through. As argued, Labour’s core voter-targeting contributed, aided by 29% of 
Liberal Democrat voters identifying Labour as their second party-choice compared to 
22% for the Conservatives297. Alongside fear of Conservative cuts and the relatively 
weak Liberal Democrat performance  in Labour areas  compared to Conservative 
areas resulted in a weaker performance seat-wise298, along with SMDP 
disadvantaging third parties. Thus, what can be learned from Cleggmania and the 
Liberal Democrats? 
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Insufficient voters believed or desired  Clegg was a viable Prime Minister or in 
Liberal Democrat victory299. From the media depicting him as a possible British 
Obama300 to being hated, Clegg saw extremes. The media did not create 
Cleggmania, but boosted it, and social media defence of the Liberal Democrats and 
in campaigning post-election campaigning to persuade the party in securing electoral 
reform demonstrated their appeal, but insufficient for a breakthrough. However, it is 
worth considering the debates’ impact on Clegg.   
The debates influenced voter perception of the parties and their leaders.  Pattie and 
Johnston demonstrated if voters thought a party leader had performed badly in the 
debate, they were less likely to vote for them, and vice versa301. Interestingly, Labour 
voters who thought Brown performed best were more likely to vote Labour rather 
than Liberal Democrats about Clegg or Conservatives about Cameron302, showing 
Labour loyalty. However, Clegg’s performance was the most dominant in shifting 
support: paraphrasing Johnson and Pattie again, their hypothetical voter became 
almost a Liberal Democrat convert303: 
The biggest effect is that for evaluations of Nick Clegg’s performance 
on the probability of our hypothetical voter shifting to the Liberal 
Democrats…from a 0.53 probability for someone who thought Clegg 
was the worst [debater] to a near certain probability for someone who 
thought him best. 
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Cameron and Brown had a smaller similar effect304. Thus, without the debates, there 
would have been no ‘Cleggmania’, no recalibration to tackle the Liberal Democrats 
by the other parties, and possibly no coalition. Thus, the debates were hugely 
influential for the media, the election and mobilisation behind the leader and the 
Liberal Democrats. To quote again Pattie and Johnston305: 
No leader going into a future debate should take the event lightly: 
debate performance has the power to influence evaluations of 
leaders, attitudes towards parties and even vote choices. 
 
The impact is clear: the first debate was most influential, as it ‘launched 
Cleggmania…the Liberal Democrat surge...306’ Thus, Cleggmania, given impetus by 
the press, occurred before being beaten back by the main parties and with Clegg 
unable to match first debate heights. However, Clegg’s personal ratings remained far 
higher than either Cameron’s or Brown’s throughout the campaign and especially 
post first-debate307, demonstrating that leadership perceptions do not overall 
motivate partisanship. Indeed, as Clarke et al detail308, although the Liberal 
Democrat manifesto was supported by their voters, it was less supported by Labour 
or Conservative voters. Clarke et al sum it up309: 
‘[With the] Liberal Democrats’ partisan base [weakness] and their 
continuing inability to convince voters that they were best suited to 
handle the economic crisis, their ‘surge’ ultimately receded.’  
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The Liberal Democrat failure, although softened by first debate success, is evident. 
This is worth discussing, and it is worth revisiting leadership and party leader section 
for further development on their effect on voter mobilisation and partisanship. 
Conclusion 
 
2010 was influential. Firstly, the Conservatives could regain power, even if within 
coalition. Labour could be defeated, and the Liberal Democrats were an electoral 
force. The TV debates’ introduction was ground-breaking. The Internet began to be 
seriously used for elections. There was a Youth turnout boost in the election, with the 
debates arguably assisting this. As the BES states, the vast majority of party 
contacting and mobilisation came from leaflets, with social media contacting’s poor 
impact evident. Although the debates were less significant in future elections 
(although still influential), their significance in the 2010 election cannot be overstated, 
and any analysis of the election and  British politics must include them. 
It would now be beneficial to look at  later elections. I will examine the 2014 Scottish 
referendum to analyse the electoral mobilisation during it, particularly the youth vote. 
Looking at how perhaps the Scottish referendum built upon the 2010 election in 
terms of engagement and mobilisation and the policies and methods utilised will 
crucial in analysing political engagement and mobilisation. I will not be looking at the 
2011 AV referendum in any great detail. For a more detailed AV Referendum 
analysis, please see King310.  
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Chapter III: The Scottish Referendum 
 
2010 was marked by the debates, and the stirrings of internet engagement, as well 
as personality and leadership being present with Clegg’s rise. 2014 saw the Scottish 
referendum, and how people were mobilised and engaged both built upon what 
occurred in 2010 and launched a new evolution in the nature of political groups and  
informal politicised communication, which would be present in later elections. Due to 
the SNP’s majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, the Scottish and 
British governments agreed Scotland would hold an independence referendum in 
September 2014. The result was 45% Yes to Independence, and 55% to Remaining 
(or No) in the United Kingdom. I will discuss how youth and other voters were 
mobilised in the referendum, and the support parameters were for the two sides.  
16-17 voting: What was the turnout effect? 
 
The referendum had 84.6% turnout,  the biggest turnout of any modern British 
poll311.The Electoral Commission highlighted how 90% of voters felt that they either 
knew a great deal or a fair amount about the referendum when asked on the 
referendum day312. Furthermore, voting was extended to 16-17 year-olds for the first 
time in Britain313. Interestingly, more 16-17 year-olds voted than 18-24s, with a 75% 
turnout of 16-17 year-olds, compared to 54% of 18-24 , and 25-34s 72% turnout .The 
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literature agrees, with Zeglovits and Aichholzer stating  16-17 year-olds vote more 
than 18 year-olds, using Austrian electoral 2008 data, the first European elections to 
have 16 year-olds voting314. Although the source uses a different nation and federal 
elections, it still bears examination.  
High 16-17 turnout could be due to the ‘novelty boost’ effect, which is when first-time 
voters vote more than older voters, as Konzelmann et al discuss315, as well as Bhatti 
et al316. Electoral Commission data corroborates this: 97% of 16-17 voters said they 
would do again, while only 3% did not know if they would317. I have discussed the 
referendum knowledge the electorate felt they had but I want to discuss the 
electorate’s political interest , as well as how the referendum was discussed amongst 
voters and the post-referendum politicisation of Scotland. Furthermore, the 
referendum TV debates as a follow-up to the previous chapter will be examined, 
particularly if they motivated the young and what effect they had. Finally, I will 
discuss the referendum’s impact on the 2015 General Election 
Mobilisation of the Ayes and Nays 
 
Scotland’s 2011 election had low turnout, with 50.4% for the regional list and 51.7% 
for  constituencies318 (as these are MMP election) which can be compared with the 
2007 Scottish election turnout rates of 52.4% for the Regional list and 51.7% for 
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constituencies319, showing a slight drop. This contrasts to the 2010 General Election 
Scottish turnout of 63.8%320, demonstrating how Scotland viewed Westminster 
elections as more salient. However, Scotland saw unprecedented political 
engagement and mobilisation during the referendum321, arguably politicising 
Scotland and resulting in 71.1%  turnout in 2015322, higher than the average UK 
turnout. 
Leaflets were the most popular choice across all demographics about receiving 
political information and voter contacting, with 36% of voters most preferring this, 
with the Internet at 26%, and TV broadcasts at 23%323. Social media was only 10% 
of people’s choice324,interestingly being categorised differently from the Internet. The 
Scottish referendum was, as Buchanan showed, one of the most discussed topics on 
British Twitter and Facebook during 2014, illustrating interest and engagement325. 
Polat echoed this, stating online discussions can increase political debate 
participation326, showing online discussions’ viability. The viability of the negative 
campaign of Better Together as compared to Yes Scotland, the Independence 
campaign, as well as independence’s supposed risks played well to social media, as 
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Hansen et al argue that negative news content is retweeted more, increasing 
reach327, while negative sentiment is detrimental to retweeting.  Negative news about 
Scotland’s viability as an independent country had more reach due to its negativity, 
demonstrating social media’s potential. Indeed, as Berger and Milkman state, 
positive and anger-inducing content goes viral more328. As shall be seen later, 
negative messages are not always beneficial.  
To return to the referendum TV broadcasts, the fact that they were second in 
popularity demonstrates their political potential.  It would be thought in reference to 
previous chapters that the younger cohort (so 18-24, although 16-17 year olds must 
be included due to Scotland) would prefer social media, the internet, and social 
activism to other forms of political communication, while older voters would prefer 
TV, newspapers, radio and other  methods. The data confirms this, as those aged 
16-34 preferred online political contact and information, typified as social media, 
email and online adverts329, although as the Electoral Commission said330: 
For those…who reported having had enough information on the [two] 
campaigns…to vote… [their] main source of [information] came from 
TV (56%), internet (52%) and leaflets (34%). …Those aged 55+ were 
more likely to report that the TV was their main…information [source] 
while those 16-34 and 35-43 reported the internet as their main 
source…. 
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With ICM stating  16-17 year-olds are most likely out of any age group to state their 
preferred political communication method was online331, this further demonstrates 
younger voters preferring online political communication, with older voters preferring 
TV332. As noted, 90% of voters felt they knew a great amount about the referendum. 
However, there seems to be a turnout limit, as the highest referendum turnout was 
91% in East Dunbartonshire333, fitting with the percentage who knew a great amount 
about the referendum. However, 16-34s stated they were less clear on the 
information available and the referendum consequences334, showing the necessity of 
greater mobilisation and information amongst the youth, and why there was such 
heavy youth targeting. As discussed, leaflets are the most popular way to express 
political information, and the UK and Scottish governments both produced a 
referendum information booklet to go to all Scottish households. Just over 50% 
viewed the Scottish government booklet as helpful, while 38% thought the same 
about the UK government booklet335, showing some mobilisation by the leaflets. 
However, it is worth examining how the Yes/No demographics break down, before 
moving onto SNP membership discussion and Scotland’s politicisation. 
Political advertising has been argued to have almost no effect on turnout. Instead, it 
excels at changing political attitudes and vote-shares for political candidates and 
parties, as Spenkuch and Tonatti argue336. Thus, the political advertising during the 
referendum337 may not have affected turnout, but the result overall. Thus, 
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demographic contact rates should be analysed, especially the Better Together voter 
contacting efforts during the referendum: 
 
Figure 3 Source: British Election Study, Panel study data 2014 (N=2,414) 
The campaign contacted more under-18s than other groups, with 18-25s and the 
66+ group being equal. This may be because the younger cohorts were most likely 
to vote independence, while the 66+ demographic were more likely to vote No. The 
middle cohort (defined here as 26-65 year-olds) were not contacted by Better 
Together as much. Therefore, Better Together contacted the young and the elderly 
more compared to other age groups, as the middle aged cohort is similar until the 
56-65 year olds. If a comparison is made with Yes Scotland with the same 






Figure 4 Source: British election Study, Panel study data 2014 (N=2,414) 
Although the under-18s had low numbers, (even if they were pursued by Yes 
Scotland), 18-25s cohort were clearly still targeted in larger numbers by the Yes 
Scotland campaign, as well as the 66+ cohort. Thus, Yes Scotland carried out similar 
demographic targeting as Better Together, with 60% of 26-35s being contacted, with 
the 36-45, 46-55, and 56-65 age-ranges all having similar rates of contact for both 
Yes and No, with a slight variation of people recording no contact by Yes Scotland. 
Thus, Yes Scotland was actually better at contacting a wider demographic than 
Better Together, although they also made more effort to contact the youth. 
Rosenqvist investigated under 18s voting, arguing against it due to their lack of 
political knowledge338. As before, analysing how the votes break down will be key to 
seeing how political campaigns mobilise supporters, especially with an emotive 
subject as Scottish independence. 
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Yes Scotland and Better Together 
 
I will looking at SRS data, as well as other sources. The study itself is publicly 
unavailable, but as stated, many different academics used its data from it for various 
articles and presentations, enabling me to use them. 
With Mitchell and Henderson’s analysis of the No result, it occurred due to older 
voters339 voting No. If only voters under 50 voted, Scotland would be independent340;  
16-18 voters had a large 62.5% Yes vote, compared to 37.5% against341, giving 
credence to the heavy youth contacting. It is worth noting that a September 2015 
BBC article which also commented on the SRS stated the opposite, with the 16-19 
cohort voting 54% to remain in the UK342. However, I will carry on with the 
interpretation that 16-19 year olds voted for independence, and discussion of why 
the other article varied will have to take place in other works.  
More women voted to stay than men at 56.6% and 46.5% respectively343, and the 
working class voted heavily to remain compared to the middle class, with a working 
class Yes vote of 53.6% compared to a middle class Yes vote of 41.7%344. With the 
previous evidence that middle class and elderly voters have higher turnout345, 
evidently these were why Scotland is not independent. Furthermore, they were 
already politically mobilised and engaged, and although the youth were politically 
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interested in the referendum, Better Together’s mobilisation determined their victory. 
Particularly why the youth turned out to vote for the referendum is evident when low 
youth turnout is examined: although young people may be disengaged from formal 
politics, they are politically interested in causes, which Scottish independence 
arguably is346. Thus, they were effectively mobilised by the campaigns. 
Dassonneville argued short-term socio-economic structures are becoming more 
influential than long-term factors on turnout and electoral decisions347. Looking 
further at the reasons for the vote result, Ashcroft’s poll post-referendum stated that 
Yes voters perceived the NHS to be the second most important issue in deciding 
how to vote at 54%348, while No voters perceived it as 36%349. The most important 
factor in Yes voters in determining their vote was being disaffected from Westminster 
politics, with 74% of Yes voters stating this as their top reason350, contrasting to No 
voters, with 4% of them thought it was the most important factor. Notably, those 
wealthier and more satisfied with life voted against independence, while those not 
voted Yes. 
There were two television debates during the referendum, which hoped to repeat the 
success of the 2010 debates. However, the literature suggests this did not occur. As 
MacDonald and Mao argue, the debates did not significantly affect the final 
results351, and neither did the devolution promise made by the main three UK party 
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leaders. The debates’ lack of impact is bolstered by Henderson and Mitchell’s SRS 
report which stated that 64.4% of the Scottish electorate viewed the debates as 
having no impact as they were already decided, 29.1% stating that they made them 
think but didn’t affect their vote,  5.1% stating that they seriously got them thinking 
about the other side, and finally 1.4% stating that the debates totally changed their 
vote352.  Thus, clearly the debates had little effect on voter decisions. When voters 
researched referendum information online, swing voters leant more towards No353, 
which arguably could be said to be risk and negative news content as discussed 
earlier with Hansen et al, being more viral354. Taking Dassonneville again355, this 
correlates with previous discussion concerning short-term economic factors being 
more influential than long-term factors in electoral decisions, but only due to 
gradually weakening long-term factors356. How do you mobilise if this is the case?  
The referendum was dominated by currency, the EU, and Scotland’s potential. As 
Johns states, the Scottish electorate were unconcerned with national identity, nor 
devolved powers, the Union was not seen optimistically, but neither was there 
widespread independence pessimism357. Indeed, fear of the unknown and the future 
were dominated, as well as voter life satisfaction. Quoting Johns again, the more 
willing the voter was in taking risks, the higher chance of voting independence358. 
Combined with voters who felt they would be personally better off in an independent 
                                                           
352 Henderson and Mitchell (2015), p.19. 
353 Ibid, p.19. 
354 Hansen et al (2011) 
355 Dassonneville (2016) 
356 Ibid. 
357 Johns, Rob (2014) Why Scotland Voted No. Presented at the Department of Politics & 
International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, 30 September 2014. [Online] Located 
at: http://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/scottishreferendumstudy/files/2015/01/RHUL-slides.pdf and accessed 3rd 
May 2018. 
358 Ibid. 




Scotland being more likely to vote Yes359, economic risk was the deciding factor, 
bringing to mind rational choice theory in voting decisions, as Blais critiques360. Also, 
areas which had suffered public service cuts were more likely to vote Yes. Thus, 
mobilisation could only go so far; even with 85% turnout, No won. New voters made 
little difference to the overall result361, so stating that Yes would have won if they 
turned out more young voters is fallacious. Revisting risk, this is often decisive in 
referendums, as Naudeau et al discuss how risk-taking attitudes had a modest but 
significant impact on individual choice and the outcome of the 1995 Quebec 
independence referendum362. Addressing risks that people are wary of is crucial to 
any referendum, and thus the literature should be explored, in particular Hallahan 
363,and Strömbäck’s work, which discusses political media framing364.  
Tthe young were mobilised effectively, and turnout was high. Counter to 2010, the 
Scottish TV debates were not as influential and that the youngest cohort turned out 
higher than a lot of older voters. There are parallels between the 2016 EU and the 
2014 Scottish  referendum, particularly on how socio-economic divisions affected the 
vote (for example, the more deprived the area, the more likely the voter was to vote 
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Yes or Leave)365. However, the ongoing politicisation Scotland due to the 
referendum is necessary to discuss. 
The Politicisation of Scotland and the aftereffects of the referendum 
 
David Cameron’s post-referendum focus on England rankled with the Scottish 
independence campaign366. Cameron discussed  the high turnout, high civic 
engagement367 and particularly youth engagement.  
Youth turnout was high368, and the 18-24 cohort turned out higher than the same 
group in the 2010 UK general election369, demonstrating young Scots’ political 
interest during the referendum. NatCen explored this, stating that in 2016 and three 
years prior, Scottish political engagement increased, with 69% of Scots doing some 
kind of political activity, compared to 61% who did the same in 2013, increasing by 
8%370. When analysed, the referendum effect is clear371: 
Of the 69% who had registered their views on an issue, 3 in 10 did 
so specifically in relation to the… referendum. Moreover… 
younger people were more likely to have taken part in an activity 
related to the independence referendum than older age groups 
(44% of 18-29 year-olds compared with 26% of 65+s). 
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Thus, the young were more driven by the referendum than the elderly, so although 
the elderly are more politically engaged, the referendum was significant in  political 
engagement. If BES data from September 2014 through to early 2015 is examined, 
the referendum impact is clear:  
 
Figure 5 British Election Study, Panel Study data 2014-2015 (n= 5,151) 
Significantly during the referendum and immediately afterwards, under 18s were 
politically interested by 9.27 out of 10, much higher than other demographics, 
although the most elderly voters during September-October 2014 were the second 
most politically attentive. However, if contrasted to March 2015, under-18s’ political 
interest dramatically fell from October to March 2015, arguably due to them unable to 
vote in general elections. However, 65% of Scottish 18-24 year-olds said that they 
would definitely vote in the 2015 General Election as compared to 34% of their 




English counterparts372, demonstrating the referendum’s mobilising effect. The older 
generations’ political interest only increased slightly. However, 16-17 year-olds’ 
demobilisation due to voting restrictions can be corroborated by Breeze et al’s 
interviewing 16-17 year-olds post-referendum 373: 
…I [voted] in the Referendum, the most important thing…and now I 
[can’t] vote in the General Election, that’s pretty crap.  
Evidently, the youth were angry and politically disengaged post-referendum, and so 
political engagement stalled. However, as Breeze argues, by the referendum’s very 
nature (as there were dozens of small organisations on both sides) enabled youth 
participation and engagement: to quote Marsh and Akram, these groups represented 
a rise in alternative forms of politics which crossed between ‘the social, the socio-
political and political’374.  
The informal, fluid yet political nature of these organisations could be why the 
referendum engaged the youth; as Bang states, supposed disengaged youth 
‘may…be the most active in more informal…governance networks and practices’375. 
Referring to Marsh and Akram again, the referendum bridged youths uninterested in 
formal politics and politics itself, as it ‘spanned the…porous boundary between 
traditional and new forms of political participation.’376 It also galvanised formal politics 
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with ‘ …under-18 year-olds who [felt no affiliation] to any political party declined’377. 
Thus, social media is important to political engagement, as Eichhorn states the 
importance of informal political learning within social networks and peer groups378, 
demonstrating the success of the referendum.  Referring to Lawrence, his statement 
‘Public involvement transformed the credibility and hence the perceived legitimacy of 
mediated politics...379’ although concerned with political television, can be used for 
understanding the effect of these irreverent social groupings on politics, giving 
Scottish politics and politics itself a credibility that did not exist before, leading to 
Scotland’s politicisation.  
 As seen, Scottish 16-17 year-olds being the most online cohort demonstrates social 
media’s potential. The referendum’s crucial nature was vital in its perception as 
significant and why there was much political engagement, as it was seen as a ‘lived 
experience’, as highlighted by Bang, Marsh and Akram380 rather than impersonal 
formal politics and Parliament (both Scottish and British). Rubin’s work on how 
young people can develop political ideas and ‘develop civic identities as reactions to 
personal everyday experiences’381 corresponds with how these groups and social 
networks can be used to politically mobilise and engage. Thus, society and politics 
being ‘experienced’ engages voters. The referendum’s significance and the youth’s 
role reflected in the turnout. This phenomenon was recorded in Breeze et al’s work, 
which recorded how young voters joined political parties and became more involved 
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in Scottish politics, formal and otherwise, due to the referendum382. However, care 
must be taken to not conclude that the referendum definitely resulted in a newly 
engaged Scottish electorate, but it was significant. 
 Any political awareness and mobilisation discussion must include the enormous rise 
in Scottish party membership. SNP membership went from 25,000 to over 42,000 
directly post-referendum383. Furthermore, Scottish Green membership significantly 
rose, octupling to over 9000 by September 2015384385. SNP membership settled at 
118,000 in May 2018, almost as large as the Conservative Party386, illuminating the 
SNP’s dominance of Scotland. These parties all campaigned for independence, 
which perhaps demonstrates how Yes politically engaged more successfully  while 
the No side mobilised to defend the status quo without actually getting involved in 
politics per se. Thus, it is worth studying Henderson’s SRS analysis387: 
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Figure 6 Scottish Referendum Data 
UK political interest barely increased during the campaign’s last four weeks, while 
Scottish politics interest increased along with referendum interest. Therefore, the 
referendum mobilised Scottish  and referendum politics interest, fitting with reduced 
turnout at the 2015 and 2017 General Elections. Across all levels, there was less 
interest in UK politics than Scottish or referendum politics, concluded as UK politics 
being regarded less importantly. Thus, the referendum mobilised and engaged 
voters. To use more Henderson, the Yes and No voter disparity may illustrate why 
Yes party membership increased, and why Scottish political engagement 
increased388: 
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Figure 7 Scottish Referendum Data 
 
Yes voters perceived political involvement and engagement would rise post-
referendum, with personal involvement estimation being enormous at 65.7% 
compared to 25.8%, while No voters both perceived Scotland and individuals would 
be far less involved politically, with the Scottish public estimated 71.5% to becoming 
less involved and 31.9%  more involvement. Thus, Yes tapped into potential political 
reengagement. As seen, No voters overwhelmingly were satisfied with Westminster 
politics389, while Yes voters felt otherwise390. Therefore, Yes’ youth engagement 
countered Sloam’s assertion that ‘politics itself for the young has negative 
connotations’391. 
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What does the referendum mean? 
 
The referendum would change Scottish voter allegiances. Most Yes voters voted 
SNP in 2015, with post-referendum data demonstrating 70%  of Yes voters intended 
to vote SNP, with only 10% for Labour, as Fieldhouse and Prosser discussed392, with 
eventually over 90% of Yes voters voting SNP at 2015393 leading to Labour’s 
Scottish collapse, only recovering slightly in 2017. No voters did not enormously 
change intentions bar slight Conservative rise.  Thus, an attitudinal and voting 
intensions realignment occurred due to the referendum (or in public policy language, 
the ‘punctuated equilibrium’394) radicalness.  
The referendum mobilised many Scots, including for the first time 16-17 year-olds 
being brought into formal politics, tempered with Rosenqvist’s argument that granting 
votes to under-18s is inadvisable due to their lacking political knowledge395. Leaflets 
and TV remained the most popular for people gaining their opinions, with the Internet 
fast becoming a mobilising and communicative force. Contrary to 2010, the TV 
debates were perceived insignificantly. The different goals held by the two 
campaigns gave a hint of the 2015 General Election, and how risk played a role. 
Social media and internet communication came into relief by youth engagement on 
social media396 and politically involving the youth in politics was evident by the 
referendum, with high youth turnout and engagement. Political interest and attention 
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rising during it supports the importance of campaigns, and mobilisation of voters can 
have an effect. As such, the Scottish referendum informs how voter mobilisation was 
changing, which impacted both voter choice and mobilisation. The referendum being 
a ‘lived experience’ and what this means politically is key. Thus, I will look at the 
2015 General Election and how the main parties mobilised supporters. Although 
2015 fell back in somewhat from 2014 in regards to political communication, the 
continuing growth of social media and the youth’s evolving engagement with politics 
















Chapter IV: The 2015 UK General Election 
 
The last chapter discussed the evolution of political mobilisation, especially amongst 
the young and on social media. The Scottish referendum was arguably significant in 
this regard. How the parties built on the messages from the referendum, as well as 
the five years of political campaigning, issues, and technology  development since 
2010 would be significant. Thus, this chapter will build upon thoughts and concepts 
discussed in the last chapter and previously, detailing how British political parties 
mobilised and engaged voters over time. 
This chapter will examine how the main parties used social media, the Internet, and 
traditional mobilisation to mobilise in 2015. It will unconcerned with the precise 
election events, but instead with how the main political parties mobilised supporters 
for greater turnout and engagement. I will demonstrate that social media was utilised 
more effectively by political parties as both campaigning and mobilising tools. 
However, social media and the Internet’s use as campaigning tools will not foster 
greater political participation and mobilisation if used exclusively, especially among 
those unlikely to vote, and social media was not used to its full potential, instead 
acting as another method of campaign instead of engagingly, as Fletcher 
discusses397. The television debates will also be examined to see if they had the 
same mobilising effect as in 2010. The 2010 and 2015 BES data will be examined to 
see if party contact rates had evolved from 2010, as social media spending and 
political party social media participation may have varied.  
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Voters’ political engagement through social media and the Internet will also be 
studied. Thus, an explanation of the 2015 General Election and voter mobilisation 
will become clear, as well as political participation and engagement-boosting. 
Discussing youth voting and mobilisation in the election is key to revealing how 
parties mobilised and engaged reluctant voters. 
An explanation of youth voting (and other age groups) during the election 
 
The 2010 election had a 44% turnout for the 18-24 cohort398. As an August 2015 
Ipsos Mori poll said, in 2015, the same cohort turnout was 43%399, turnout for 25-34 
year-olds was 54%, and those aged 55+ had 78%400.  Turnout increased by 1% from 
2010’s 65% to 66% in 2015401, and youth turnout decreased 1%, while the slightly 
older cohort increased their turnout.  This will be analysed by discussing how parties 
contacted and mobilised voters. 
 With the Liberal Democrats in 2010 having policies as free university tuition, the 
youth were seemingly attracted402, even if this resulted in less votes than hoped. 
With the Liberal Democrat participation in the 2010-5 coalition, they declined 
dramatically across all demographics, with their student and youth strongholds 
virtually eliminated, demonstrated by their youth support dropping from 30% to 
5%403.  The Conservatives won, pushing Labour back and eviscerating the Liberal 
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Democrats. Thus, how the demographics broke down party-wise must be examined, 
as this will illuminate the youth vote and the results. 
I will discuss the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrat and UKIP s, as they were 
the four national political parties campaigning in the election, with the Greens 
campaigning separately across the UK. I will not discuss enormously the nationalist 
parties or the Northern Irish parties. I will primarily be interested in the age 
demographic. To begin, I will look at the 2015 BES data, analysing data before, 
during and post-campaign: 
 
 
Figure 8 British Election Study, Panel Study Data 2015 n= 74,279 
 
This data is across Great Britain. Seemingly, the younger the voter (bar under-18s) 
the more left-wing they are. Thus, left-wing parties struggling to make an impact 
electorally seems to hold, as older voters are more likely to be right-wing and turnout 




more. However, the table is how people self-identify politically, so it may not 
correspond to actual political choices, as centrist parties would have performed 
better. Younger voters both turnout less and are less politically interested than older 
voters, so how political parties contact potential voters will change by demographics. 
The Conservatives won unexpectedly, gaining 24 seats to 330 on 36.8% vote-share 
(0.8% increase)404. Home-owners, the elderly (those aged 60:, 45% to Labour’s 
25%), the wealthy, with £20K-39K earners going 37% Conservative compared to 
32% Labour, £40k to £69k 42% Conservative and 29% Labour, and finally £70k 
earners voting 51% Conservative compared to Labour’s 23% dominated the Tory 
vote. Their support from the privately employed was  43% to Labour’s 26%, 37% of 
those with A-Levels or less and 38% of those with GCSE education or less405, and 
those paying mortgages, owning homes outright, and privately renting, with 47%, 
42% and 34% respectively voting Conservative, according to YouGov research post-
election406. Also significant are Conservative voters’ newspaper choice: they were a 
majority of Sun, Times, Express, Mail and Telegraph readers, while not winning 
Guardian, Mirror, Independent and Star readers407. Significantly, the Conservatives 
received a minority of BAME408 , 23% to Labour’s 65% , according to the Ipsos Mori 
post-election409, compared to the Conservatives winning 39% of whites versus 
Labour’s 28%410.  
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Thus, the Conservatives gained a majority of votes across many demographics, not 
gaining majority support of socially-housed and BAME citizens as well as the poor 
and public-sector workers. Therefore, how the Conservatives communicated and 
mobilised voters differed from Labour’s.  
Labour performed slightly better than 2010, with a 30.4% voteshare and 9.3 million 
votes, a 1.5% increase411. However, Labour lost 26 seats, down to 232. According to 
the above YouGov data,  the young (18-29) dominated Labour’s vote with 36% 
compared to the Conservatives’ 32% 412, while only having 25% of over 65+s. 
Labour also were supported by women under 50, and never had male majority 
support at any age413. Labour also had stronger public sector worker support, with 
36% of them voting Labour compared to 33% Conservative. Labour also gained the 
votes of those earning £20K or less with 36% compared to the Conservatives’ 29%. 
Also, Labour only won a majority of voters in social housing, with 45% to the 
Conservatives’ 20%414, which when combined with voter-registration changes and 
the arguable effect social housing and rented accommodation turnout (which Labour 
lost by a smaller margin), illustrated that Labour failed to sufficiently mobilise voters, 
and demonstrated their inability to reach higher classes and their perceived 
economic weakness. This is further demonstrated by looking at the 2015 aggregate 
Ipsos Mori results415 and seeing that although Labour managed to get 41% of the DE 
social class, they lost the other classes to the Conservatives416, demonstrating 
Labour’s lack of wider appeal. Finally, Labour got 1% less than the Conservatives on 
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university graduates, getting 34% to the Conservative 35%, which is interesting as in 
2017, the university educated tended to dominate in voting for Labour417.  Thus, 
Labour’s electoral support existed amongst the poor, the public sectors and rental 
sectors, but it was unable to convince enough to vote Labour nor did it assuage the 
economic concerns voters held towards Labour. The SNP’s rise devastated Labour 
in Scotland, as previously discussed. Exactly how Labour mobilised supporters and 
tackled Labour weakness will be discussed, but before that, I shall analyse the 
Liberal Democrat vote. 
The Liberal Democrats suffered, being reduced to 8 seats and 2.4 million votes418, 
dropping almost to 8% despite hoping to retain 15-30 seats419. Looking at the above 
YouGov and Ipsos data, the Liberal Democrats only gained 7-8% of each 
demographic, with their only significant outlier being 16% of  Independent readers 
voting Liberal Democrat420. They performed better amongst richer and older 
populations, but this topped at 12% amongst AB voters421. Interestingly, data 
indicated the party was more popular when voters were asked to think about their 
own constituency, demonstrating the MPs were more popular than the party itself422. 
Furthermore, the Liberal Democrats lost fewer votes in seats where the incumbent 
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stood compared to new Liberal Democrat candidates hoping to retain it423, although 
this was rather muted. Also, Clegg’s descent into unpopularity had a significant vote-
drag, even if pre-election reports were sceptical424. However, the Liberal Democrats 
received a seat for every percentage point they received (although millions more 
votes than the SNP, and dozens fewer seats) unlike UKIP. 
UKIP received 3.8 million votes, one seat, 12.6% voteshare, and third in vote total425 
They came first in the 2014 European elections, although European Parliamentary 
elections are conducted under proportional representation, and are second-order 
elections, demonstrating new parties’ difficulty breaking through UK’s FPTP system. 
Before 2015, UKIP hoped to gain Labour areas such as Dudley and Rotherham426 
due to  UKIP-friendly demographics of those areas of elderly, working-class, male, 
lesser-educated and whiter populations, as Ford and Goodwin discuss427. This 
illuminates electoral-shift towards UKIP, and evolution of how political parties 
communicated and campaigns changing. 
As YouGov and Ipsos show, UKIP’s foundation was evident. UKIP had more support 
across all ages than the Liberal Democrats428 of around 11-14%, with youth support 
being 9%, the same figure as the Liberal Democrats. According to Ipsos, 18-24 year-
olds voted 8% UKIP, 3% more than the Liberal Democrats and equal to the Greens, 
demonstrating the Liberal Democrat decline and the rise of UKIP amongst this 
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group429. Seemingly, the older the voter, the higher the UKIP vote with 30-39 year-
olds 10% for UKIP, 40-49s 14%, 50-59 year-olds voting 16%, and finally 65+s voting 
16%430, similar to older groups voting more for Conservatives. Also, white and poorer 
voters were more likely to vote UKIP431 maybe explained by their migrant-hostile 
policies432, and also significantly, the lesser educated the voter, the more likely they 
would vote UKIP, with 20% with GCSEs or less voting UKIP as compared to only 6% 
of the university-educated433.. Although Europe featured less than in 2017, it was still 
significant, even if Euroscepticism was not more prevalent in 2015 than it was in 
2012, which was when UKIP’s polling numbers began to rise, as explained in the 
BSA findings post-election434.  
The findings discusses how UKIP supporters are relatively left-wing economically435, 
relatively right-wing socially and also feeling alienated from main parties and 
government436. Whitaker’s and Lynch support this, arguing UKIP’s 2009 election 
support as well as afterwards stemmed from alienated, Eurosceptic voters 
concerned about migration437. Thus, UKIP’s 2015 support came from the alienated,  
who distrusted government, older and whiter, and poorer compared to other party 
supporters. There was Conservative concern of a mass exodus of Conservative 
voters to UKIP. However, Webb et al detailed only 5% of Conservative members 
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actually voted for UKIP in 2015438. This demonstrates that UKIP posed a slight 
Conservative risk, but UKIP’s demographics leant more towards harming Labour. 
Thus, it is evident what motivated UKIP’s support.  
With the above analysis in mind, it is worth exploring the various party campaigns 
and how they contacted voters during and post-election to see the impact contacting 
voters had on turnout. As such, voter contacting methods of the parties will be 
examined, using the 2015 BES campaign data. I will first exclude the ages from 25 
and above, then I will examine those aged 65+, and then finally all the age 
demographics: 
Table I: Types of contact reported by respondents to the British Election Study 
survey – Controlled by 18-24 year olds. 
Waves – British Election Study – Wave  5 during Election, and Wave 6 post-
election. 
Campaign/Post Campaign. Contact rate measured in %. 
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I excluded Twitter, unlike in the 2010 chapter; the 2015 data has a larger range of 
social media data, which I will utilise later. Again, significantly, leaflets were the most 
popular way across all parties in contacting young voters (and indeed all voters) with 
email being second and others far behind, although Labour home visits were high. 
Labour had the most impact in contacting younger voters, with again leaflets being 
the most significant, with an 18% lead over the Conservatives post-election and a 
6% lead during. The Conservatives were second in contacting 18-24 year olds, with 
the Liberal Democrats and UKIP behind. Comparing UKIP’s contacting and 
mobilising efforts  to the Liberal Democrats, notably UKIP contacted fewer people 
but received far more votes. Looking at post-campaign figures, not a lot changed, 




apart from more youth contact, and leafleting confirmed as the most popular method, 
with texting and telephoning at the bottom. Notably, there may be an under-
estimation of total voter-contact439. I will now utilise the same data but for those aged 
65+ to see how the elderly were contacted: 
Table II: Types of contact reported by respondents to the British Election Study 
survey – Controlled by 65+ year olds. 
Waves – British Election Study – Wave 5 during Election, and Wave 6 post-
election. 
Campaign/Post Campaign. Contact rate measured in % 
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Comparing the two tables: across most metrics, more effort was made by all parties 
to contact and mobilise voters aged 65+ than for the young (bar Labour’s leafleting, 
which had a higher youth contact-rate). Furthermore, the Conservatives had a higher 
elderly email contact-rate, with 2.7% campaign-contact and 12.3% post-campaign 
compared to 1.9% and 7.7% for the young, demonstrating the Conservatives’ main 
demographic targets. UKIP contact-rates universally for the elderly were higher than 
their young vote, fitting with UKIP voters being often older, and also that older voters 




are more likely to participate in formal politics. I will not go through every result, but it 
demonstrates that political parties (apart from Labour youth leafleting (and email)) 
made more effort in 2015 to contact elderly voters, with the Conservatives contacting 
the most, and a far closer race between them and Labour compared to youth-
contacting. 
It is possible to see entire electorate contact-rates post-campaign by examining 
Cowley and Kavanagh’s The British Election of 2015440: 
Table III: Voter Contact during the Campaign (%) 
Types of Contact Con Lab LD UKIP 
Phone 2 3 1 - 
Leaflet/letter 34 38 23 21 
At home 7 10 3 1 
Street 2 3 1 1 
Email 9 9 4 1 
Text 1 1 -  
Overall 39 43 25 22 
Waves 6: BES, Core weighting.  
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Labour evidently leads. Emails dominated voter contacting, only being beaten by 
Labour’s home visits, although they were popular amongst Conservatives too. 
Although care must be taken not to overstate the mobilisation impact of social media, 
it is significant.  As discussed, social media was first properly exploited in British 
elections in 2015, even if not as significantly as 2017. The Conservatives being 
second in contact perhaps demonstrates their social media usage, and  their lesser 
reliance on normal contacting.  
The Conservatives won a majority of demographics and the election. Labour only 
managed some demographics. The Liberal Democrats gained 8% per demographic, 
far from their strong student and youth support from 2010 and before, while UKIP 
had stronger support than them generally. The result was unexpected; instead of 
Labour in power, there was a Conservative majority, only one UKIP MP, Liberal 
Democrat collapse, and Labour lost seats. However, with the serious emergence of 
social media, political communication and mobilisation opportunities changed. 
Despite the drive for youth political participation, the young felt  political stake, nor 
did they feel that parties spoke to them, as Fox states, although he notes that using 
the term ‘alienated young people’ is problematic, as it suggests there is only one 
form of political engagement441, with young people finding politicians and politics 
alienating, not politics in itself442. Labour proposed lowering the voting age to 16, but 
this did not tap into how political parties and Labour in particular contacted and 
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mobilised youth support, with only a 4% lead amongst the 18-29s compared to the 
Conservatives. However, contacting youth would be a key aim of all. 
Social networks during 2015 and online mobilisation   
 
In 2015, 72% of British adult Internet users used social media, demonstrating 
political parties’ validity in using the Internet seriously443.. Perhaps the most famous 
social media campaign during the election was the Conservative one concerning 
Miliband and the prospect of Salmond commanding him in a hung parliament444, and 
the most lasting memorywas Cameron’s ‘chaos’ tweet445. Thus I will discuss social 
media’s mobilisation and engagement. I will exploit the 2015 BES data during and 
post-election, as this discusses how social media was used and how people 
responded as well as voters mobilising others via social media. How online 
campaigning is more of a ‘bubble’ than thought will be discussed, as Conover et al 
hilight446. All of this will demonstrate how parties in 2015 mobilised and engaged 
voters. 
Firstly, I shall discuss the spending receipts of the main political parties, as this 
explores how much the various political parties invested in social media mobilisation. 
The Conservatives’ Facebook 2015 election expenditure was £1.2 million out of a 
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total Tory expenditure of £15.6 million447448. Compared to Labour’s expenditure of 
£16,000 over the same period449, arguably the Conservatives were more visible on 
Facebook than Labour, perhaps signifying why Labour lost, even though young 
people are more engaged with social media. UKIP’s expenses were £91,322450 over 
the same period, so UKIP spent more on Facebook than Labour, significant as one 
of UKIP’s strategies was targeting Labour strongholds451, as Ford and Goodwin 
identify::452 
The ideal seats for UKIP share key characteristics: … lots of ‘left 
behind’ voters who …are the most receptive to UKIP... These ideal 
seats also have very low numbers of voters who…remain resistant to 
UKIP, including university graduates, ethnic minorities and people in 
professional and economically secure occupations… if UKIP stood a 
strong candidate and knocked on plenty of doors – they would probably 
find the most voters receptive to their message. 
 
UKIP only won one seat in 2015; the huge majorities of some UKIP-friendly Labour 
seats protected Labour MPs, such as Stoke-on-Trent North453, with a 10,000 majority 
in 2010, reduced to 5,000 in 2015, despite an 18.6% UKIP vote-share increase 454. 
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However, UKIP did not rise above this, being decimated in the 2017 General 
Election as will be seen. Also, as seen from the demographic data, UKIP did not beat 
Labour in almost any demographic, showing that perhaps focusing on social media 
on certain seats was UKIP’s only viable strategy, as they were unable to match 
Labour’s or the Conservatives’ level in a first-order election. This maybe 
demonstrates social media limitations. 
Returning back to social media expenses, the Liberal Democrats spent £22,245 from 
May 2014-May 2015455. As their 2015 seat target was 30-35456, arguably a national 
social media campaign was unnecessary, and instead seats that were defensible 
were targeted online, like UKIP. This was necessary, because although the Liberal 
Democrats had received 23% of the vote and 57 seats in 2010457, they plummeted in 
seat and vote numbers in 2015. Thus, in 2015, the main parties did not fully exploit 
social media, and engaged in a very unidirectional and paternalistic way, instead of 
being dialogic and interactive.  
Alistair Campbell stated that ‘the genius of social media and…Facebook is the 
concept of the friend. We trust our friends.’458 Facebook was dominant, with Twitter 
being ‘where only the journalists are… it’s not where people are.’459 As such, Labour 
reached 16 million people on their Facebook page in their best month, and the 
Conservatives managed to reach 17 million a week during the campaign460. With the 
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ability to quickly disseminate information, the potential for social media was clear, 
even if care must be taken to not overstate this. As McDonald, Ladd and Lenz argue, 
although the work is from 2009, newspaper endorsements have a significant effect 
on voters, as an estimated 10-25% of tabloid readers whose papers switched their 
endorsement to Labour in 1997 voted Labour in 1997461, which indicates that the 
print media in 2015 could still be strong, with a mobilising effect. Indeed, examining 
the data, UKIP was endorsed by the Express, although still resulting in a bigger 
Conservative vote than UKIP amongst the readership (44% to 33%), the fact that the 
stories  the Express wrote about were broadly sympathetic to the Conservatives 
helped them, as well as demonstrating that switching was positive for UKIP462. As a 
majority of papers backed the Conservatives or a coalition-continuation, it is evident 
why this negatively affected Labour463.  
Although Labour hoped that using online communication would be beneficial, as 
more of its demographic and voters were online, the Conservatives’ having more 
money and their greater embracing of the digital realm put paid to that, as well as the 
argument that mobilising the young and disaffected by social media may not be 
possible. To discuss Leyva, although those who use social media politically regularly 
have a weakly positive correlation with offline formal and informal political 
engagement while still being a ‘slacktivist’ online464, those already demographically 
(so richer and more educated) and psychologically likely to politically engage have a 
much greater level of political engagement, both online and offline. Thus, frequent 
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social media consumption does not mobilise or engage many beyond those who 
would be engaged or mobilised anyway465. Additionally, Min’s argument that simply 
accessing web technologies and social media is not enough to ensure political 
mobilisation and engagement466 demonstrates that although social media and online 
tools are somewhat useful, it does not encourage those not online or the politically 
unengaged. Therefore, if political parties do use social media effectively, it must be 
an interactive and two-way process between voters and parties, which will engage 
and mobilisie voters and non-voters alike. If not, then political social media activism 
is effectively a ‘bubble’.   
Looking at Fisher et al,  although campaigning online was strengthened in 2015, 
face-to-face campaigning results in stronger electoral benefits, which is one reason 
why the types of voter contact detailed above were significant467. The Conservatives 
utilised their campaigning skills effectively in 2015 as well as the general 
circumstances of the vote468. The paper also argues that constituency and thus 
electoral campaigns matter to the overall result469. This perhaps explains why the 
Conservatives won: being ahead in various issues, they campaigned effectively, 
turning wavering voters into supporters who were then mobilised to vote, as Foos 
argued in 2016 concerning candidate contact and party support470. Therefore, stating 
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that social media was solely the reason for Conservative victory is incorrect: 
although the Conservatives had a greater reach on social media, social media does 
not effectively bring in new voters, as stated. It instead drives the politically engaged 
and mobilised, which is good for the Conservatives (and potentially the Liberal 
Democrats) but is not so good for Labour’s traditional base, although with the 
middle-classening and rising educational levels of current Labour voters and 
members471, this may evolve.  
However, studying Vaccari and Valeriani’s 2016 work, particularly how social media 
deepens and broadens party-related engagement, social media can revitalise party 
activities amongst party members as well as non-party members who discuss politics 
on social media472, with these discussions narrowing the party-engagement divide 
between members and non-members473. Thus, social media may benefit political 
mobilisation and engagement, even though how it drives up participation of the 
politically disengaged needs to be discussed more. This can be interpreted from the 
Vaccari work474: 
 Not only do social media contribute to hybridising repertoires of party 
activism but they are also promoting a hybridisation of party activists, 
bringing together older and newer types of participants who may have 
different views of party engagement and different reasons for taking 
part... 
 
Thus, social media can mobilise, but only if done well and tied in with offline party 
activism. Indeed, Wojcieszack and Mutz argue that social media’s apolitical nature 
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can attract those disinclined to engage with political institutions475. Gibson and 
Cantijoch agree, arguing that digital media may ‘upgrade’ political discussion into a 
‘more [actively engaging] participatory form…’476, demonstrating how social media, if 
participatory and dialogic, can mobilise political participation and turnout. Thus, the 
Conservatives’ 2015 campaign may have mobilised some, but it was not as polished 
as Labour’s 2017 digital campaign. Norris discussed in 2003 (so before social 
media’s rise) how the Internet was a reinforcing mechanism for those already 
politically involved and engaged477, so over time, political parties utilised the web and 
social media more to engage voters. This is essential to political success, because 
as argued by Webb et al, campaign work done by supporters may match or exceed 
that done by party-members, with individual party-members doing more than non-
member supporters478 and more intense activities too, although lower-intensity work 
is carried out by non-party members.  
However, Baumgartner argued in 2010 that social media users were no more 
inclined to politically participate than users of other media479. This paper discussed 
the US 2008 presidential primaries, but it still is worth studying as a FPTP system. 
One reason why Conservatives performed well can be found in Conover et al’s 2012 
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paper, which although again US-focussed, demonstrates right-wing social media 
communities: 
…exhibit greater levels of political activity, a more tightly 
interconnected social structure, and a communication network… 
that facilitates the rapid and broad dissemination of political 
information.480 
This may explain the Conservatives’ work on social media and their victory. Although 
they had fewer members and supporters overall than Labour481, they were favoured 
by the fact that the economy, taxation, the election process and living standards 
were salient on the public agenda throughout the election, with Labour unable to 
take advantage of the NHS being its strongest point as it was only discussed 3.7% of 
the time482. Therefore, even with Labour’s greater support-base, the Conservatives 
having more money for social media and their dominance of main campaign issues 
ensured Labour’s disadvantage. A rational choice approach could arguably be the 
reason for Conservative success, but Petracca argues otherwise: 
…By assuming that self-interest is an empirically established 
component of human nature, rational choice theory…perpetuates 
a political life which is antithetical to important tenets of normative 
democratic theory…483 
 
Thus, dominance of friendly issues to the Conservatives during the campaign, and 
Cameron’s perceived charisma ensured victory, as well as their greater utilisation of 
social media and the Internet. Although other arguments shall be examined, what 
can be seen is thus: social media use by British political parties had developed to the 
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stage where it had moved beyond perfunctory  engagement of the already mobilised 
and motivated, and had begun to bleed into offline campaigning. The Conservatives 
being richer were able to exploit new media, despite their smaller membership than 
Labour.  This was done via the Conservatives’ use of microtargeting, which as 
explained by Zuiderveen et al, is484: 
“a…type of personalised communication that involves collecting 
information about people, and using that information to show them 
targeted political advertisements.”  
 
 
 Indeed, as Roper states, although the UK cannot completely replicate the 
microtargeting style of the US due to UK campaign restrictions, the Conservatives 
‘understood who the persuadable voters were, where they were, and what consistent 
message might appeal to them. Labour did not use digital technology to target key 
voters.485’ The microtargeting done by the Conservatives and the focus on key 
issues which resulted in Conservative victory is in further evidence by Ross, who 
stated that486:  
Using Facebook…the Tories [identified] the key concerns of small 
groups of undecided voters, for example women in their 40s who 
were concerned about schools and GP opening hours, in specific 
districts of key marginal seats… During the final days, these voters 
were targeted repeatedly, on the phone, via websites and in 
person on the doorstep. 
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Therefore, the Conservative focus on specific issues and microtargeting, buoyed by 
Facebook and relentless contact after their issues were highlighted and noted, 
ensured a victory as well as the effective employment of social media487, even if it 
was somewhat of a one-sided, paternalistic usage. Their use of microtargeting 
benefitted them electorally, with Zuiderveen et al commenting how ‘online political 
microtargeting helped the Conservatives to win… key marginal seats and the 
election…488’ Indeed, Zuiderveen et al argue that microtargeting may actually benefit 
political engagement and mobilisation, as it may ‘reach citizens who ignore 
traditional media, and it can interest people in politics via tailored messages. 
Microtargeting might thus increase information, interest in politics, and electoral 
turnout’489. Thus, how the Conservatives used social media meant that Labour were 
defeated, and the Liberal Democrats lost their West Country stronghold, being 
focussed upon relentlessly by the Conservatives’ microtargeting. However, the way 
that they did this was not truly conducive towards a dialogic and engaging social 
media presence.  
It was not until 2017 that UK political parties (mostly Labour) truly managed engaged 
with social media, and this really resulted in greater mobilisation and engagement of 
supporters, as shall be discussed later. However, the Conservatives mobilised and 
engaged people somewhat with their 2015 social media campaign. With that, I will 
discuss young voters, and non-voters. 
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Differentiating between different voters/non-voters is crucial, as the differences 
between a young voter (taking young to be 18-24) and an elderly voter (55+) by their 
political belief and life experience are large. The young are more likely to be using 
social media and digital technology, as demonstrated by the BES 2015 data which 
stated that 18-25 year olds were the largest user-group on both Facebook and 
Twitter in March 2015 490. Social media however was distrusted, as seen in the 2014 
Audit of Political Participation, which stated only 7% of voters viewed it  as ‘an 
effective means of holding politicians to account’491. Regarding the election492, most 
commentators and users thought that Labour would be the largest party493. This 
corresponds with Barnett’s belief that digital platforms and social media are an echo 
chamber rather than a megaphone, demonstrating social media’s mobilising force 
may not be the most effective494. 
Although many people in 2015 had online access, people rarely used the Internet for 
directly political means, with political information being dissipated in an apolitical 
perception.  Thus, I will examine BES data regarding election social media, as there 
is unfortunately insufficient social media data post-election. However, I will analyse 
data concerning political information shared on websites, on social media platforms, 
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and so on. Thus, social media, although useful, should not be used solely to 
increase political mobilisation and engagement. I will initially use the whole dataset, 
and then will break it down further demographically: 
Table IV: Social Media and Internet Activity by voters during the 2015 
Election Campaign utilising British Election Study data. 
Waves – British Election Study- Wave 5 during election. Measured in %. 
% of people who shared information 














5.9 21.8  1.4 












1.5 97.1  1.4 
Signed up 
online to help a 
party or 
candidate  




you visited the 
website of a 
candidate? 
8.7 90.2  1.1 
Have you tried 
to persuade 
somebody 
which party they 
should vote for? 
11.3 86.8  1.8 









Do you use 
Twitter? 
28.1 71.5 n/a 0.4 






8.5 4.6 14.1 1.0 
Do you follow 




for political info? 
10.7 2.4 14.0 1.0 
Do you follow 
people you 
personally know 
on Twitter for 
political info? 
6.9 6.2 1.0 14.0 









Do you use 
Facebook? 
66.5 33.1 n/a 0.4 






17.1 5.8 41.8 1.8 







9.8 13.1 41.8 1.8 
N= 30725     
 
In the election, few used social media politically. However, nearly 67% used 
Facebook, as compared to 28.5% using Twitter, making the emphasis on Facebook 




valid as a campaigning strategy. Also, 10% used Twitter for political information and 
contacting, with 17% following candidates or parties on Facebook for political 
information, and 10% of Facebook users getting political information off of personal 
contacts. However, these are far more than those sharing political content via email, 
instant messenger, other online platforms and those signed up online to assist 
candidates. Interestingly, 11.3% tried to persuade others which party they should 
vote for and nearly 9% visited candidates’ websites. Thus, it seems that social media 
and the Internet are not enormously useful for political mobilisation and contact. 
However, examining 18-24 year olds, there is clearly more online mobilisation 
potential:  
Table V: Social Media and Internet Activity by voters aged 18-25 
during the 2015 Election Campaign utilising British Election Study 
data.  
Waves – BES- Wave 5 during election. Measured in %. 
% of people who shared information 






2.7 92.7  4.7 




















6.2 89.1  4.7 
Signed up 
online to help a 
party or 
candidate  




you visited the 
17.1 79.7  3.2 




website of a 
candidate? 
Have you tried 
to persuade 
somebody 
which party they 
should vote for? 
20.4 73.3  6.3 





Do you use 
Twitter? 
53.2 45.4 n/a 1.4 






19.8 8.7 21.3 3.4 
Do you follow 
other people on 
Twitter 
(commentators, 
23.0 5.5 21.3 3.4 





for political info? 
Do you follow 
people you 
personally know 
on Twitter for 
political info? 
18.8 9.7 21.3 3.4 





Do you use 
Facebook? 
87.3 11.6 n/a 1.4 






34.3 8.1 40.0 4.9 




17.5 24.9 40.0 4.9 







N= 3046     
 
Firstly, compared to the whole population, more young people use both Twitter and 
Facebook, with 53.2% of them using Twitter compared to 28.1% overall, and 87% 
using Facebook as compared to 66.5% overall. On almost every single metric, the 
youth are more engaged online politically (apart from email, which is 2.6% compared 
to 2.7% overall, but the small youth N must be considered) and also tried to 
persuade others on vote-choice by 10% compared to overall. Furthermore, the 
political parties seemed to be less engaged regarding this; it seemed to be organic, 
and that people discussed politics and encouraged others to vote despite political 
parties, with the youth especially doing this. As already discussed, although the 
political parties were realising the Internet’s importance (somewhat utilising Kent and 
Taylor’s five strategies in building, maintaining and developing dialogic online 
relationships of building a loop, relaying useful information, ensuring return visits, 
ensuring interface intuitiveness and ensuring visitor conservation by creating an 
uncluttered web format495), it was underdeveloped. Using the framework of Kent and 
Taylor, the Conservatives employed at least some these strategies,  with the relaying 
of useful information via YouTube adverts and microtargeting. However, there was 
not a large usage beyond this, with no serious attempts made to use clear software, 
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uncluttered web formats, dialogic relationships and more, instead relying on 
microtargeting and videos as previously said. The other parties were not much 
better, although Labour was more organic in their social media messaging. Kent and 
Taylor shall be revisited at the end to see how their theories applied to the other 
party campaigns in other elections, but introducing their strategies now will give 
important context to the rest of the thesis. Kent and Taylor’s work could be argued to 
be outdated somewhat with their focus on individual websites, as is befitting their 
1998 publication, but in the age of apps and social media in general, their validity is 
still existent. Parties in 2015 used social media and the Internet in an old-style 
campaigning style rather than embracing their new advantages. How parties in 2015 
engaged  with them to mobilise and increase turnout is discussed by Aldrich et al:  
…Although…official online contact from parties and candidates…reach 
a smaller audience than offline methods, the gap is much smaller in the 
US than in the UK...496 
Ignoring US comparisons, UK parties (although 2010 election data) were not good at 
contacting voters online, with it being noted that: 
 …the online version was particularly important in mobilising younger 
voters to get involved… informal political online contacting… is much 
higher in the UK than…the US…while UK parties have not yet ‘bought’ 
into digital [voter] communication… voters…are…comfortable with 
sharing election…information online.497 
Therefore, British informal political online contacting is high, with the voters 
cheerfully communicating election material between themselves, mobilising each 
other. Political parties in 2015 were mobilising persuasion efforts online, as Jackson 
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discussed498, but although there was campaign and candidate discussion online, 
campaign activity done mostly offline, with it being far greater for persuasion and 
mobilisation. As seen above, the youth are more politically engaged in sharing 
political material and persuading others than those who actually turn out in the 
highest amount, so perhaps discussing youth political engagement as low is 
incorrect, as Smith and Thompson state, arguing that youth engagement and 
participation is beyond just low turnout, and how youth alienation is unsurprising 
when youth-orientated policies are decided by ageing political elites499.Youth political 
activity and discussion online was seen with the ‘Milifandom’, with Miliband 
becoming a youth meme, which as Hills states, indicates ‘an engagement with 
politics and speaking back to media and political elites…’500.  
Translating political interest and engagement to turnout is a key party issue, and one 
that was not really addressed in the election. The Milifandom is significant, because 
as previously discussed, there are arguments about whether political and civic 
engagement is driven down with Internet usage. Bouillanne discussed its potential to 
drive up political and civic engagement, but only with a small positive effect, and it 
also depends on previous political interest and online access501. However, with 
something as informal yet political as the Milifandom, a spontaneous Labour fan 
creation on social media, the British online voter is able to politically communicate, 
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but parties must create interactive voter dialogue. However, there was discussion 
online of election material, in particular the TV debates, which occurred again. These 
were not as significant as in 2010 but still bear examination, particularly the effect 
that the party leaders and policies addressed during the debates had on 
campaigning and party support/mobilisation. 
 
2015 TV Election Debates 
 
The TV debates were not the novelty they were previously. They differed from the 
previous debates in that seven party leaders took part in multiple formats and 
variation of leaders, depriving any debate discussion being ‘Prime-Ministerial’ in 
outlook and style502, as realistically only two leaders had any chance of becoming 
Prime Minister. Examining the BES 2015 election data, interest in the debates 
dipped over time:  
Table VI: % of voters who watched the 2015 General Election TV 
Debates 
Wave 5: BES Data during election. All data. 
First 
debate 
Yes No Don’t Know 
38.7 31.6 1.3 
Second 
debate 
22.5 29.8 1.1 
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7.0 10.1 0.4 
N: 
30725 
   
 
 Around 40% of the population watched the first debate, which was less than the 
interest in the 2010 debates. After this, interest radically declined, to 22.5% and 7% 
watching the debates respectively. Cowley and Kavanagh noted that TV debate 
bulletins were at 48% in the first campaign week, dipping to 18% in week three, 18% 
in week five, and hovering at 5% in the week afterwards,503 illustrating their lack of 
dominance compared to 2010. The coverage the election debates received was 
influenced by online chatter, as highlighted by Pedersen et al, which stated how 
Farage dominated discussion on Twitter during the debate, and also afterwards 
where Miliband was perceived as slow to condemn him504. This is in accordance with 
UKIP supporters’ growing strength and social media activity, as noted by Ridge-
Newman505. Miliband attempted to use the TV debates to burnish his image, netting 
him positive coverage and a rapturous social media response, however the 
Conservatives reacted to this in their campaign both on and offline, demonstrating 
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how debates still shaped the campaigns, as Dayan and Katz explore in their media 
events study506. 
Miliband tripping up (literally) at the end of the fourth debate may have negatively 
impacted him electorally, according to Shepherd and Johns’ argument of voters 
being affected by visual images as much as words507, but this seemingly had little 
negative impact on Twitter, which had Miliband as the winner versus Cameron. 
Despite this, Cameron was ahead, polling 44% to Miliband’s 38%508. Thus, social 
media being a bubble was demonstrated again, and the TV debates may have 
contributed by being perhaps more performative than policy-based, which Coleman 
and Moss explored in their TV debates work509. Despite this, although debate 
interest declined, with fewer people watching them at all stages than previously, they 
still drove campaign interest, and were utilised by smaller parties to pursue their 
‘niche agendas’. This was especially visible in debates featuring Farage. As Allen et 
al demonstrated, he overwhelmingly discussed Europe, the British constitution and 
immigration in his opening and closing statements510, with the other minor party 
leaders doing similar for their issues, although they did not exclusively discuss their 
party strengths as Downs expected511. As stated earlier, Farage was one of the most 
searched for politicians in Britain, especially during the TV debates,512 and although 
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UKIP received 3.8 million votes, they only won one seat: there was no electoral 
breakthrough, despite social media interest. Consequently, the election debates 
were centred around the party leaders, and how voters perceived the various party 
leaders affected the eventual vote, as discussed by Garzia in 2012, arguing that 
party leaders affect the electorates’ voting decision513. Thus, the 2015 debates did 
not mobilise those insufficiently politically interested but they influenced or cemented 
vote-choice. Although the TV debates were twinned with other television and online 
events, Cowley and Kavanagh stated: ‘…these networked initiatives had some 
impact, it was largely on young people already interested in politics.’514. Therefore, 
although there was heavy social media interaction and interest regarding the 
debates, they did not have the impact of 2010, reinvigorating existing voters instead 
but failing to politicise new ones. 
Post-election and conclusion 
 
The Conservatives won. Miliband resigned, having taken Labour backwards in seats. 
Clegg resigned, the Liberal Democrats in ruins. Although UKIP came third in vote-
share, they acquired one seat, and Farage resigned. The Greens managed a million 
votes yet only one MP, and the SNP dominated Scotland. Thus began soul-
searching. The Internet and particularly Twitter predicted a Labour victory, along with 
most of the polls. Why did they lose? It was clear that the Conservatives defeated 
Labour via their arguments and campaigning. The TV debates were neutral or mildly 
bad for Miliband, while Cameron succeeded. Miliband and Labour were unappealing 
to the electorate, and Scotland was lost. The Conservatives ran an excellent micro-
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targeting campaign and YouTube videos on social media, assisted by persistent 
negativity towards Miliband and Labour, as Roper explores515. Furthermore, Labour’s 
focus on peer-to-peer sharing and focusing on its core audience did not succeed, 
with their focus on Twitter and relying on retweets and message sharing not 
preventing a Conservative victory, which differed from the Conservative focus on 
targeting specific voters with specific messages, as Roper details516. However, 
elements such as the Milifandom were interesting, tapping into an irreverence yet 
politically motivated series of messages which had the potential to engage and 
mobilise. 
 As Jennings and Stoker stated in 2016, England was cleaved in twain politically, 
with one being cosmopolitan and global, and the other inward-looking, more English 
in identity, and negative about immigration517.  The next chapter will discuss the 
European Referendum of 2016, and the Internet’s impact on the 2017 election. I will 
seek to explore how mobilisation and engagement evolved from the 2015 election, 
and whether the techniques adopted by the main parties were further developed or 
whether their methods remained static. The approach taken by some in the Scottish 
referendum of informal groups politically engaged and mobilised would be one that 





                                                           
515 Roper, Caitlin (2018) pp.1-13 
516 Ibid, p.12 
517 Jennings, Will and Stoker, Gerry (2016) The Bifurcation of Politics: Two Englands. The Political 
Quarterly. Volume 87, Issue 3. July-September 2016. pp.372-382. [Online] Located at: 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.12228 and accessed on July 14th 2018. 












Chapter V: The EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election 
 
The last chapter discussed the 2015 election, and how parties mobilised voters. It 
was over halfway through the period of study, and thus was useful to analyse how 
parties mobilised their supporters. The Conservatives’ online mobilisation techniques 
were based around microtargeting various demographics and individuals of said 
demographics rather than peer-to-peer sharing as utilised by Labour. Although 
Labour seemed to be dominant on Twitter and somewhat on Facebook, the 
Conservatives had spent far more on Facebook and through judicious targeting and 
messaging, gained a majority. Thus, I will be examining how mobilisation and 
engagement evolved from this during this chapter examining the EU Referendum 
and the 2017 election, and how the campaigns/parties mobilised their supporters 
and potential voters, building upon the work and lessons learned in 2015. 
During this final chapter, I will discuss the 2016 EU Referendum, and how the 
opposing sides of the referendum both engaged and mobilised their supporters.518 
As such, I aim to find coherent explanations for how the referendum mobilised 
support across all levels of society, and how voters were mobilised using such tools 
as social media and various issues. I will look at what had been learned from the 
2015 General Election, and whether this resulted in greater voter mobilisation. 
Towards this, I will look at the 2017 General Election, as the development of social 
media mobilisation and voter mobilisation was significant, and as discussed 
previously, how political parties used the Internet and social media to increase 
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turnout and participation had developed slowly, so looking at the election where it 
truly was significant is paramount.  
An analysis of the EU Referendum of 2016 will shed light on youth mobilisation, and 
how political mobilisation and turnout were focussed upon during the EU 
Referendum. Initially, I theorise that the  EU Referendum utilised many different 
elements of voter mobilisation, and that developments over many different elections 
resulted in a true mobilising force, resulting in a high turnout of 72%. Whether this 
was due to voters being invested in the EU issue and turning out for that reason or 
whether the high turnout was due to voter mobilisation and engagement efforts by 
both sides will be seen. Furthermore, this will enable me to see how mobilisation 
differs across elections and referendums, and combining this with the earlier analysis 
based on the Scottish referendum and the previous elections, I will create a case 
concerning how voter mobilisation and engagement has evolved in Britain in both 
referendums and elections from 2010 to 2017.  
The EU Referendum 
 
Britain voted to leave the EU on 23rd June 2016 on 52%, with a 48% Remain vote. I 
will look at voter mobilisation and how voters were contacted  and engaged.  
As Becker and el found, urban areas had low turnout; indeed, six London local 
authority areas had a turnout of less than 65% compared to a UK 72%, with 
significantly Remain support being strongest in London, arguably affecting the 
result519.  This is significant for how Remain broke down, as well as why Leave did 
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not succeed there generally. Indeed, urban areas had less turnout overall than the 
rest of the country. Urban dwellers tend to be younger than the rest of the 
population, and thus lower turnout. 
The older the voter, the higher likelihood they had of voting and voting Leave. This is 
evident from BES data: 
Table I: Voter breakdown for EU vote 
British Election Study: Wave 9, post-EU Referendum  
Ages Turnout Voted 
Remain 
Voted Leave Don’t Know 
18-25 87.5% 74.4% 25.3% 0.3% 




88.3% 66.8% 32.8% 0.4% 
36-45 92.2% 54.0% 45.3% 0.7% 




93.6% 49.8% 49.5% 0.7% 
56-65 96.4% 44.6% 54.7% 0.7% 
66+ 98.0% 40.5% 58.8% 0.6 
56+ Combined 97.1% 42.8% 56.5% 0.7% 
N: 2185 for 18-
25, 3781 for 26-
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35,  5966 for 
18-35, 4166 for 
36-45, 5796 for 
46-55, 9912 for 
36-55, 7924 for 
55- 65, 5854 for 
66+ and 13778 





Taking note of the higher turnout than actually occurred due to the nature of BES 
data, the older the voter, the more likely they voted Leave and voted in general; this 
is corroborated by the Natcen referendum report which found that 93% of 65+ voters 
voted compared to 60% of 18-34s520. This is also evident from a YouGov poll taken 
immediately post-referendum, which stated that 71% of those aged 18-24 voted 
Remain, with 25-49 year-olds voting 54% Remain, 50-64 year olds voting 60% to 
Leave, and those aged 65+ voting 64% to Leave521, with Labour voters voting 65% 
Remain, Conservative voters voting 61% Leave, 80% of Greens Remain, UKIP 95% 
Leave, and the Liberal Democrats voting 68% Remain522. Younger voters voted 
Remain significantly, while older voters voted Leave. Labour voters’ heavy backing 
of Remain had consequences during the 2017 election523. Furthermore, 
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Conservatives backed Leave, directly opposite to how the majority of Conservative 
MPs voted, while Greens and Liberal Democrats voted heavily to Remain, and UKIP 
voted Leave enormously524. Looking at demographic breakdown of the parties will 
illuminate further, but now it would be useful to study voter mobilisation and young 
voters. 
Youth Voters in the EU Referendum 
 
As discussed, mobilising voters and increasing turnout is linked to voter 
engagement, be that through social media, traditional voter-contacting, non-
traditional political activism and politically active groups. Beaumont emphasises the 
importance of socio-political learning by experiencing political action and discourse in 
a politically active community525. Sloam explored this phenomena by studying 
mobilisation of young people for the European Referendum526 and how social media 
drove this, showing how over the past few elections, British political actors and 
participants began to properly utilise social media to mobilise and increase turnout. 
Indeed, as Garcia-Castanon et al stated, young people become politically engaged 
due to ‘the conduits and forces behind their own participation in offline politics 
because of online political activity’527. This was done to greater effect with 
Momentum and Labour in 2017 with utilisation of social networks to promote political 
participation528, as Rosenstone and Hansen identified social networks’ ability to 
                                                           
524 Ibid. 
525 Beaumont, E (2011) Promoting political agency, addressing political inequality: a multilevel model 
of internal political efficacy. The Journal of Politics. 73 (1): pp.216-231. 
526 Sloam, James (2018) #Votebecause: Youth Mobilisation for the referendum on British membership 
of the European Union New Media and Society pp.1- 18. [Online] Located at: 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/146444818766701 and accessed 1st July 2018. 
527 Garcia-Castanon, M, Rank A and Barreto M (2011) Plugged in or tuned out? Youth, race, and 
Internet usage in the 2008 election. Journal of Political Marketing, 10, (1-2) pp.115-138 
528 Pickard, S (2018) Momentum and the movementist ‘Corbynistas’: young people regenerating the 
Labour Party in Britain. In: Pickard S and Bessant J (eds) Young People Re-generating Politics in 
Times of Crises. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.115-137. 
Chapter V: The EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election 
156 
 
reduce the cost of obtaining political information529. As discussed previously, young 
people were politically interested but were turned off by formal politics, with young 
people feeling that politics and the news media were aimed at and dominated by 
older adults, as Buckingham identified530, so both Remain and Leave tried to engage 
the young on social media to increase turnout and mobilisation.  
Knowledge ensures political participation, as Gestil and Levine discussed531. A 
YouGov poll just pre-referendum stated 39% of 18-24 year-olds had political interest 
in the campaign, with 49% certain to vote, with full-time students being 44% and 
56% respectively532. Importantly, the young stated they were more likely to vote in 
the referendum than in previous elections 
 Despite this, over 50% of the young were not certain to vote and 61% had no 
political interest in the EU vote. This is far less than other European countries: Hix 
highlights how youth in other European nations have higher interest and positivity 
towards the EU533. Thus, Beaumont’s maxim about how socio-political learning and 
political education is constructed within political networks would be crucial. Also, 
Vitak et al’s work demonstrating Facebook political activity and exposure to it 
predicts offline and online political behaviour, with intense Facebook activity being 
negatively related to political activity534 is vital. Thus, the more intense the social 
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media use, the less likely a voter is to vote. Johnson et al further investigate, stating 
that relying on social networks for information provides an insignificant positive vote 
likelihood, while relying on YouTube provides a significant negative likelihood, 
although social media use shows a significant likelihood to participate in political 
discussion on and offline, while pre-existing political interest is much stronger and 
significant for this535. Although this concerns the US, it has vital elements to inform 
on turnout and political engagement. Goodwin et al discussed campaign effects’ 
impact on public attitudes towards the EU, and found that the referendum had a high 
potential for pro-EU arguments, but they were not made to the same degree as 
Leave, as shall be seen536. It is worth examining what motivated people to vote how 
they did. 
Goodwin and Heath demonstrated in their August 2016 EU Referendum paper how 
demographics affected the vote537: 
…Turnout was generally higher in pro-Leave areas…public support for 
Leave closely mapped past support for UKIP…support for Leave was 
more polarised along education lines than UKIP support ever was. 
Turnout being higher in pro-Leave areas is notable. Leave was supported by many 
Labour voting areas and UKIP-targeted areas, for example Blackpool and Wales, but 
performed badly in Scotland (38%), London (40.1%) and Northern Ireland 
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(44.1%)538. Significantly, those areas with a population aged 65 and over had a very 
strong positive turnout coefficient, those with no qualifications had a very strong 
negative turnout coefficient, those areas with non-white voters had a very strong 
negative coefficient, areas with a strong 2014 UKIP vote had a strong positive 
relationship, and a higher turnout in the same EU elections having a positive turnout 
effect with finally London and Scotland having a negative insignificant turnout 
effect539. Thus, areas with educated voters, elderly UKIP voters and those with high 
turnout in the previous EU elections were more likely to vote, with London and 
Scotland as well as non-white and young voters having low turnout. Significantly the 
more educated the voter, the less likely they voted Leave. 
Looking at Heath and Goodwin again, the Leave vote was much higher in authorities 
with numbers of low-educated people, and vice versa with the highly educated.540 
They demonstrate that fifteen of the twenty ‘least educated’ areas voted Leave, while 
every single of the twenty most educated areas voted Remain541, which is significant: 
as was seen in the previous chapters, Labour and the Liberal Democrats were 
supported by the most educated, and the Conservatives and UKIP gained the 
support of the least educated, while Labour were supported by the poorest. 
However, in the referendum, most Labour constituencies actually voted Leave, 
causing issues for Labour’s EU policy, as Hanretty illustrates542. Hanretty also states 
that Leave was strongest in less-economically developed areas, with low education 
levels and heavily white areas. This contrasts with strong Remain areas such as 





542 Hanretty, C (2016) Most Labour MPs Represent a Constituency that voted Leave Medium [Online] 
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Lambeth and Hackney, the City of London, Edinburgh, and Cambridge, with the fifty 
strongest Remain local authorities in either London or Scotland543. Leave being 
strongest in poorer areas is counter to what would have been thought as Labour 
areas which ‘should’ have voted Remain as Labour officially backed Remain. 
However, Goodwin and Ford discuss the relation between UKIP and ‘traditional’ 
Labour voters544. It is worth considering what immigration attitudes and ethnic 
diversity had on the result545: 
There is…a negative relationship between the level of EU migration 
…and the level of support for leaving the EU… communities that had 
the fewest recent immigrants from the EU that were the most likely to 
[vote] leave…. Of the twenty places with the fewest EU migrants, 
fifteen voted…leave... By contrast, of the twenty places with the most 
EU migrants, eighteen voted…remain….[In] the areas…most receptive 
to …Leave… there were hardly any EU migrants… 
 
Thus, the higher the EU population, the more likely it voted Remain.  Detailing 
mobilisation is still necessary.  
Mobilisation in the EU Referendum  
 
Facebook and Twitter were used for mobilisation on either side, as Cookson and 
Gordon highlighted546.  As Bond et al argued, seeing a political message on a 
friend’s page can affect voting behaviour547. Vicario et al discussed how the two 
campaigns segregated themselves on Facebook, increasing polarisation and 
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polarising narratives within the campaigns548 and decreasing intergroup 
communication. Thus, mobilising the most supporters and the evolution of 
arguments would be key to success. As previously stated, Twitter is not used widely, 
but the politically active use it. As Matsuo and Benoit state, Leave dominated 
Twitter549: 
….Leave were in a better position on Twitter [with] a larger volume 
of tweets, [hashtags and tweets to follow] conveyed positive 
messages, and offered a wider range of pro-Leave accounts to 
follow. 
Leave were more effective on Twitter, focusing on immigration, motivating Leave 
voters550. The more positive messages, greater tweet volume and the wide range of 
tweets to follow meant that Leave was more popular on Twitter. As Hansen et al 
argued in 2011, positive Twitter messages unrelated to news are retweeted more, 
while messages that are negative and news-related tend to be retweeted more, 
which occurred with Leave’s Twitter success551. With Leave voters caring most about 
immigration and Remain voters about the economy, as was learned from the BES 
post-EU Referendum panel wave552, in addition to Matsuo and Benoit’s discussion of 
Leave voters engaging with hashtags such as #immigration and #Migrationcrisis553 
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and Leave’s prominence on social media, what motivated Leave is evident. Leave 
social media was, to restate Matsuo and Benoit, centred on a nexus of political and 
campaign accounts such as Nigel Farage, UKIP, and Vote_Leave, while Remain 
was centred on accounts such as Robert Peston, the Guardian and the BBC554.  
Combined with Leave’s positivity on Twitter and focus on non-news accounts and 
hashtags based on Leave’s driving force, fitting in with the negative news-related 
tweets, this illustrates how Leave motivated and mobilised, although caveats must 
be had to the extent to which social media can mobilise voters. Leave voters also 
believed at 90% that the economy would be better after leaving, while 93% Remain 
voters believed it would get worse, while 69% of Leave voters (and 31% of Remain 
voters) thought nothing would change as Curtice notes555, demonstrating why Leave 
voters were motivated more: although Remain were seemingly equally determined, 
Remain turnout was slightly lower. This is visible from the NatCen report again556: 
The Referendum attracted a group of ‘new voters’ who did not 
participate in [2015]…A majority (60%) of this group voted 
Leave…. Turnout [was decisive]... Those who said they leant 
towards Remain in the [referendum] run-up… were more likely to 
not vote (19% vs 11% of Leave supporters). If turnout among 
…both sides had been equal, the vote would… [be]… closer. 
By bringing together non-voters, and with some Remain voters not voting, Leave 
won. Thus, Leave’s campaign had more traction. Immigration and the economy 
being salient ensured Leave’s victory, especially with their positive message. 
Curtice’s BES data findings illustrate how the Referendum highlighted Britain’s 
divide. 91% of Remain voters disagreed that the EU undermined Britain’s identity, 
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while 82% of Leave voters agreed, showing how a lower Remain turnout benefitted 
Leave, and combined with 70% of Leave voters thinking immigration would decrease 
if Britain left demonstrates the reasons for the vote result557. The issues were more 
salient and Leave communicated their message better and tapped into ‘those left 
behind’, as Goodwin and Heath have identified558. Additionally, Curtice again 
identified what voters thought the consequences of leaving were: 55% thought that 
immigration would decrease, 33% thought that the NHS would improve, and 23% 
thought the economy would get worse559.  
Dominating social media, the issues, and a more proactive campaign, Leave 
mobilised and engaged more voters. Using social media to engage with and mobilise 
supporters is crucial, as Howard and Kollanyi analysed in 2016, arguing the Leave 
campaign’s use of bots560 was remarkable561: 
…30% of voters will decide how to vote in the week before the 
election, with half of these on polling day…bots over social media 
heightens the risk of massive cascades of information at a time 
when voters will be thinking about their opinions and canvassing 
their social networks for [friends and family]…sentiments... political 
bots have a small but strategic role in… referendum 
conversations…hashtags associated with the argument for 
leaving…dominate… 
Leave’s campaign utilised bots, and thus contributed to the dominance of Leave on 
social media. However, I will not be discussing bots beyond this: as stated 
previously, focusing too much on bots will prove to be a distraction. There are other 
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elements which I argue has had a higher impact on voter mobilisation and political 
engagement, and especially with bots not utilising social media in a dialogic and 
participatory way, which prevents true mobilisation and political participation and 
instead just mobilises those already political, as highlighted by Gibson and 
Cantijoch562. Furthermore, Narayanan et al’s 2017 research demonstrated the role 
bots played in the campaign, revealing they had little impact, little visibility and were 
not shared widely563, although further analysis must be taken regarding the ‘large 
number of accounts both human and automated that shared polarising and 
provocative content over…social media in days leading up to the referendum.’ 
Analysis by Bastos and Mercea concluded ‘…botnet [activity]… was relatively minor 
compared to the overall conversations during the Referendum campaign.’564  Thus, I 
shall leave the bot discussion for further analysis. With that, the traditional media’s 
role and the impact it played within the EU referendum will occur. 
During this, the focus will be on traditional media such as television and newspapers, 
and how they affected the overall result and impact. Cushion and Lewis discussed 
the role media coverage played during the referendum, highlighting the claims made 
by the two campaigns, such as the £350 million per week for the NHS claim made by 
Leave565. The coverage tended to be dominated by Conservative infighting or 
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incorrect statistics presented without explanation, confusing and ill-informing 
voters.566 Indeed, they stated ‘the reliance on claims and counter-claims by leading 
Conservative politicians did little to advance public understanding of the [EU], 
and…perpetuated… a…long-standing negative associations the British media have 
been reporting for many decades.567’ This again was highlighted by Leave’s usage of 
the ‘blatant untruth… of the claim that the UK could not stop Turkey joining the 
EU.’568 However, negative reaction also came about to the Treasury’s claim prior to 
the referendum concerning 500,000 jobs disappearing and GDP lowering by 3.6% in 
the event of a Leave vote569, prompting a furious row between the two sides.  
Evidently, Leave was well-served by the conduct and presentation of the media, and 
how the reporting of the debate was ill-served by the conduct of the television media, 
which discussed by Cushion and Lewis570:  
…independent expert analysis and testimony was sucked into the 
partisan binary between leave and remain campaigners, while 
journalists were reluctant to challenge or contextualise claims and 
counter-claims. Journalists were, in this sense, constrained by the 
[broadcasters’] operational definition of impartiality. 
Thus, television media’s coverage of the referendum was flawed as it was 
disengaged with the issues, and was frivolous instead of analytical.  Cushion and 
Lewis’ analysis is concerned with the study of the television media, but it is worth 
noting it in relation to the impact of the media coverage of the newspapers and other 
such media. 
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I will not detail every campaign event, but I will highlight the issues covered and their 
effect on the campaign and voter mobilisation. How the issues were mobilising in 
themselves is important, and will be discussed in regards to media coverage. As 
discussed earlier, there was much rancour with the media and the referendum 
issues, with Moore and Ramsay discussing in their work on UK media  referendum 
coverage the ‘rancorous…bitter way in which the referendum…was fought 
was…reflected in and enhanced by the media coverage…many news outlets 
encouraged and stoked the partisanship.571’ I will mostly use Moore and Ramsay’s 
work during this section, as it encompasses the media coverage, although other 
works will be drawn upon.  
Three topics dominated referendum discussion and coverage: the economy, 
immigration, and finally health distantly third, with warnings of Brexit repercussions 
being dismissed by the press as Remain scaremongering, and the media’s tendency 
to link immigration to the economic issues raised by Leave572. Furthermore, specific 
nations and nationalities were negatively targeted, with the fiction of Turkey’s 
potential EU entry being particularly raised by Leave573 and Albania, Romania, 
Poland, and Bulgaria being negatively targeted574. Combined with the Leave 
supporting newspapers of The Sun, The Daily Mail, Daily Express, The Daily 
Telegraph, and The Sunday Times outnumbering the Remain supporting 
newspapers of The Mirror, The Guardian, The Independent and The Financial Times 
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in salience and readership, as Firmstone demonstrated575, ensured that the 
campaign issues would be framed in a Leave-friendly way, which were made more 
often and with higher ferocity than the Remain media576, with compelling, patriotic 
language being employed more by the Leave-supporting papers577. Returning to 
Firmstone again, the similarity to the TV media’s framing of the issues in a battle 
between the two campaigns instead of sober and serious analysis was a feature of 
both sides of the newspaper media578. The extent to which 
The extent to which the Leave campaign was assisted by perceptions of loss of 
sovereignty to Brussels, immigration concerns, and the salience of Europe to British 
politics is important and how the media’s referendum coverage assisted this. Using 
Gavin’s exploration of the media’s impact on the referendum, I will explore these 
attitudes in the media’s political discourse, and how the salience of these elements in 
media coverage mobilised voters somewhat579. Although this thesis will not go into 
enormous depth over these attitudes, they are important to recognise in the context 
of  referendum coverage. As Gavin states: ‘…the media’s capacity to reinforce pre-
existing attitudes – whether these attitudes relate to the EU, immigration, benefit 
fraud, or climate change – is…significant. Moreover, [reinforcing forces]… also have 
potentially important repercussions for public misperceptions…So even if 
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reinforcement is the media’s only impact…remember that the results can… be 
consequential….’580  
Therefore, as Sanders and Gavin found, the media’s impact on economic perception 
is evident581, showing how the papers’ focus upon these issues was significant, as 
supported by McCombs’ confirmation of the media’s agenda-setting power582. 
McCombs wrote this in 2005 before the true rise of the Internet and digital 
engagement in the UK, but it is significant still, especially as Leave tended to be 
backed by those less digitally literate and elderly, as stated before. Gavin’s 2007 
work on UK media stories impacting the EU’s salience in Britain can be paired with 
this583, demonstrating the prevailing attitude towards the EU that was prevalent in the 
British media during the referendum and before. Furthermore, recalling Moore and 
Ramsay’s findings that Brexit economic issues and general economic issues584 were 
increasingly linked to immigration in the media, as well as ‘coverage of…immigration 
[effects] were overwhelmingly negative. Migrants were blamed for… Britain’s 
economic and social problems – most notably for putting unsustainable pressure on 
public services… the majority of negative coverage of specific foreign nationals was 
published by three news sites: the Express, the Daily Mail, and the Sun.585’ it is clear 
what the main issues had been interpreted as. Fitzgerald and Smoczynski detailed 
the unfounded claims made by the UK media about the immigrant threat to the UK’s 
economy, security and the NHS586, with Balch and Balabonova also describing these 
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claims587, thus ensuring that this issue framing would carry on throughout the 
referendum, particularly migration’s perception as a threat to the UK.  Cheregi has 
also detailed how the UK media historically over-emphasised immigration 
numbers588, so when the referendum media coverage emphasised migration’s 
supposed negative impact, this benefitted Leave. In addition to the ‘persistent and 
strongly critical coverage of what was often characterised as the EU’s exercise of 
sovereignty over Britain’589, which Daddow highlighted as a feature of the British 
press before the EU campaign590, Hawkins’ analysis of decades of media criticism of 
the EU was linked to disapproval of the EU in itself is self-evident591. Thus, as the 
economy was the most covered issue, with 7028 articles during the campaign, 
followed by immigration on 4383 articles, and then health with 1638 articles (the 
£350 million per week to the NHS pledge being prominent)592 demonstrates how 
these issues combined to benefit Leave, especially when sovereignty was discussed 
in over 2000 articles in the context of the economy and immigration. Therefore, the 
dominant media attitudes that had dominated the British press reached a climax in 
the EU campaign, and as previously  seen with older voters reading newspapers 
more than younger voters, this helps explain the Leave vote. I will not discuss the 
exact motivations behind the Leave vote,, but it is important to discuss it briefly. 
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 As Sloam and Henn argue, young people perceived the economy as far more 
important than immigration, in sharp contrast to citizens over 65 years old593, which 
as voter turnout being stronger amongst the elderly than the young as seen before, 
the domination of the Leave press and also Leave on social media, demonstrates 
the dominance of Leave-friendly messages. Indeed, as Deacon found: ‘…[Factoring 
in the] strength of papers’ endorsements and …their circulation…size, [the] Leave 
campaign has an 82% to 18% advantage over Remain.’ 594 Barnett added that: ‘The 
barrage of headlines designed to reinforce campaign slogans will have shored up 
Leave strategists with confidence to pursue their simple message… an orchestrated 
tabloid campaign around EU pen-pushing bureaucrats, EU costs to the United 
Kingdom and untrammelled EU immigration lent itself perfectly to the oft-repeated 
mantra of Take Back Control.’595 Thus, traditional newspaper’s impact in the EU 
referendum campaign is evident. 
The dominating attitudes in the media coverage assisted are  commonly held by the 
older population (65+) who both voted in large numbers to leave the EU and also 
who vote the most regardless. With the Leave campaign dominating social and 
traditional media, the extent to which people were engaged, some of the reasons 
why voters chose to leave the EU and why certain issues were salient become 
clearer. However, social media is important, and must be discussed further. Iosifidis 
                                                           
593 Sloam, J and Henn, M (2019) Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain. 
Palgrave, London. P.76. 
594 Loughborough University (2016) Centre for Research in Communication and Culture. Report 5, 
Media Coverage of EU Referendum. June 27. [Online] Located at: http://blog.lboro.ac.uk and 
accessed 2nd March 2019. 
595 Barnett, Steven (2016) How our Mainstream Media Failed Democracy Referendum Analysis 
November 22. [Online] Located at: http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-
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and Wheeler discuss this ably, along with further exploration of the Leave 
campaign’s highlighted issues.  
 Iosifidis and Wheeler’s EU referendum analysis highlighted how the Leave 
campaign focussed on Turkey imminent EU entry as well the claim that leaving the 
EU would result in a £350m weekly bonus for the NHS, both of which were incorrect, 
but crucially tapped into the main issues of immigration and more NHS money, along 
with the Leave statement of ‘we want our country back’596. The exploitation of the 
traditional and social media to spread messages as well as social media’s ability to 
interact with other voters and networks quickly compared to a sclerotic Remain 
campaign resulted Leave winning. 
 Polonski discusses in more detail Leave’s dominance on social media597: 
Leave… had routinely outmuscled [Remain]… with a  more 
powerful and emotional message across all social media 
platforms, leading to the activation of a greater number of 
[grassroots] Leave supporters…dominating on Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram, influencing swathes of undecided voters… twice as 
many Brexit supporters on Instagram, and five times more active 
than Remain… seven to one outnumbering on Twitter…the three 
most frequently used hashtags came from Leave [and were 
positive]… using the Internet, the Leave camp was able to create 
the perception of wide-ranging public support…their message was 
simple, intuitive, and emotionally charged…  
Leave dominated with a simpler message, a beneficial media environment, and they 
appealed to emotion by using the salience of immigration to increase turnout, while 
successfully targeting voters, as Mullen argues: ‘the Leave campaign was much 
                                                           
596 Iosifidis, Petros and Wheeler, Mark (2018) Modern Political Communication and Web 2.0 in 
Representative Democracies Javnost – The Public Journal of the European Institute for 
Communication and Culture Volume 25, 2018, Issue 1-2: The Liquefaction of Publicness: 
Communication, Democracy and the Public Sphere. Pp.110-118 [Online] Located at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2018/1418962 and accessed 5th July 2018. 
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more successful at targeting than…Remain…’598. Along with the most widely read 
papers backing Leave599, Remain’s complacency may have also contributed their 
defeat: as Zhang points out (as well as arguing higher education was the dominant 
factor between Remain and Leave voters), the foregone conclusion that Remain was 
guaranteed victory combined with Leave’s significant mobilising of voters who had 
not engaged in general elections, Remain lost600. 
What can be learned? 
 
From discussing how Brexit was made in England and Brexit’s link to the rise of 
English nationalism (along with immigration concerns and a willingness to take 
risks)601, to nostalgia powered by the tendency to identify as a Leave voter and with 
a loss of control602 and the divide between cosmopolitan and ‘backwater’ locations, 
with ‘backwater’ locations being vexed by the EU, immigration and nostalgia, as 
Jennings and Stoker argue603, there are many discussion points. Looking at voter 
mobilisation in the referendum, Leave voters were up against the main political and 
economic forces in Britain, but prevailed due to a greater belief in their campaign, 
Remain complacency, a greater social media and Internet targeting campaign, and a 
friendly media environment. By focusing on immigration, the NHS, and Britain’s 
global role, along with simple, strong messaging, Leave mobilised their supporters to 
                                                           
598 Mullen, Andrew (2016) Leave versus Remain: The digital battle. EU Referendum Analysis 2016. 
599 Swales (2016) p.10 
600 Zhang, Aihua (2018) New Findings on Key Factors Influencing the UK’s referendum on Leaving 
the EU World Development, Volume 102, February 2018, pp.304-314. P.313 [Online] Located at: 
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turnout more than Remain, which additionally had the benefit of older voters 
overwhelmingly voting Leave, as they turn out at much higher levels than younger 
voters. The use of tools such as Instagram and apps assisted with Leave’s success, 
along with the self-segregation of the two campaigns on social media, as Weaver et 
al discuss604 and the differing style of messages and accounts used by the two 
campaigns assisted with driving up positive engagement with Leave. Voter 
mobilisation methods were built upon from previous elections, and the combination 
of salient issues, micro-targeting, the nature of referendums and an effective social 
media campaign resulted in high turnout.  
Leave’s media domination, both televised and off, helped to swing the argument 
towards the Leave campaign, and benefitted them in the referendum, especially 
regarding issues of immigration, sovereignty and health. It is worth exploring further 
works on this, such as Fox and Pearce’s work on Euroscepticism’s generational 
decay, which confirms that British youth are the most supportive of EU membership 
due to ‘their experience of the EU in their formative years, their relationships with 
domestic political institutions, and their access to education’605, which correlates with 
Down and Wilson’s 2013 findings of people becoming more Eurosceptic with age, as 
they are less likely to  benefit from freedom of movement, for example606. The 
importance of Europe in many people’s minds drove up turnout, and effectively 
mobilised them on social and traditional media as well as in turning out to vote. 
                                                           
604 Weaver, Ian S, Williams, Hywel, Cioroianu, Iulia, Williams, Matthew, Coan, Travis and Banducci, 
Susan (2018) Dynamic social media affiliations among UK politicians Social Networks, Volume 54, 
July 2018, pp.132-144 [Online] Located at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2018/01/008 and accessed 
4th June 2018. 
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The 2017 Election 
 
I shall discuss the 2017 election and how the various parties mobilised their 
supporters, looking at contacting and mobilisation methods including leaflets, online 
methods, home visits, and so on. I will also analyse the TV debates, the voter 
demographics, and other such variables which may offer clues on how mobilisation 
increased turnout. I hypothesise that the main parties or at least some of them fully 
engaged with social media and the Internet realising their potential. I will also look at 
campaigning apps, Labour’s particularly, and what effect they had on mobilising 
Labour supporters before and during the 2017 election. I will also be looking at the 
relatively poor performance of the Conservative social media campaign. Looking at 
youth mobilisation and what impact if any the EU referendum had on turnout and 
mobilisation will also be crucial. Thus, I will construct a solid explanation of how the 
parties in the election mobilised their supporters. I shall also be looking at the impact 
of the ‘youthquake’ . I will initially look at the election background and how the 
political parties contacted voters prior to the election as well as data taken during the 
election. The scholarship on the election is not as developed as it could be because 
it has not been that long since the election, so this is a preliminary investigation. 
However, I will draw upon the work of Britain Votes 2017, although I stress that I 
already have drawn upon the individual papers within the edited volume that makes 
up the work. I will also use The British General Election of 2015 and The British 
General Election of 2017, as although I have touched upon them already, they are 
excellent sources of information for analysis of the various elections and the 
comparisons I wish to draw. Using them alone will not suffice, but they will be a good 
foundation. 
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Background of the 2017 election 
 
With Conservative dominance in the polls and Labour enfeebled, victory seemed 
assured. Thus, May in April 2017 declared that a general election for June. Over the 
campaign, the Conservative polling fell while Labour’s rose607, although a Tory 
majority was still within grasp. However, the election resulted608 in the Conservatives 
on 42.4% (318 seats) of the vote, gaining 5.5% since 2015, Labour on 40% (262) 
gaining 9.5%, the Liberal Democrats on 7.4% (12), going backwards by 0.5%,  the 
SNP on 3% (35), losing 1.7%, UKIP on 1.8% (0), losing 10.8%, and the Greens on 
1.6%, going backwards by 2.1% (1)609. The Conservatives undertook a confidence 
deal with the DUP (10 seats), counter to pre-election expectation . Labour’s support 
rise was unprecedented, as was UKIP’s collapse and the Liberal Democrats’ slight 
revival. I will discuss what motivated and mobilised the main parties during the 
election, and the voter demographics. Again, I will look at social media and whether 
the parties were adept at using it, or whether it was still conducted under the same 
methods as before which did not engage new or uninterested voters. 
Initially, I shall be again looking at contact rates. In particular, the rates before, during 
and post-election, examining Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, and 
UKIP, as they are the only parties who run in all areas of the UK, with the Scottish 
Greens being separate and Northern Ireland being its own case: 
 
                                                           
607 Rentoul, John (2017) General Election polls: how they’ve changed since Theresa May made her 
shock announcement The Independent [Online] Located at: 
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608 BBC (2017) 2017 General Election Results BBC June 2017. [Online] Located at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2017/results/england and accessed 20th July 2018. 
609 Ibid. 
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Table II: Types of contact reported by respondents to the British Election 
Study survey. 
Waves – British Election Study – Wave 11 pre-election and Wave 12 during the 
election. 
Pre-Campaign/Campaign. Contact rate measured in %. 
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The pre-campaign and campaign contact rates are significant compared to the 2015 
and 2010 General Elections. The main parties contacted people more during the 
2010 pre-campaign, with 25% of voters being contacted by the Conservatives, 20% 
for Labour, and 19% for the Liberal Democrats, with UKIP not being a major party 
yet610. Thus, the Liberal Democrats had less contact than in 2010. This could be 
explained by the Liberal Democrats being bigger and had higher expectations then. 
Labour contacting more people prior to 2017 can be explained by the party’s bigger 
membership in 2017, while the greater Conservative 2010 contact rate could be 
explained by the party being perceived to be on the cusp of government. The 2015 
pre-campaign rates in 2015 are also significant as compared to 2017, as the 
Conservatives had a higher contact rate during the pre-2015 election period of 22% 
as compared to 19.2% while Labour had a 2015 higher contact rate, with the Liberal 
Democrats being higher in 2017 on 13% as compared to 11.1%, and UKIP having a 
pre-campaign contact rate in 2015 of 5.9%, demonstrating the falling UKIP and 
Liberal Democrat fortunes611. Again, Labour seems to be consistently higher in 2017 
compared to previous elections, perhaps explained by higher membership as well as 
various other demographics, and as McKibbin highlights in his exploration of how the 
referendums affected the General Election vote and Labour’s voter makeup612.  
                                                           
610 Please see Chapter Two for full details on this. 
611 Wave 4 of March 2015 pre-campaign wave British election Study Data. 
612 McKibbin, Ross (2017) In the Shadow of the Referendums The Political Quarterly Volume 88, 
Issue 3, July-September 2017, pp.382-285 [Online] Located at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
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Turning to the during-campaign rates, the Conservatives had a 24.6% contact rate, 
Labour had a higher 31.2%, Liberal Democrats on 15.9%, and UKIP on 3%, 
demonstrating their fall since 2015. Looking at the 2010 figures, the Conservative 
contact-rate was 47% during the election, 39% for Labour and 34% for the Liberal 
Democrats, which when compared to the 2017 data, arguably demonstrates how 
political parties targeted far less voters generally in order to gain more voters in 
relevant constituencies. 
Table III bears examination: 
Table III: Types of contact reported by respondents to the British Election 
Study survey. 
Waves – British Election Study – Wave 13 post-election survey. 
Post-Campaign contact rate measured in %. 
Contact Con Lab LD UKIP 
Telephone 1.1 2.2 0.8 0.0 
Leaflet 29.9 31.2 19.2 5.1 
At home 4.0 7.1 1.9 0.2 
Street 0.9 2.5 0.6 0.1 
Email 4.8 8.0 2.9 0.3 
Text 2.2 4.9 1.6 0.2 
Other 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Overall 43.2 56.5 27.2 6 








Leaflets remain the most popular, with 31.2% voters having been contacted by 
Labour, 29.9% for the Conservatives, 19.2% for the Liberal Democrats and 5.1% for 
UKIP, with email, texting and home visits being the other methods. Labour 
dominated in voter-contacting, with a 56.5% contact-rate, compared to the 
Conservatives’ 43.2%. Compared to the 2015 data, Labour were much better at 
contacting, with the other parties far behind. UKIP’s contact rates were low, dropping 
from 22% to 6% from 2015. The Conservatives improved their contact rates by 4%  
compared to 2015, while the Liberal Democrats only increased theirs by 2.2%.  
The 2010 post-campaign data numbers are higher, but the 2010 data is of a different 
polling format to the 2015 and 2017 data, which may help explain this. Despite that, 
Labour contacted more voters in 2017, with 55% being contacted in 2010 compared 
to 56.5% for 2017, but the Conservatives contacted more voters in 2010 with 65% 
contact compared to 2017’s 43.2%, and the Liberal Democrats contacted 50% 
2010613. Kavanagh and Cowley discuss the 2010 intense leafleting operation, 
illustration how it occurred on a greater scale than in other elections614. The 
Conservatives were far more effective at voter-contacting until 2017, with Labour 
barely contacting more people in 2015 while being beaten in 2010. Labour contact 
success arguably contributed to their surprise election success. UKIP’s decline was 
also evident from their poor contacting. Thus, Labour’s ability to contact and mobilise 
                                                           
613 See Chapter II for more information on this. Please also note that I did not include UKIP in the 
2010 figures as UKIP was not a significant political party then. 
614 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2010) The British General Election of 2010, p.242. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. 
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their supporters is evident, with other parties only really matching them on leafleting. 
However, the data significantly excludes social media data, which had been growing 
in importance over the past few elections. 
Labour’s manifesto may have contributed to their success. For example, the 
manifesto was received well, especially regarding its youth appeal, as Sloam and 
Henn explain615. These pledges included introducing rent controls, reversing housing 
benefit abolition for 18-21 year olds, abolishing university tuition fees, the bugbear of 
the Liberal Democrats from 2010-5, and abolishing zero-hours contracts616. Although 
the Liberal Democrats also had some youth policies, including their firm commitment 
to  remain in the EU, Sloam and Henn argue that ‘their perceived lack of credibility 
on issues such as public services, higher education and austerity [cancelled out their 
support for young people].617’ Along these lines, the Conservatives restated previous 
policies and commitments, such as boosting youth employment and apprenticeships, 
with barely 0.1457% of the manifesto being dedicated to youth-orientated 
policies618.The Conservative electoral campaign was set firmly towards older and 
Leave voters, which backfired once the so-called dementia tax and the removal of 
the ‘triple-lock’ on pensions planned by the party in a majority government was made 
clear619. Out of all the manifestos, Labour’s was seen as most successful, with 
Sloam and Henn demonstrating that ‘around a quarter of Labour supporters (of all 
                                                           
615 Sloam, James and Henn, Matt (2019) Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in 
Britain, p.93. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
616 Ibid. 
617 Ibid, p.94. 
618 Ibid. 
619 Ibid, p.95. 
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ages) [cited] the party’s manifesto as the most important reason for voting 
Labour620621’  
As Labour backed such popular policies as eliminating tuition fees, social housing 
investment and Conservatives and other parties were outgunned. Labour’s 
manifesto was exceedingly popular amongst the young and generally: ‘young people 
were attracted to Corbyn’s perceived authenticity and policy programme… the 
Labour Party appealed directly to this demographic through proposed investments in 
education and housing, and by guaranteeing workers’ rights… [inversely] the 
successful pursuit of UKIP voters by the Conservative Party were…naturally 
repellent to many younger voters…622’  
It is worth noting that according to an ICM 2017 poll taken just before the election, 
why Labour’s manifesto and strategy were successful becomes clear: ‘The 
differences between 18-21 year-olds and all 18-24 year-olds over their prioritisation 
of materialist issues were less surprising… the younger group were more concerned 
about university tuition fees whilst the older group were more focused upon jobs and 
housing.623’ Labour’s strong defence of the NHS paid dividends, as according to 
Ashcroft Polling, 18-24 year olds prioritise the NHS as the most important electoral 
issue, with 27% of this demographic choosing the NHS as the most important624. 
Brexit was at 15%, with young voters apparently happy with Labour’s softer Brexit 
option. Next at 13% was austerity, poverty and inequality, education at 10%, and the 
                                                           
620 Ibid, p.95 
621 Yougov (2017b) Why people voted Labour or Conservative at the 2017 General Election. [Online] 
Located at: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/07/11-why-people-voted-labour-or-conservative-2017-
gener and accessed 27th April 2019. 
622 Sloam and Henn (2019) pp.110-111. 
623 ICM (2017) Hope not Hate/National Union of Teachers 18-24 poll. [Online] Located at: 
https://icmunlimited.com/wp-cotent-uploads/2017-06/2017_hopenothate_18-24s_poll.pdf and 
accessed 1st March 2019. Located in: Sloam and Henn (2019) pp.106-107.  
624 Sloam and Henn (2019) p.105 
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economy and jobs at 8%. Thus, although eliminating tuition fees was certainly eye-
catching and may have contributed to Labour winning seats like Canterbury where it 
had never won before, arguably Labour’s manifesto as a whole was successful, and 
claims that tuition fees alone swung it for Labour’s success are incorrect, with 
instead Labour’s whole manifesto and the campaign explaining this. Corbyn’s 
perception as authentic and principled also served him and Labour well, as Flinders 
argues625. With all this, Labour’s rise in support, both amongst the youth and 
generally, demonstrates how Labour’s campaign and manifesto commitments 
succeeded.  This can be seen by examining Labour’s appeal amongst the youth 
demographic (and beyond), with Sloam and Henn noting that Labour’s 2017 lead 
over the Conservatives was 29% amongst 25-34 year old voters and 16 points 
amongst 35-44 year olds, making it clear how Labour’s policies and messages 
reverberated with a significant section of the electorate626. Again, this is further 
highlighted by discussing how Labour’s performance amongst these demographics 
had improved since 2010: all three main parties were on around 30% support from 
the youngest electoral cohort, and in 2015, 18-24 year olds supported Labour over 
the Conservatives by 42-28%627, with 62% voting for Labour compared to only 27% 
for the Conservatives628. The Liberal Democrats crashed from their 2010 heights, 
going to 4% from 30% in 2015, and Labour improving on their 2010 share amongst 
the youth vote by 11%629. Therefore, Labour’s policies and manifesto attracted the 
                                                           
625 Flinders, Matthew (2018) The (anti-) politics of the general election: Funnelling frustration in a 
divided democracy. Parliamentary Affairs, 71 (1) pp.222-236. 
626 Sloam and Henn (2019) p.101. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Ipsos Mori (2017) How Britain Voted in the 2017 Election. 20 June. [Online] Located at: 
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young, with tuition fees being attractive but not the overwhelming driving policy that 
drove Labour’s vote so highly. 
 Having analysed why Labour’s manifesto was so popular amongst the young, it 
makes sense to turn to social media, where the young dominate, to see what the 
effect this had on election turnout and mobilisation. 
Social Media usage in the 2017 election 
 
 I discussed previously how previous British electoral contests had not really 
engaged on social media, bar outliers in Scotland in 2014, the 2015 election 
somewhat and the EU Referendum. By looking at social media contact rates, I will 
demonstrate how this had changed in 2017: 
Table IV: Social Media and Internet Activity by voters during the 2017 British 
General Election 
Waves – British Election Study- Wave 12 during election. Measured in % 
% of people who shared information. 
Variable     





Do you use 
Facebook? 
68.4 31  0.5 




14.8 13.4 37.6 2.6 









you know on 
Facebook? 





12.7 54.4 n/a 2.0 
Twitter     
Do you use 
Twitter? 
28.6 70.6  0.8 
Do you share 
political content 
on Twitter? 
5.9 22.2 n/a 2.0 






8.0 5.1 14.2 1.3 
Do you get 
Twitter political 
info from other 
people 
(commentators, 
11.0 2.1 14.2 1.3 











6.8 6.3 14.2 1.3 
Miscellaneous     
Do you share 
political content 
through email? 
1.9 96.1 n/a 2.0 




1.9 96.1 n/a 2.0 





1.3 96.7 n/a 2.0 
N: 34464 
 
Significantly, 68.4% of the population use Facebook, almost a 2% increase on 2015, 
although interestingly there is a drop of 2.3% from those who follow candidates or 
parties on Facebook for political information, even if there is a 4% drop who said 
they do not follow politics on Facebook, demonstrating Facebook’s increasing 
politicisation. Political information being received by other people sharing it on 
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Facebook is up from 2015, with 9.8% stating that they received political information 
in this way in 2015, and 22.3% stating this in 2017, demonstrating social media’s 
potential. 12.7% shared political information on Facebook in 2017, compared to 
10.8% in 2015, again showing how Facebook was becoming politicised, but not due 
to the political parties, which perhaps demonstrates how voters relied more on more 
viral content informally rather than from parties. 
 
 Only 0.5% more people used Twitter in 2017, and 5.9% in both 2017 and 2015 
shared political content on Twitter, with  8% less using Twitter to follow candidates 
and parties in 2017 compared to 2015’s 8.5%,  demonstrating Twitter’s insignificance 
again, even with the lessons of the Leave campaign on Twitter. 0.3% less got 
information from commentators and journalists in 2017, and 0.1% less got political 
information on Twitter from personal contacts in 2017 compared to 2015, showing 
although Twitter had more people on it than in 2015 actually was not used politically 
as much in 2017. Also in 2017, only 1.9% of people shared political content via email 
as compared to 2.7% in 2015, showing that more people were sharing content on 
Facebook and using Facebook politically rather than other Internet methods of 
sharing information, including Twitter. Interestingly, more people shared political 
content through instant messenger in 2017 (1.9%) than in 2015 (1.5%). Only 1.3% of 
voters shared political content on another website or online platform in 2017.  
 
Political parties used social media less as a top-down tool but a communicative 
method that could be embraced by party members and the wider public, not being so 
based in formal politics. As Margetts discussed in 2017, social media may have won 
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the 2017 General Election, with Labour having a far more effective and innovative 
social media operation than other  parties630: 
…[The Conservatives] run a central Facebook page and Twitter 
account that pump out announcements to [their followers], but in 
2017…Labour had been working away on a far more wide-ranging 
and innovative social presence across platforms from the time that 
Corbyn took over as leader, giving them a base of followers and 
networks that could be used to mount an efficient advertising 
strategy and outreach campaign, particularly among young 
people… where social media ‘won’ for Labour was among younger 
age groups who are turning away from Facebook and spending 
increasing proportions of their time on ‘mobile first’ platforms, 
particularly Instagram (with ten million UK users, mostly under 
thirty) and Snapchat (used by half of 18-34 year olds)…. While the 
Conservatives are reputed to have spent more than £1 million on 
direct advertising with Facebook…nearly ten million people 
watched pro-Labour videos on Facebook that cost less than 
£2000…  the Labour manifesto was regarded as positive, which 
helped their case. 
 
Labour’s greater social media activity and mobilisation assisted in their good result, 
as Sloam and Henn highlight in detail in Youthquake 2017631. This demonstrates 
Labour’s use of social media in a more intelligent way than before.  The argument 
that to effectively exploit social media and the Internet, an informal political 
communication atmosphere should exist, with political parties engaging in informal 
dialogue. As discussed previously, Eichhorn et al highlight informal political learning 
amongst social networks and peer groups632, demonstrating how Labour’s 
recognition of this paid dividends. To return to Margetts, Labour used young artists 
not usually political, such as JME’s interview with Corbyn, which was viewed over 
2.5 million times, and the #Grime4Corbyn movement with Stormzy et al633. Thus, 
                                                           
630 Margetts, Helen (2017) Why Social Media May have Won the 2017 General Election The Political 
Quarterly, Volume 88, Issue 3, July-September 2017. P.386-390. [Online] Located at: 
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Labour performed excellently on this front, with a huge shift to Labour amongst the 
young634 as Ford identified, stating that Labour’s performance was particularly strong 
in constituencies with large concentrations of young voters635, as previously 
explored. In contrast, the over-60s voted overwhelmingly Conservative, whereas 
Labour saw its vote share increase in all other age groups636. As helped the 
Conservatives during 2015, Labour’s  social media by using Facebook and Snapchat 
adverts assisted in campaigning637, and showed online campaigning’s viability. 
Indeed, as Ford noted, Labour dominated the other parties on social media 
contacting during the election campaign, with almost double the contacts of the 
Conservatives638.  
Social, activist groups (such as Momentum) involved with Labour also assisted, with 
hundreds of new volunteers being involved in physical campaigning639. Momentum’s 
videos were viewed by 12.7 million640, and 10,000 volunteers on election-day 
knocked on over a million doors to mobilise voters641. Therefore, with a large 
membership tied into what Chadwick describes as a party-as-a-movement642, which 
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was similar to what occurred in the Scottish referendum, as Marsh and Akram 
highlighted with their focus on ‘the social, the socio-political and political’, Labour 
created an engaging political movement643. Labour’s focus on viral video content 
was important, as Segesten644 and Fletcher discuss in their respective analyses of 
Labour’s mobilisation efforts645.  Labour’s developing of their internet presence 
beyond advertising and party websites was crucial, making it a useful mobilisation 
tool. The apps and campaign groups used by Labour were crucial in gaining support, 
with Momentum utilising the Calling for Corbyn app, which used phones, computers 
and tablets to canvass potential voters and supporters, which was combined with 
social media integration and a Momentum hashtag, directly tying this to both 
Momentum and Labour, as Pickard describes646. Momentum’s other apps directly 
assisted Labour, including My Nearest Marginal as Dommett and Temple identify647, 
which the Conservatives were unable to match, with Cowley and Kavanagh 
highlighting how Labour-supporting groups outstripped both the reach and number of 
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Conservative ones648. Indeed, they further highlight how more Labour and Corbyn-
supporting stories were shared online than right-wing/Conservative-supporting 
stories 649, demonstrating the reach of Labour’s message.  Combined with Labour’s 
embrace of SnapChat, with Labour’s Snapchat filter having 36 million views and 
being used by 7.7 million people650, Labour’s reach and usage of new technology is 
demonstrably better compared to the Conservatives, especially compared to the 
Conservatives abandoning SnapChat651. Despite this, Labour member and grandee 
reaction  was mixed, with Dommett highlighting how concern over Momentum apps 
wasin existence, although the potential benefits were welcomed652. As Chadwick 
discussed, online interactions when combined with political engagement and 
mobilisation in ‘the real world’ are the most effective653, thus demonstrating how 
Momentum’s app-use combined with Labour’s large membership benefitted  Labour. 
Analysing Momentum’s usage of apps is somewhat difficult currently due to the lack 
of literature, so future work on this must take place. 
Looking further at Momentum and Labour’s app usage, their impact compared to 
other parties is evident. As Ross and McTague reported, more than 100,000 
individuals used ‘My Nearest Marginal’ to campaign in 100+ seats nationally, 
assisting in taking twenty-five of the thirty Momentum target  constituencies654, a 
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million doors canvassed on election-day655 and 10,000 Momentum volunteers on the 
same day, tackling political activism’s perceived slide656. McDowell-Naylor discussed 
this further, demonstrating how Labour used technological innovation, socially 
mobilised citizens and a large membership657 which once aligned with social-media 
activism, translated into party politics, as Chadwick again discussed658, illustrated 
how Momentum and Labour utilised their large membership. 
Although analysis occurred regarding Momentum, with Shabi659 and Armstrong660 
analysing Momentum’s impact, with Shabi in particular commenting on how 
Momentum and Labour drew inspiration from the Bernie Sanders 2016 campaign 661, 
which is work for a future paper, looking at apps in too much depth will not take place 
now. Indeed, looking at the Momentum campaign, the element of satellite campaigns 
as discussed in the introduction and elsewhere comes to light, particularly the ‘My 
Nearest Marginal’ app. This fits Edwards’ ‘democratic intermediaries’ theory, which 
benefits parties during election campaigns, being linked to political parties both 
informally and formally, as with Momentum662. Thus, Momentum’s role, although 
bearing closer examination in the role of citizen-based campaigning of that similar to 
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the Scottish referendum independence-linked groups, and as highlighted by 
Gibson663, and Vaccari and Valeriani argue, which particularly discuss ‘new digital 
foot soldiers…emerge and allow existing members to expand their repertoires’664, 
demonstrates how app and new technologies usage holds with new explorations of 
party-membership and party affiliations as discussed. As more work is done on this, 
more be illuminated, but as Dommett and Temple argue, Momentum’s apps and 
quasi-independence from Labour are important to voter mobilisation and external 
groups,665:  
‘…The lack of direct access to a reserve army of additional volunteers renders 
parties reliant either on…productive…intermediary bodies, or…their own systems by 
which to capture contact information and attempt to involve such individuals in party 
activities… yet [these] may undermine [the benefits of] satellite campaigns:… they 
are flexible…not integrated into official party campaigns. They appeal to activists 
who consider themselves as ‘doers’… not ‘joiners’666 
Thus, the importance of apps, Momentum and externally-linked party organisations 
remains evident, and future analysis will be fascinating. The usage of such tools by 
Labour and Momentum are relevant in discussing informally-linked party 
membership and party mobilisation. Bonotti highlighted that participating in party 
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politics via party members, supporters, activists or voting produced benefits and 
incentivised voters, demonstrating how Labour’s 2017 approach was beneficial667. 
Ward and Wring discuss the shortcomings of the other parties in 2017668: 
…[the Conservative campaign] was too controlled, too negative, too-
top-down, inflexible, and appeared to want to simply replicate…the 
2015 campaign tactics… the party forgot the social element to social 
media… much emphasis was placed on micro-targeted ads via 
Facebook…these failed to resonate and were much less likely to be 
shared… 
The Conservatives went backwards from 2015. Labour dominated Twitter, with 
Corbyn’s account gaining twice as many retweets and mentions as May’s and four 
times as many as the official Labour and Conservative party accounts, with Labour 
having more hashtags and friendly accounts than the Conservatives, as Kaminska et 
al discovered669. Although the Greens attempted Snapchat, they did not succeed as 
much as Labour, with the Liberal Democrats virtually vanished, not appearing in the 
top 20 election-hashtag groupings670. UKIP were further behind, with the party 
chairman requesting that their candidates should close their own social media sites 
due to the difficulties UKIP candidates caused the party on social media671. Labour 
were much further ahead, with Turner and Kahn recognising how Labour won over 
young voters by ‘[tweeting] more, posting more, and [sharing] more than all of its 
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rivals.’672 It shall be worth visiting why the Conservatives’ 2017 social media 
campaign was less successful than 2015’s. 
Labour’s usage of decentralised, networked, citizen-led social media campaigning, 
as Gibson identified673, which focused on the ability of social media to enable 
participation and campaign activists direct the campaign clearly paid dividends, 
compared to the other model of data- driven social media campaigning, as used by 
the Conservatives as well as Leave during the EU Campaign. Anstead identified how 
the Conservatives did this, analysing how data was gathered to target and mobilise 
voters674. Labour’s ability to utilise social media beyond a party extension 
demonstrated its viability as a mobilisation tool, although again social media is not a 
complete panacea, as to refer again to Mellon and Prosser, they argue that social 
media users (once controlled for age, gender and education) are not statistically 
different from non-social users on political attention, values or political behaviour675, 
even if without these they are actually less likely to vote, younger, and be better 
educated than non-users, as well as being more politically attentive. Furthermore, 
Vromen et al676 discuss how social media677 can be used to politically engage voters 
with formal politics, with overcoming young voters’ scepticism towards formal politics 
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being the challenge, as Henn and Foard highlight678. Vromen et al discuss that 
focusing on social media as a panacea for voter mobilisation and engagement is not 
optimal, with parties needing to assist young people in formal political 
participation679. Thus, Labour’s tying in external organisations followed this path, and 
the youth’s turn (and other demographics) to the side of Labour was beneficial. 
Therefore, I have demonstrated how Labour and other parties used social media to 
mobilise voters, and how Labour relatively succeeded in using social media to 
engage voters online as well as enabling them to participate in offline political 
activity.  
The Conservative’s 2017 social media messaging compared to their 2015 effort and 
Labour’s was not as well-developed, and contributed to their near-electoral defeat. 
As Cowley and Kavanagh state: ‘Conservative targeting [in 2017] appeared much 
less successful, whilst Labour enjoyed considerable success as a result of material 
shared peer to peer.680’ This demonstrates the Conservatives being less successful 
than 2015, and Labour doing somewhat better. Labour performing better concerning 
social media benefitted them and their voter-base, as ‘given the decline of press 
readership, especially amongst the young, the new forms of social media are a way 
for politicians to communicate with a group which has hitherto been difficult to 
reach’681.  
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Despite 2015’s lesson seemingly being that highly-targeted paid advertising worked 
best, and that organically-shared content by party supporters was less effective682, 
the inverse was apparently true for 2017. The 2017 Conservative digital team was 
less developed than 2015, with the two digital election gurus of Craig Elder and Tom 
Edmonds relying on a team recruited by Conservative HQ instead of bringing along 
their own team683. Additionally, the nature of the snap election damaged them, as ‘in 
2015, they had been able to draw upon at least 18 months of preparation… as well 
as building up data from emails and doorstep conversations. In 2017…almost none 
of the necessary preparatory work had been done. 684’   Furthermore, Corbyn had 
three times the followers as May on Facebook and Twitter685. This benefitted Labour 
and hampered the Conservatives, with such tools as Snapchat (as previously 
discussed) being utilised by Labour whilst being abandoned by the Conservatives, 
with Labour utilising Snap Ads as poll-reminders, and over 600,000 voters using 
Labour’s Snapchat polling station finder686. Despite this seemingly demonstrating 
that organic spread over social media was more advantageous than paid online 
campaigning, arguably, both  were complementary to one another, as Labour spent 
£35,000 on Facebook to add 230,000 followers to their page, with 220,000 joining 
organically, with over 23 million people seeing Labour’s Facebook page687. 
 Corbyn and Labour inspired a rush of anti-Conservative activity which developed 
more Labour trust and support than prior to the election. Klotz’s work can be built 
upon here, as Cameron effectively utilised the nascent political internet and social 





686 Ibid, p.308. 
687 Ibid, p.308-9. 
Chapter V: The EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election 
196 
 
media in the late 2000s with Web Cameron and Ask David in contrast to Brown’s 
clunky YouTube use, May’s and the Conservatives’ ineffective 2017 use of the 
Internet and social media paled in comparison to Labour’s 688. 
Another reason for worse Conservative performance compared to 2015 was the 
huge spread in anti-Conservative websites and social groups, such as The Canary, 
38 Degrees, and more, with Conservative campaigners lamenting that ‘we can’t go 
into another [election] relying on just the Taxpayer’s Alliance and the Countryside 
Alliance.689’ As such, this disadvantaged the Conservatives in a way not possible in 
2015, demonstrated by the number of stories shared criticising the Conservatives 
than those supporting them, with the most viral election piece being Labour-
supporting by a left-wing website690. As previously, the poor Conservative 
performance contrasted to previous years. In 2010, there was a strong Conservative 
youth wing, with the party mobilising grassroots digital campaigning, along with 
Facebook mobilisation and rallies691. This dwindled in 2015 and 2017, with 
Conservative grassroots mobilisation online reaching a nadir in 2017, with ‘a 
renewed focus on Cambridge-Analytica-style data-driven and highly 
centralised…targeted techniques’692, which although somewhat successful in 2015, 
suffered in contrast to Labour in 2017, especially with younger Conservatives 
rejecting the uninspiring Conservative campaigning online environment693.  
Moreover, as Sloam and Henn state: 
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…Labour… – particularly…Jeremy Corbyn – dominated a social 
media space where political information is well-trusted and 
relatively highly consumed by Britain’s… young…694 
Therefore, why Labour performed well and the Conservatives did not is evident. With 
unprecedented youth support for Labour and high levels of youth activism695, this 
benefitted Labour, especially with Ofcom’s research demonstrating that in the 65+ 
age group, fewer than 8% used any form of online or social media sites for news, 
with 40% of 16-24 year-olds finding news on social media.696 Additionally, only 9% of 
18-24 year-olds read print newspapers in contrast to 24% of all age groups and 40% 
of over 65s697, and with the two largest newspapers in circulation (and online) 
leaning towards the Conservatives, which benefitted them, as Philips 
demonstrates698. However, it should recognised social media is not the ultimate 
electoral mobilisation tool: as Elvestad and Philips argue, social media confirms pre-
existing biases rather persuading or informing699, with simple, emotive messages (as 
in the EU referendum) being the best way to utilise it700.  
However, the Conservative failure make traction with young voters or potential 
Labour defectors was evident, with a failure of messaging meaning that although 
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some of them had voted Leave in the EU referendum, ‘…they now found [in the 2017 
election] that they were being asked to support a government offering nothing 
more…than ‘strength and stability’.701‘ Along with the perceived uninspiring leader, 
campaign and manifesto of the Conservatives and May as contrasted to Corbyn, 
Labour and Labour’s manifesto which were seen as positive702 and Corbyn’s 
campaigning being perceived positively, Labour mobilised both online and offline and 
almost defeated the Conservatives. The Conservatives had forgotten their 2015 
lessons and their 2015 online strategy: as recorded by Elder and Edmonds in 2015: 
‘be where your audience is – and ignore the places they aren’t.’703 The 
Conservatives not doing this in 2017 regarding Snapchat and disregarding their 
campaign tools, along with their weak 2017 campaign, ensured that their social 
media and digital campaigning operation was far weaker in 2017. As Rhodes 
summarised704: 
‘A perfect storm of Corbyn’s unspun personality, honest 
approach…and non-mainstream message, a sense of 
establishment scepticism and waning backing for austerity 
measures…705 which was reflected in the Labour…manifesto, 
coupled with digital-media activism, an enthusiasm for movement-
led politics and a terrible campaign by the [Conservatives] also 
helped Labour. Momentum’s organisationally enabled 
campaigning suited this… and formulated…activist agency with 
their inclusive messaging and horizontally structured organising, 
which empowered individuals… to…make a (political) difference.’ 
                                                           
701 Philips, Angela (2019) p.94. 
702 Rhodes, Abi (2019) Movement-led Electoral Campaigning p.179. Political Communication in 
Britain: Campaigning, Media and Polling in the 2017 General Election (eds) Dominic Wring, Roger 
Mortimore, and Simon Atkinson, p.179. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
703 Cowley, Philip and Kavanagh, Dennis (2015) The British General Election of 2015. P.150. 
Palgrave, London. 
704 Rhodes, Abi (2019) Movement-led Electoral Campaigning p.183 Political Communication in Britain: 
Campaigning, Media and Polling in the 2017 General Election (eds) Dominic Wring, Roger Mortimore, 
and Simon Atkinson, p.183. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
705 Clery, E Curtice, J, and Harding, R (2016) British Social Attitudes: the 34th Report. London: NatCen 
Social Research. [Online] Located at: www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk and accessed 1st April 2019. 
Chapter V: The EU Referendum and the 2017 General Election 
199 
 
Thus, the Conservatives’ failure to address this along with the lack of a coherent 
message and a complacent campaign ensured that their social media campaigning 
would suffer. Although steps have been made to address this with a call for a 
Conservative version of Momentum706, the effect of this will remain to be seen. 
Clearly, however, a focus on policy as well as the popularity and perception of party 
leaders is vital for study of social media mobilisation, and if it is truly mobilising, as 
arguments have been made that Labour performed to higher expectations due to the 
election taking place when British voters were tiring of austerity, as Goes 
discusses707. However, the Labour social media campaign was more successful than 
the Conservatives’. However, the relatively new development of the TV debates as 
well as other  social media effects cannot be ignored, and thus it would be prudent to 
examine them. 
TV Debates, social media effects and demographics 
 
I shall look at the TV debates to discover if they had as big an impact as previous 
elections. I previously discussed the role that May’s reluctance to participate in the 
2017 leader debates as well as her subpar campaigning relative to Corbyn played in 
the election, but I will revisit them here. I will also examine voter demographics of the 




                                                           
706 Sloam, James and Henn, Matthew (2019) p.111. 
707 Goes, Eunice (2018) ‘Jez, We Can!’ Labour’s Campaign: Defeat with a Taste of Victory. 
Parliamentary affairs, Volume 71, Issue 1, March 2018. P.64. [Online] Located at: 
https://doi.org.10.1093/pa/gsx062 and accessed 1st July 2018. Located in: Goes, Eunice ‘Jez, We 
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Table V:  Attention paid to the debates during the 2017 TV election debates 
and other elements 
Waves: British Election Study – Wave 12 election survey used. 
Variable Yes No Don’t know 
Did you see or 
hear all or part 
of the Channel 





6.5 72.2 2.3 
Did you see or 





the five party 
leaders? 
12.1 45.4 2.6 
Did you see or 
hear all or part 




of the main 
parties? 
6.2 14.7 0.5 
Have you 
listened to or 
19.2 78.4 2.4 















31.5 64.1 1.1 
N: 31997    
 
Only 6.5% of the population watched the first debate, with 12.1% watching the five 
party leader debate. This is far less than for previous elections708709. According to the 
Hansard Society, debates or interviews with party leaders or other politicians were 
the most important source of information in deciding whether and who to vote for710, 
with 74% agreeing that they were the most important with only 25% being reached 
by them, so although less people watched the debates as previously, their 
significance was clear. 69% agreed (and were reached by) news programmes were 
the most important711. 72% thought that discussions and conversations with people 
were the most important, while 50% viewed social media discussions in this way with 
21% being reached by them, showing that old media methods (as well as personal 
                                                           
708 See the previous chapter, especially BES Wave 5 data. 
709 See chapter II. 
710 Hansard Society (2018) Audit of Political Engagement 15 p.25 [Online] Located at: 
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discussions) were important in engaging people politically in elections. Interestingly, 
political activity by parties was 46% for importance on only 17% reach, 
demonstrating the validity of Labour’s social media campaign by facilitating offline 
participation and a less paternalistic approach712. Thus, although the debates were 
not viewed by many people, discussion about them and their perceived importance 
dominated.  Interestingly, although leaflets as seen above and in the previous 
chapters were the most prevalent way of party contact and mobilisation, only 34% 
stated they were important in their voting decision, the lowest score for importance, 
questioning their effectiveness, even if they raise awareness713. Other forms of 
online political engagement should be discussed as well. Theresa May however did 
not participate in the debates fully or at all, but please revisit the theory chapter for 
further discussion on this and political leadership. 
 
48% stated that they had done no online political engagement during the last year714, 
while 29% had watched politically related online content, with only 19% visiting 
political websites or social media accounts, and only 12% stated they followed a 
politician or political party on social media715. Only 17% said they had shared 
something politically related on social media, which is significant if compared to 
2015, which were less than this, demonstrating social media’s viability as a political 
communication and engagement tool had matured716. Furthermore, looking at the 
age breakdown,  targeting youth on social media was viable, even its effectiveness 
may be questioned, as Vromen et al argued. 
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Quoting again from Hansard, age is significant in determining political activity online, 
as 43% of 18-34 year-olds watched politically related videos online in the 2017 
election compared to 15% of 55+s717. Furthermore, 29% of 18-34 year-olds visited 
the social media account of a politician or political party compared to 12% of those 
aged 55+718, showing how social media youth targeting by political parties was 
viable, and less so for older voters. This is reinforced by 63% of politically interested 
18-34s have watched online political content, compared to 20% of over 55s. This 
could argue social media mobilisation only works with those already politically 
interested, as Bouillane argued719. However, 55% think that social media broadens 
political debate by giving a voice to people who would not normally take part, and 
40% think that social media breaks down barriers between voters, politicians, and 
political parties, showing social media’s potential. Furthermore, the youth seem more 
interested in social media campaigns than older voters, despite misgivings regarding 
social media’s effectiveness providing nuanced views and political engagement720.  
 
On the youthquake, many commentators surmised that the election result came 
about due to large youth turnout, with one post-election poll suggesting youth turnout 
(18-24 year olds) increased by 16%721. However, as Prosser et al discovered, there 
was no evidence of a youth surge, with turnout in the youngest age group actually 
                                                           
717 Hansard (2018) pp.27-28. 
718 Ibid P.29. 
719 Boulianne, Shelley (2009) Does Internet Use Affect Engagement? A MetaAnalysis of Research, 
political Communication, 26:2, pp.193-211 [Online] Located at :10.1080/10584600902854363 and 
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720 Hansard (2018) p.30. 
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being lower in 2017 than 2015722. Also, there was not a large youth turnout, but 
instead ‘Labour’s share of the vote increased.. [but] this is not the same as a surge in 
youth turnout. Labour was more popular amongst younger voters in 2015 and 
Labour’s popularity increased amongst all except [for the] 70+’723. Thus, Labour 
gained a higher youth vote proportion, but there was not a higher general youth 
turnout, although there was a 2.5% increase in turnout overall%.  
 
As McKibbin demonstrates, Labour and Conservative demographics were in flux724: 
[Labour] swings [were] strongest in socially mixed ‘wealthier’ 
seats…social class is only one [variable]. Labour is...the party of 
the educated man –even more the educated woman – as it is of 
the working man. Labour lost…several…working class and ‘poor’ 
constituencies to… Tories… [some] of these areas were former 
mining seats and once Labour’s heartland, which…voted 
Leave….Where industry and unions once tied people to Labour… 
these are gone, leaving voters only with…socially conservative 
and insular culture to shape their politics. 
 
Thus, ‘traditional’ Labour areas were lost somewhat to the Conservatives, while they 
gained such seats as Kensington, Canterbury and towns such as Plymouth, 
demonstrating how Labour’s vote was typified by the younger, wealthier urban voter, 
while the Conservatives were typified by poor, socially conservative towns and 
suburbs which typically voted Leave. Jackson argues that Labour’s success came 
about partly from a radical manifesto, which attracted younger voters alienated by 
                                                           
722 Prosser, Chris, Fieldhouse, Ed, Green, Jane, Mellon, Jonathan, Mellon, and Evans, Geoff (2018) 
The Myth of the 2017 youthquake election British Election Study. 29 January. [Online] Located at: 
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1uUk and accessed 6th April 2018. 
723 Ibid. 
724 McKibbin, Ross (2017) In the Shadow of the Referendums The Political Quarterly Volume 88, 
Issue 3, July-September 2017, pp.382-285 [Online] Located at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-
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the Conservative stance on Brexit725. Also, according to Jennings and Stoker, 
Labour increased its vote in constituencies with a higher share of ‘precariat’ and 
emerging social workers while the Conservatives increased in less populated towns, 
rural areas, and less diverse, older populations726. To quote further727: 
 
…Brexit support was associated with an [increased] Conservative vote 
and a decrease in the Labour vote between 2005 and 2017. The 
coefficient...is twice as large for Labour, indicating a stronger 
relationship between the forces that underpinned Brexit and long-term 
change in Labour’s vote. 
 
Thus, Labour’s relative success (with areas of no qualifications, graduates, white 
Britons and younger voters)728 was by appealing more heavily to these areas with a 
strong manifesto and the Conservative stance on Brexit, as well as Labour’s 
ambiguous Brexit strategy. Although this divide was not brought into existence as a 
result of the EU vote, it highlighted it729: 
 
…Over the past decade Labour support has been gradually getting 
younger, more well educated, and more ‘liberal’….voters moving to 
both the Conservatives and non-voting in 2017 from Labour voting in 
2005 are more authoritarian… than those who remained Labour voters 
(and gained ones between 2005 and 2017)…This process…seems to 
be have [been heightened] through the EU Referendum… 
 
Thus, Labour’s social media focus makes sense, as well as utilising the membership 
to mobilise voters, while the Conservatives’ embracing of Brexit and more socially 
                                                           
725 Jackson, Ben (2017) Commentary: The Politics of the Labour Manifesto. The Political Quarterly, 
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conservative policies730 assisted in gaining ground elsewhere, although as Heath 
and Goodwin discussed, this backfired against the Conservatives in seats such as 
Canterbury and some London seats731, although they also found that heavy Brexit-
voting areas had very positive effects on Conservative vote-share, as well as areas 
which had a heavy UKIP vote-fall732. However, only in extremely heavy Leave areas 
did the Conservatives performed much better than Labour, with Labour doing well 
nationally and the Conservatives making progress in Leave areas but performing 
badly in Remain areas733. Labour was assisted by the lack of focus on Brexit during 
the campaign to quote Whiteley et al’s argument.734  
 
Goes discusses other electoral influences: 
 
Voters who are more [politically] interested or knowledgeable…tend to 
be more ideological or policy-orientated whilst less aware voters…are 
[leader] influenced735… when political parties offer genuine choice to 
voters (such as this election)…ideological position questions become 
more important whereas…party leader reputations and their stances on 
the issues…become less important736… Labour’s surge and the 
noticeable decline in the voteshare of the smaller parties…suggests 
the ideological positioning of the main parties influences voting 
behaviour. 
 
                                                           
730 As well as somewhat of an economic nationalist tone from their manifesto 
731 Heath, Oliver and Goodwin, Matthew (2017) The 2017 General Election, Brexit and the Return to 
Two-Party Politics: An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result The Political Quarterly, July-September 
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accessed 5th August 2017. 
732 Ibid. 
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Support Among Leave and Remain Voters. LSE Brexit. 6th June. [Online] Located at 
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675 
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Thus, voters who are politically aware are more ideological and policy-focused while 
those less interested are leader-influenced. However, in times of genuine political 
choice, as Curtice describes 2017 as being post-referendum737, and corroborated by 
Curtice and Simpson, who found that voters in the election who thought that there 
was a great deal of difference between the parties was 45%738, party leader 
reputations decreased, and this with party ideologies contributed to the main parties’ 
vote-share, as Curtice describes739:  
Social conservatives swung towards… Conservatives, social 
liberals were attracted towards Labour –a process that [explains] 
why neither the party of social conservatism, UKIP, nor that of 
social liberalism, the Liberal Democrats, [electorally] prospered… 
 
Their manifestos and the electoral backdrop meant that the two main parties would 
gain the majority vote-share. However, although there was a very slight turnout 
increase, this did not benefit Labour especially, as Curtice and Simpson explain: 
This development [more likeliness to vote]…had relatively little to do 
with…the appeal of Labour’s campaign…. Most of the increased 
turnout amongst the youngest cohort…was [evident] in the 2015 
election, and… the 2016 referendum. [2017] witnessed…the 
continuation [of that]. There is little evidence Labour…benefitted from 
the increased turnout...Labour would be unwise to presume that 
winning over the previously disengaged will ensure [future] [victory]. 
 
 
Labour must  mobilise existing voters more to win, and the Conservatives must up 
their campaigning and mobilisation efforts to overcome limitations of their smaller, 
older membership, as Bale argues740.  
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As was seen from Goes, voters with varying political knowledge have different 
motivations. Those more politically knowledgeable are policy-concerned, and those 
with less are leader-concerned. Dorey741 discusses how Corbyn’s popularity rose 
during the campaign, with May’s reputation suffering, and Parry742 described 
Corbyn’s seemingly more ‘accessible’ nature and his campaign, which arguably 
contributed to his support amongst those less politically aware, which when 
combined with Labour’s well-received manifesto, could explain the high Labour vote. 
Thus, utilising social media and satellite campaigns (as Vaccari and Valeriani 
argue743, enables ‘digital foot soldiers and allow existing members to expand their 
repertoires’) mobilised supporters and the political, but is ineffective at mobilising the 
unengaged. If demographic details from Hansard744 are analysed, mobilisation 
details are clear: 
 
Table VI: Demographics of the 2017 vote 
Hansard Audit of Political Engagement 15 
Age/certainty 
to vote 
18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75+ 
44% 49% 55% 69% 68% 75% 76% 
Interest in 
politics 
41% 49% 53% 64% 65% 62% 62% 
                                                           
http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/29374/10/UKElectionAnalysis2017-Thorsen-Jackson-and-
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of politics (a 
fair amount 
at least) 









41% 34% 36% 37% 30% 33% 29% 
Social Class demographics 




certain – 10/10) 





81% 63% 36% 43% 
Knowledge of 
politics (knows 
at least a fair 
amount) 





36% 31% 22% 25% 






39% 34% 25% 37% 
Remain and Leave  
Variable Remain Leave 
Certain to vote 75% 71% 
Interest in politics 72% 60% 
Knowledge of politics 
(knows at least a fair 
amount) 
67% 54% 
Satisfaction with present 
system of governing 
28% 32% 




The older the voter, the more likely they vote, the higher their political interest and 
knowledge, and the more they’re satisfied with the system745. Thus it is evident why 
older voters vote more, raising issues about Labour’s social media focus. Moving 
onto social demographics, the higher the class, the higher the vote, and although AB 
voters are the most politically interested, DE are more interested than C2, which is 
interesting, and is worth exploring in future . Finally, looking at Remain and Leave 
demographics, Remain is more certain to vote, has higher interest and knowledge of 
politics, and feels that getting involved is effective. However, Leave is more satisfied 
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I reviewed the EU Referendum and the 2017 election.. I also focussed on the Labour 
and the Conservatives conflict, as they were the most significant parties. With 
Labour’s usage of social media and looser membership structures to boost activism, 
as discussed by Chadwick and Stromer-Galley746, as well as the emergence of 
Momentum which advocated digital activism and politicisation, Labour was well 
positioned. In regards to the EU Referendum, Leave having a greater social media 
and Internet targeting campaign and a stronger campaign resulted in voter 
mobilisation and Leave winning. By focussing on salient issues such as the 
immigration and the NHS, mobilisation occurred, and using elements such as 
Instagram and apps also worked. Positive engagements and a coherent, confident 
message defeated Remain and ensured high turnout, with the older voters who 
favoured Leave heavily turning out.  
 
In 2017, Labour excelled at voter-contact. Social media’s importance necessitated 
parties to efficiently utilise it, and although the Conservatives ran an effective data-
driven campaign in 2015, Labour’s social media campaign, their large membership, 
and their effective usage of Corbyn and the Labour manifesto ensured strength.. 
Labour’s effective use of online campaigns and a decentralised networked 
membership campaign which disseminated information and discussion of relevant 
points demonstrated their viability, and coupled with popular policies and an 
energised leader, Labour nearly won. The Conservatives suffered from a lack of 
social media engagement, neglecting the tactics that had brought them relative 
success in 2010 and victory in 2015. Although initial fears that new Labour members 
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would not actively campaign proved false 747, Labour’s failure to win outright and 
mobilise enough supporters demonstrates Labour’s inability to mobilise voters and 
the young, querying how much the youth can be mobilised .However, the 
Conservatives were hampered by their small membership, their Brexit policy, and 
their leader, with all of these impacting negatively on mobilisation and voter-contact, 
resulting in difficulties for both parties. The smaller parties will struggle until the two 
parties adopt similar policies, and the stakes are perceived as less high. The TV 
debates were not seen as many people in 2017, but the conversations it inspired 
ensured that they remained good for mobilisation. Labour was assisted by receiving 
the votes of many educated and wealthy individuals, but their youth support 
hampered them as they vote far less.  
 
British politics is in flux but social media’s viability to exercise previously existing 
voters is demonstrable. How to mobilise non-voters is unclear, as well as how the 
main two parties will escape their rut and effectively appeal to other voters. The 
focus is seemingly on how to replicate successes such as Momentum’s campaign in 
the election, and with peer-to-peer, organic social media campaigns being the most 
effective, how the other parties react to this will be the key question in British politics 
over the next electoral cycles. The Conservative social media campaign suffered 
from their highs of 2015, and the party must analyse how and where it went wrong, 
with difficult questions to answer on policy, leadership, and representation.
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The thesis focus has been the evolution of campaigning, from the TV debates’ 
introduction to the Internet’s and social media’s impact. Examining the two 
hypotheses posed in the introduction again: 
 
H1: Young voters have increased turnout since 2010. 
H2: British political parties  have become more adept at using the 
Internet and social media to influence election results and voter turnout.  
H1 was somewhat correct. Young voters have turned out more since 2010, with 44% 
in 2010, 75% for the Scottish referendum, 43% in 2015, around 60% for the EU 
Referendum, and although if the young are counted as 18-24, their turnout was 
initially reported as incredibly high in 2017 with reports of 16% turnout boost, but in 
fact youth turnout flatlined in 2017748. Although Corbyn and Labour performed well in 
2017, gaining an enormous swing of the already-voting young, they did not mobilise 
new voters to vote for Labour or even to vote, with turnout barely increasing to 69%. 
Looking at the literature, Gibson et al argue that relying on the Internet will lead to a 
narrowing of politically-engaged citizens by reinforcing existing engagement levels, 
locking out potential voters749. The paper stems from 2005, so before the social 
networks, but it still acts as a warning to not over-rely on the Internet and social 
media to attract young voters, and that any online mobilisation must occur with a 
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change in Parliamentary politics otherwise existing participation patterns will  be 
reinforced, as Lusoli et al discussed in 2005750. Corbyn’s Labour arguably attempted 
this during the election and with the satellite campaigns such as Momentum. Thus, 
youth turnout remained more or less static by 2017, having fluctuated throughout the 
seven years, and more work should continue to see the ultimate youth turnout trend. 
 
H2 was correct for some political parties. From the slow starts and blogs of 2010 to 
the Conservatives’ micro-targeting campaign in 2015 to the Snapchat and 
Momentum satellite campaigns in 2017, online and social media use evolved 
enormously. Although the exciting element about 2010 was the TV debates which 
shook up the election and engaged people, 2015 defined them less, instead largely 
featuring the Conservative micro-targeting and their enormous social media budget, 
which was the first time that a British political party had utilised the Internet’s 
potential, with the Conservatives winning, although whether Labour could have 
challenged this is debated. However, Labour’s innovative use of social media to 
mobilise and contact voters was inspired, and resulted in 2017 being hailed as the 
first social media election. It is arguable whether Labour’s social media campaign 
contributed to their better-than-expected showing, and to what extent Corbyn himself 
was responsible for Labour’s rise. I will conclude that some political parties were 
adept at social media, with the Conservatives not developing beyond 2015, Labour 
adopting an inspiring, informal and dialogic campaigning atmosphere, and the other 
parties not managing to be impactful. Thus, the next general election will show if the 
political parties have learned the lessons of the past, and whether their contacting 
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and mobilising efforts will be online-focused, for the benefits that will bring, or 
whether the old methods of leafleting, face to face meetings and so on will continue 
to be the main methods. Labour is best-placed to prosper with their large 
membership and satellite campaigns, which are weapons that the other parties do 
not have. Political parties still have to tackle the salient issues be it the NHS, 
defence, the economy or other issues, regardless of the strength of feeling on social 
media and what was expected to happen, as occurred to Labour in 2015. 
With all of these in mind, it is worth revisiting Kent and Taylor’s five strategies. This 
shall only be brief, as using them as the basis of an entire thesis or piece of work 
would necessitate a radical reordering of the thesis, and Beverley illustrates how 
large public-scale institutions such as universities use Kent and Taylor’s five 
strategies, demonstrating the viability of using them for this purpose751. However, 
discussing their usefulness will add an interesting bookend to some of the 
discussions in the thesis. When quoted earlier, they were used for the purpose of 
further expansion of a particular point, but they are important in the field. To quote 
earlier: 
 
“Kent and Taylor’s five strategies in building, maintaining and 
developing dialogic online relationships of building a loop, relaying 
useful information, ensuring return visits, ensuring interface 
intuitiveness and ensuring visitor conservation by creating an 
uncluttered web format752”  
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Thus, greater analysis is needed regarding Kent and Taylor, as there is excellent 
scope for this analysis. In particular, analysing the extent to which the 2016 EU 
Referendum and the 2017 General Election social media campaigns (particularly 
Labour and Momentum’s apps and web campaigns)  reflected the five strategies, 
and to what extent they truly were dialogic and engaging, revealing more of how 
mobilising those elements were. However, that will be discussed in a future paper, 
and although recognising their importance is vital, exploring the mobilising effects of 
social media and the Internet in regards to these case studies needs to be tackled. 
 
The extent to which social media and the Internet can be a true panacea to low 
political activism is key to this topic. The findings of the case studies tells different 
conclusions and further potential exploration about how political parties in Britain 
mobilise their supporters.  
In 2010, it was found that the TV debates did impact the election, inspiring new 
confidence in leadership due to Clegg while demonstrating that perceptions still have 
on electoral success: the Liberal Democrats and Clegg were not seen as credible or 
potential to lead the country, and although there was some evidence of online 
mobilisation with voters communicating to each other via social media about political 
issues, particularly concerning Clegg, social media and online methods were not 
properly utilised by the parties yet, with although a strong Conservative network in 
existence, not utilised to the extent it could have been. Leaflets and traditional 
methods of contacting remained the most popular voter contacting method, and 
future elections and referendums would pave the way for a dialogic social media 
presence. Blogs and experiments such as WebCameron were the main online tools 




how future referendums and elections would build upon 2010 would remain to be 
seen. 
 
 Looking at the Scottish 2014 referendum, it will be worth analysing in future work the 
effect political leadership and political rhetoric had on the result, as this is an 
important area of study. Also, the referendum saw political yet irreverent social 
media and social groupings which although again were political, were not formally 
linked to the main parties. The different motivators behind the Yes and No voters (as 
seen in the relevant chapter) also bear examination further, but the further evolution 
of how social media and online mobilisation occurred in British politics, feeding into 
2015 and beyond, was fascinating, and although 2014 demonstrated that a 
campaign could not be won by relying on online mobilisation and social media alone, 
instead also needing to win on the dominant political issues as well, it could result in 
remarkable effects. 
 
2015 was a surprise Conservative victory. Although Labour had attempted a peer-to-
peer networking social media movement (Twitter especially) in an attempt to 
mobilise and engage its core vote, social media’s tendency to only mobilise and 
engage those already political ensured that this tactic would not work, along with the 
fact that the Conservatives used micro-targeting on Facebook in conjunction with 
traditional voter contacting and dominance of the main issues, resulting in a Labour 
defeat. As such, micro-targeting, strong messaging, and a dominance of the issues 
mobilised and engaged voters to vote Conservative. Of particular note for future 
study is Endres and Kelly’s work on microtargeting, which identifies (although in a 




more likely to be so, due to their longer voting history and political nature753. Hersh’s 
work on microtargeting and campaign perception of voters is also of note, due to the 
exploration of how parties mobilise and engage supporters754. In future, examination 
of the leaders during the 2015 election would be excellent, as although the 2010 and 
2017 election analysis touched upon these, there is scope for exploration about the 
leader effect on 2015, in particular concerning the effect Clegg, Miliband, Farage and 
Cameron had on their parties and how their presence mobilised and engaged voters. 
Sparks of the irreverent yet political social media movements that were initially seen 
in 2010 with Clegg and 2014 to a greater degree with independence-linked social 
movements were seen with the Milifandom movement, but Labour’s mobilisation of 
voters and their supporters was not done to the same extent as the Conservatives, 
and the Conservatives’ exploitation of their Liberal Democrat coalition partners 
ensured that they would gain a majority. However, lessons learned during this 
election would carry on to the next election and referendum.  
 
The 2016 referendum saw another evolution in political campaigning. Although far 
more work can be done regarding the effects concerning the mobilisation and 
engagement of voters during the election, and more work has been done on this by 
others, the main issue that can be taken away from this is that the Leave campaign 
had a far more positive, engaging message than Remain, and it dominated the main 
issues of the NHS, immigration, and sovereignty far more effectively than Remain 
did. With Leave possessing good messaging online and the incoherency from 
Remain, as well as Remain’s inability to counter the arguments from Leave, Leave 
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won. Leave’s gaining of those who did not care too much about risk was important to 
their victory. The tendency of the older generations to vote more than the younger 
ones also helped Leave’s victory, as older voters are more likely to vote Leave, and 
with younger voters leaning heavily towards Remain, this hampered Remain 
somewhat. Furthermore, the fact that the two campaigns were rather self-
segregating on social media ensured that Remain’s message would not get over on 
social media to possible supporters also is significant. Finally, it seemed that in 2016 
the dominant media narrative that favoured Leave was still important, as the majority 
of the media’s narrative and issues was friendly to Leave and did not help the 
Remain side gain traction. However, although claims have been made that bots were 
important to the result, care must be taken to not put this as the sole reason why 
Remain lost. As such, the social media mobilisation of Leave, the friendly 
demographic to Leave, the fact that Leave voters tended to vote more, and the 
media message ensured that Leave would win. The mobilisation and engagement of 
voters in 2016 was higher than in any previous referendum however at 72% turnout, 
indicating that if an electoral poll is viewed as significant, then there will be a 
corresponding response. In future, again leadership could be looked at, in particular 
the extent to which the various campaign and party leaders had on the referendum 
result. 
 
The 2017 general election signified a further evolution in how political parties 
mobilised and engaged their supporters in Britain. As already stated in the chapter, 
Labour’s usage of peer-to-peer, organically shared networks on social media and 
with their large membership and campaigning groups ensured a near defeat for the 




poor policies, poor campaigning from May resulted in a reverse of what occurred in 
2015. As discussed, the usage of satellite campaigns by Labour in the form of 
Momentum and the apps used by this, for example My Nearest Marginal, connected 
social media with offline political mobilisation, which although the disengaged and 
demobilised were still not truly engaged, with turnout decreasing from the EU 
referendum and increasing slightly from the 2015 election to 69%, demonstrated that 
Labour’s development and usage of social media campaigns and methods were 
somewhat efficient at actually mobilising the Labour support network and Labour 
voters. As such, Stromer-Galley and Chadwick’s analysis deserves further analysis 
regarding this, and any work that develops on this thesis would do well to regard 
them. Of course, the extent to which social media can mobilise voters and engage 
voters is to be questioned as a result of this, because although Labour had the 
superior social and digital media campaign, they did not win, as the Conservatives 
held superior numbers on the key issues of the election and of the leadership, which 
although Corbyn improved immeasurably over the course of the campaign, still did 
not beat May. Thus, how the political parties mobilise and engage their supporters 
off and online in the future shall remain to be seen, but Labour’s tactics deserve 
further study and analysis, as well as how likely voters are to change their minds 
over the course of election campaigns, as this will be key to analysing how elections 
are fought and how voters are mobilised. The nature of the effect policies have on 
party campaigns and mobilisation tactics has been studied in the context of the 
studied elections, especially 2017, but a policy-focused analysis would be viable. 
 
To summarise, this thesis concludes that political parties mobilised and engaged 




such as television debates, social media, microtargeting, satellite campaigns, apps, 
and many more. The thesis summarises and explores over time how parties did this. 
Drawing upon works such as the BES, the Nuffield Election series, thinkers such as 
Curtice, Bang, and more, and commenting on the divide between peer-to-peer and 
microtargeting social media campaigns, the thesis has made a wide-ranging and 
quality contribution to the field of democratic participation and mobilisation theory.  
 
The hypotheses were somewhat correct, and further analysis will hopefully reveal 
the motivations behind the young in Britain tending not to vote and how political 
parties mobilise and engage their supporters. The youthquake as well as 2017 
deserves further analysis, which will be done over time.. To revisit Keating and Melis: 
‘This generation of youth may therefore be the first generation to reflect the 
mobilising potential of social media and the Internet in general…755’  Although 
political parties should not rely on social media and the Internet to solve mobilisation 
issues, a time may come in the future when social media and the Internet can be 
used to their fullest extent. Thus, Bang, Marsh and Akram, who discuss the ‘lived’ 
experience of politics and Rubin’s identification of how young people are politicised 
with reactions to everyday experiences demonstrate how youth experience of social 
media and the Internet, growing by the day, and epochal events such as elections 
and referendums, will mobilise and engage voters as appropriate. Early on, parties 
were close to understanding it, even if parties ultimately backed away from their 
potential, such as Lawrence discussing WebCameron, a video blog set up by 
Cameron in 2006, and how its more interactive and dialogic elements were gradually 
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shut down by the party756.  Of course, as some are not mobilised by social media, as 
Keating and Avril again state757, so again political parties must take social media as 
just one part of mobilisation and political engagement, as once again Keating and 
Avril identify: ‘Political, educational and cultural solutions [are needed] to this 
problem, and not just a technical one758.’ However, as Theocharis and Quintelier 
identify759, friends and family posting links or expressing political opinions can trigger 
political interest, and non-political online activity can lead to political activity. So 
although social media and the Internet are not the ultimate solution for formal 
political disengagement, they can very much assist in one part in solving that issue. 
These authors should be analysed more in future works, along with closer 
examination of what exactly mobilises voters, especially the young.  
Future speculation 
 
There is  future discussion potential: for example, Scotland actually had a decreased 
level of turnout from the Scottish referendum760, with one of the lowest turnouts for 
the EU and 2017 election campaigns, which hugely damaged the SNP seat total and 
enabled Conservative government, raising questions of what would have happened 
if Scotland had kept their 85% Scottish referendum turnout. I also would have liked 
to discuss voter registration further, as I feel that the new voter registration system 
from 2014 would be excellent in analysing youth registration and engagement, as the 
current system could be arguably discriminatory against them. Multi-annual 
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quantitative analyses would be the best way to analyse this, so there is future 
potential. Utilising resources such as the British Household Survey, a dataset which 
has followed the same representative of thousands of households since 1991, in any 
future work may help to complement future work, as I did not include it in this thesis 
due to brevity and all the information that I needed to access being available with the 
BES dataset. Furthermore, the EU Referendum has far more analytical possibility, 
and there is far more to analyse regarding voter mobilisation, contact, issue salience 
and issue mobilisation than I could get into, so a further analysis at the various 
issues, demographic driving forces, turnout and mobilisation methods would be 
rewarding. The referendum was significant in British history, and further analysis of it 
is necessary to determine what can be learned from it and how it currently affects 
Britain and beyond. 
 
Additionally, I analysed the effects of the leader on electoral turnout, mobilisation and 
contact, but there is more room for analysis. Milazzo and Hammond discussed how 
leader personalisation in British campaigns on leaflets can influence the result761, 
which although used in the thesis, could be the basis of further leadership analysis in 
a future thesis or paper, and thus bears closer examination.  Schumacher and 
Giger762 discuss the extent to which leadership-dominated parties change, which in 
the era of Corbynism being so dominant and May being less so, will become more 
important. Corbyn’s politics and leadership of Labour needs more academic 
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analysis, and Crines et al’s work on how Labour and Corbyn763 have interacted with 
one another is fascinating, as it has consequences for how the party relates to and 
motivates the public, making studying Corbyn’s leadership essential.  I also feel that 
work on Voter Advice Applications and their mobilisation of supporters will be useful, 
building upon Wall et al’s workl764, as they directly tap into digital communication and 
potential mobilisation. It will also be worth carrying out a comparison of other 
countries to see how political parties internationally have mobilised and contacted 
supporters, so for example analysing and comparing Trump’s successful presidential 
election to Corbyn’s almost-victory in 2017, both unexpected, and their similarities  
deserve analysing, even if Corbyn ‘and Trump’s politics are completely opposed. A 
comparison of how voters have been mobilised through the ages by different 
methods, perhaps by building upon Lawrence’s Electing Our Masters, and using it to 
analyse voter mobilisation. It could be considered that social media and the Internet 
are just the resurrection of the local meeting as popularised in the 19th century and 
killed off by the television age, as discussed by Lawrence765, but again future 
analysis will explore this. Rainsford, who specialises in analysing youth politics and 
youth engagement, will be of interest as well, and so any future analysis will take her 
work into account. Aldrich, Gibson, Cantijoch and Konitzer’s766work on electronic 
                                                           
763 Crines, Andrew Scott, Jeffery David and Heppell, Timothy (2018) The British Labour Party and 
leadership election mandate(s) of Jeremy Corbyn: patterns of opinion and opposition within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties Volume 28, Number 3, 
August 2018 pp.361-380 
764 Wall, Matthew, Krouwel, Andre and Vitelio, Thomas (2012) Do voters follow the recommendations of voter 
advice application websites? A study of the effects of kieskompas.nl on its users vote choice in the 2010 Dutch 
Legislative Elections. Party Politics, Volume 20, Issue 3, pp.416-428. March 7. [Online] Located at: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811436054 and accessed on 6th August 2018. 
765 Lawrence, Jon (2009) Electing Our Masters. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
766 Alrich,John H, Gibson, K Rachel, Cantijoch, Marta and Konitzer, Tobias (2016) Getting Out the 
vote in the social medie era: Are digital tools changing the way extent, nature and impact of party 




party contacting in elections will also be utilised more in future analysis, as their work 




Throughout this thesis, I looked at three general elections and two referendums. I 
found that as British politics and parties evolve, they are sometimes slow at keeping 
up with technology, but generally at least one  party will utilise new methods. It will 
remain to be seen if other political parties manage to successfully utilise social media 
to Labour’s extent, and if anyone can come up with an answer to the young’s refusal 
to politically engage and vote. The next election will present new opportunities, and 
whether other parties can match Labour’s social media focus, or if it is advisable for 
them to do so will be future work. Although politicians in the early 1950s welcomed 
the television age as 767‘[they] were quite pleased to see the back of the 
‘unconvinced spectator’ who was more interested in frivolity and entertainment than 
political argument’ as Lawrence  discusses, social media’s potential, especially with 
irreverent, informal yet political groups such as what occurred in 2014 and 2017, has 
opened up British politics again to the ‘unconvinced spectator’, and political parties 
and politicians must be prepared to deal with political ‘frivolity and entertainment’, 
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